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Abstract 
This dissertation examines Canadian Jewish thought from the Nazi period through to the 
immediate postwar era regarding the Nazis’ persecution and murder of European Jewry.  It 
challenges the widely accepted position that Canadian Jews were indifferent to the Holocaust 
until the Six Day War of 1967, when survivors of Hitler’s extermination program pushed the 
Holocaust onto the Canadian Jewish community’s agenda in order to counter the threat of 
rising antisemitism. The evidence produced here demonstrates that Canadian Jews’ wartime 
experience of learning about the systematic slaughter of their brethren in Europe and of 
witnessing the democratic world’s unrelenting indifference to the plight of Jewish refugees 
ensured that the Holocaust was a central component of Jewish life in Canada in the 
immediate postwar era.  Rather than the Cold War climate compelling Canadian Jews to 
suppress their memories of the Holocaust, as is commonly argued, this thesis shows that 
ongoing concerns over the security of Jews, the ineffectiveness of the UN, and the rise of 
antisemitism in Europe and the Middle East propelled Canadian Jews to raise the spectre of 
the Holocaust.  They organized desperate campaigns to create international safeguards for 
minority groups and worked to strengthen Israel diplomatically and militarily in order to 
counter future threats of genocide from a position of strength.  While the Holocaust remained 
a central feature of Jewish life throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Holocaust memory proved to 
be a divisive force amongst Canadian Jews since they often interpreted the Holocaust along 
ideological lines. The established liberal sector of the Canadian Jewish community bemoaned 
the ineffectualness of international law and adopted increasingly realist positions to counter 
the threat of Soviet and Arab antisemitism.  The communist wing of the Canadian Jewish 
  iv 
community was less inclined to trust liberal democracies to safeguard Jewish rights, 
especially during the German rearmament debate of the early 1950s. However, with growing 
evidence that showed that antisemitism was motivating the Soviet Union to collude with the 
Arabs to destroy Israel, most Canadian Jews became disenchanted by communism. 
Therefore, this dissertation alters the perception of the postwar Canadian Jewish community 
from one in which they were focused squarely on domestic issues, such as social mobility 
and fighting discrimination, to one in which memory of the Holocaust kept Canadian Jews 
focused on the tribulations facing Jews around the world.   
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Introduction 
The memorialization of the Holocaust became integral to Canadian Jewish life even before 
the Nazis had been stopped in their campaign to destroy European Jewry.  As early as 1942, 
the Montreal Council of Orthodox Rabbis
1
 declared December 2, 1942 a national day of 
mourning for Orthodox Jews, the largest denomination of Judaism in Canada, in order to 
comply with the edicts of the Chief Rabbi of Palestine and the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of 
the United States and Canada.  On the radio, Canadian M.P. Leon D. Crestohl, President of 
the Montreal Jewish Community Council
2
, read Canadian Chief Rabbi Hersh Cohen’s order 
for mourning: “Hitler and his Nazi hordes are determined to annihilate the Jewish people in 
Europe.  Authentic reports have reached us of the horrible, merciless and cold-blooded 
slaughter of over a million Jews in Poland.  Israel therefore mourns the death of its martyred, 
innocent children, victims of Nazi brutality.”  After specifying that Jews were to set aside 
work and entertainment to spend the day in prayer and attend Yiskor services, which every 
Orthodox synagogue was required to provide, Crestohl read a prayer for those trapped in 
Europe: “we pray that the Almighty may have mercy upon such of our brethren as are given 
to suffering, and exposed to danger or captivity, whether they abide on the sea or on the land, 
and may they be delivered from anguish to redemption, from darkness unto light  and from 
slavery unto liberty; and may the arms of our sovereign the king, together with his allies, be 
blessed with a speedy victory, and bring deliverance to all the peoples of the world.  Amen.”3 
                                                     
1
 Also identified as Vaad Haradonim. 
2
 Also identified as Vaad Ho’ir. 
3
 “Proclamation,” 1942, in LAC, Leon D. Crestohl fonds, MG32-C24, M-5224, file “Speeches cont.—Memorial 
Service, 1944.” 
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By 1945, the Rabbinical Council of Montreal moved the day of mourning to March 
14 in accordance with proclamations issued by the Chief Rabbi of Palestine and the Chief 
Rabbi of the British Empire.  Again Cohen called upon Crestohl to issue the proclamation 
over radio on CFCF:  
Hitler and his Nazi hordes were grimly determined to annihilate the Jewish 
People in Europe. For five years they relentlessly pursued their diabolic 
destruction.  The extent of their achievements has now been bared with the 
liberation of the conquered countries….The sad and heart-rending facts are 
now known.  Completely destroyed are the great Jewish centres of Life and 
Learning in the whole of Continental Europe. Five million of our brethren, 
young and old, have been mercilessly massacred in cold blood,--destroyed in 
lethal gas chambers,--and consumed by the fires of murder furnaces.  The 
House of Israel therefore mourns--mourns the death of our martyred innocent 
children, victims of Nazi brutality--mourns the death of the sainted souls who 
died Al Kiddush Hashem—for the sanctification of His Holy Name. 
 
Crestohl reminded his co-religionists that this new “day of atonement…shall be devoted to 
prayer, fasting and to charity.”  Crestohl was accompanied on the radio by Cantor Nathan 
Mendelsohn of Shaar Hashomayim Synagogue, who read Psalm 121 and recited the 
Kaddish.
4
   
Although the lead was taken by Orthodox Jews in Canada to mourn Jews being 
exterminated in Hitler’s Europe, in 1944, secular Canadian Jewish organizations were 
determined that all Canadian Jews unite in grieving the Jewish tragedy in Europe with an 
annual memorialization of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.  On April 16, Montreal Jewry met at 
Adath Jeshurun Synagogue to hear Rabbi Hirsh Cohen, Rabbi Pinhus Hirshprung, and H. 
Wolofsky, publisher of the Jewish Daily Eagle and Canadian Jewish Chronicle, among 
others.  As an advertisement for the meeting indicated, the purpose behind the gathering was 
                                                     
4
 Crestohl to James A. Shaw, General Manager of CFCF, letter, 13 March 1945, in LAC, Leon D. Crestohl 
fonds, MG32-C24, M-5224, file “Speeches cont.—Memorial Service, 1944.” 
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not merely to mourn, but also to mythologize the Jewish struggle and “Salute the memory of 
these intrepid men and women of all ages who, notwithstanding the horrors to which they 
have been subjected, yet retained the spirit of the will to liberty.”5  The Canadian Jewish 
Chronicle gave meaning to the Holocaust by writing that despite the Warsaw Ghetto uprising 
being “hopeless” to save Jews, it demonstrated that the noble spirit of Jews would not be 
defeated: “Let us vow that their death has not been in vain.  Only if we give their death 
meaning intended by them, will their death not have been in vain.  If we fail them in this 
then…we desecrate their noble death.  It should be obvious that the negation of Jewish 
nationalism could never have evoked the spirit which flared up there.  They gave their lives 
so that Israel, as a living force, might go on.”6  A. M. Klein, editor of the Canadian Jewish 
Chronicle, also mythologized the uprising, comparing it to the Maccabean revolt, giving 
meaning to the Holocaust as part of the narrative of the Jewish struggle to oppose the tyranny 
of Nazi Germany: “The memory of this epic we will not let die.  It stands as a constant 
tribute to Jewish valour, valour manifesting itself in every class and group of the Warsaw 
ghetto.  It gave the lie to the repeated and malicious slanders of Nazidom; it constituted the 
first suicide battle of any of the democratic forces—and this was no force, but a civilian 
population, undernourished, epidemic-ridden, rising, in a burst of glory, against its 
implacable foe.  There is no other event in our history which parallels it.  The only one which 
remotely resembles it is the act of Samson, pulling down the pillars of Dagon, and crying, 
‘Let me die with the Philistines.’”7 These acts of memorialization were not isolated, but 
                                                     
5
 Canadian Jewish Chronicle, 13 April 1944, 5. 
6
 Canadian Jewish Chronicle, 13 April 1944, 8. 
7
 Canadian Jewish Chronicle, 13 April 1944, 3. 
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occurred across Canada every year.  Throughout the immediate postwar era, the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising was emblematic of the Holocaust for Canadian Jews and was 
commemorated in April each year across the country.
8
 
This thesis examines the development of Canadian Jewish thinking on the Holocaust 
in the immediate postwar era.  It is underpinned by the methodological approach that the 
meaning and significance of the Holocaust in the eyes of Canadian Jews evolved throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s to meet political crises experienced by world Jewry.  That is to say, 
Holocaust representations—be they in the form of words or actions—were politicized in the 
Canadian context to support ideological positions.  Rather than assume that Canadian ideas 
of the Holocaust merely reflected the narrative of events that led to the mass murder of 
European Jewry or presume that Holocaust discourse was formed in a vacuum, this thesis 
examines how Canadian nationalism and specific concerns within the Canadian Jewish 
community interacted to shape constructions of the Holocaust in the immediate postwar era. 
My methodology borrows from a myriad of scholarly studies concerning how 
societies and groups represent and remember past historical events.  These studies can be 
organized into two frameworks that take divergent approaches in understanding the processes 
by which representations of history become infused within a culture’s mentalité.9  First, 
                                                     
8
 For example, in 1945, the Montreal Jewish community was called to meet at Baron Byng High School on 
April 18.  See “Do not fail to attend the Commemoration Meeting,” pamphlet, 1945, in CJCCCNA, CJC fonds, 
series ZA, box 8, file 139; Canadian Jewish Review, 13 April 1945, 4. 
9
 A complementary breakdown of Holocaust memory studies is Timothy Snyder’s dichotomy of “mass personal 
memory” and “national memory,” where the former consists of the collected memories of direct participants 
and witnesses of an event and the latter is the “the organizational principle, or set of myths, by which nationally 
conscious individuals understand the past and its demands on the present.”  See his “Memory of Sovereignty 
and Sovereignty over memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939-1999,” in Jan-Werner Muller’s Memory 
and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 39-50. 
  5 
scholars have opted to approach memory from a psychoanalytical perspective.  In this school 
of thought, group memory operates along the same lines as individual memory in that it is 
determined by the collective’s individual emotional and intellectual responses to encountered 
events.  In the case of the Holocaust, the standard interpretation is based on Freudian ideas 
and theorizes that Jewish victims were traumatised by their collective experience and 
therefore repressed their memory of the Holocaust for a time.  Burdened by guilt for either 
committing or not preventing these crimes, perpetrators and bystanders were reluctant to 
remember the Holocaust until the subsequent generation began to challenge this collective 
amnesia.  Attention has also been paid to how responses to the Holocaust vary between 
generations, which is seen as vital to understanding the future of Holocaust discourse since 
those who can personally recollect their experiences of the Holocaust are becoming fewer in 
society.
10
  Scholarship in this field has relied heavily on Holocaust testimony and literature, 
exploring the limitations of forms and media in representing the Holocaust.
 11
 
                                                     
10
 Key scholarly texts in the field include Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1975); Randolph J. Braham, ed. Reflections of the Holocaust in Art and 
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Geoffrey Hartman, ed.  Holocaust Remembrance: 
The Shapes of Memory (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993); Alvin H. Rosenfeld, The End of the Holocaust 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).  For an analysis of survivor testimonies from a psychological 
perspective, see Randolph J. Braham, ed. The Psychological Perspectives of the Holocaust and of its Aftermath 
(Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1988); Natan P. F. Kellermann, Holocaust Trauma: Psychological 
Effects and Treatment (New York: I Universe, 2009).  For generational studies of the Holocaust, see Martin S. 
Bergmann and Milton E. Jucovy, eds. Generations of the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990); Helen Epstein, Children of the Holocaust: Conversations with Sons and Daughters of the Survivors 
(New York: G.P. Putnam, 1979); Eva Hoffman, After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the 
Holocaust (New York: Public Affairs, 2003); John Sigal and Morton Weinfeld, Trauma and Rebirth: 
Intergenerational Effects of the Holocaust (New York: Praeger, 1989); Hadas Wiseman and Jacques P. Barber, 
Echoes of the Trauma: Relational Themes and Emotions in Children of Holocaust Survivors (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).   For studies on the Holocaust and ‘postmemory’, see Marianne Hirsch, The 
Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012).  Holocaust literature is immense, but academic scholarship has tended to focus on the following 
texts: Art Spiegelman, The Complete Maus: A Survivor’s Tale (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 1996); W. G. 
Sebald, Austerlitz (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2002); Primo Levy, Survival in Auschwitz (New York: Touchstone, 
  6 
Second, academics have built on the theory that representations of the Holocaust 
cannot accurately reflect the reality of Holocaust experiences for contemporary audiences, 
and therefore have sought to explore the reciprocal and complex relationship between the 
construction of Holocaust representations and shifting political discourses within society.  In 
the 1980s, historians reacquainted themselves with the work of Maurice Halbwachs, an 
interwar sociologist who argued that collective memory is a social construction shaped by 
current political aims.
12
  Halbwachs differentiated history from memory.  Whereas history 
attempts to understand change over time with the historian mindful that conditions and 
mentalities of the past differed from those in the present, memory conflates the past with the 
present through nostalgia.
13
  Therefore, collective memory, according to Halbwachs, reflects 
more the ideology and worldview of that society or group than reflects the past events, and 
serves to coalesce a group’s identity.14  Building on this theoretical framework, scholars have 
explored how the collective memory of the Holocaust differs geographically and shifts over 
time to fit different cultural milieus and political contexts.  Alon Confino has stressed the 
need to go beyond analyzing the form of representations and to examine why these 
representations were effective in conveying meaning: “the crucial issue in the history of 
memory is not how a past is represented but why it was received or rejected.  For every 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1996); Elie Wiesel, Night (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006); Cynthia Ozick, The Shawl: A Story and Novella 
(New York: Knopf, 1989); Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
11
 Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the ‘Final Solution’ (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992).  
12
 See Introduction in Lewis A. Coser, trans., On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 
22. 
13
 Maurice Halbwachs, “The Reconstruction of the Past,” in Lewis A. Coser, trans., On Collective Memory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 46-51. 
14
 For a brief discussion of Halbwachs’ theory in relation to the historian’s craft, see Margaret MacMillan, The 
Uses and Abuses of History (New York: Random House, 2008), 48-49. 
  7 
society sets up images of the past.  Yet to make a difference in society, it is not enough for a 
certain past to be selected.  It must steer emotions, motivate people to act, be received; in 
short, it must become a socio-cultural mode of action.”15  Historians of the Holocaust have 
typically concerned themselves with memory on the national level;
16
 occasionally they have 
compared how different countries have chosen to represent and remember the Holocaust.
17
  
Only recently has there developed a trend to see past national boundaries and examine the 
interaction between Holocaust and political discourses in the international sphere, such as 
decolonization, national sovereignty, human rights, and international jurisprudence.
18
   
                                                     
15
 Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” American Historical Review 
102 (1997): 1390. 
16
 Some of the more recent and key histories on Holocaust thought using Halbwachs’ collective memory theory 
within national contexts are below.  For the United States, see Kirsten Fermaglich, American Dreams and Nazi 
Nightmares: Early Holocaust Consciousness and Liberal America, 1957-65 (Waltham, MA: Brandeis 
University Press, 2006); Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Mariner Books, 2000); 
Edward T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995).  For Germany, see Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, 
Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Jeffery Herf, Divided 
Memory: The Nazi past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Claudia Koonz, 
“Between Memory and Oblivion: Concentration Camps in German Memory,” in John R. Gillis, ed.  
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 258-80. For 
the Soviet Union, see Zvi Gittelman, “History, Memory, and Politics: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5 (1990), 23-37. For Israel, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis 
and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).  For Italy, see Robert S. C. Gordon, The Holocaust in 
Italian Culture, 1944-2010 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).  For France, see Joan Beth Wolf, 
Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of Memory in France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).  For 
Great Britain, see Andy Pearce, Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain (New York: Routledge, 
2014); Caroline Sharples and Olaf Jensen, eds., Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing 
War and Genocide (London: Palgrave, 2013).  For Australia, see Tom Lawson and James Jordan, The Memory 
of the Holocaust in Australia (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2007).  For Poland, see Michael C. Steinlauf, 
Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1997); Marek Haltof, Polish Film and the Holocaust: Politics and Memory (Oxford: Berghahan Books, 2012). 
17
 See Judith Miller, One, By One, By One (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); James E. Young, The Texture 
of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993);  Rebecca Clifford, 
Commemorating the Holocaust: The Dilemmas of Remembrance in France and Italy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Jennifer Taylor, ed., National Responses to the Holocaust: National Identity and 
Public Memory (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2014); Tim Cole, Selling the Holocaust: From 
Auschwitz to Schindler, How History is Bought , Packaged, and Sold (New York: Routledge, 1999).  
18
 See Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in 
the Global Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); David Fraser, Law After Auschwitz: Towards a 
  8 
Controversy has surrounded studies into the politicization of Holocaust memory for 
two reasons.  First, promoters of Holocaust consciousness are frequently accused, 
particularly by the political left, of peddling a political agenda, namely Zionism, rather than 
being sincere in advocating for humanitarianism and human rights.  Arno Mayer, frustrated 
by the tumultuous negative reviews of his efforts to historicize the Holocaust within the Nazi 
campaign against communism (albeit at the wrongful expense of minimizing Nazi 
antisemitism), lashed out against those who see the Holocaust as “absolutely unprecedented 
and totally mysterious” as well as those who belittled the fact that non-Jews also were 
exterminated  in death camps.  With the historical focus on the Jewish tragedy, Mayer was 
angered that Jews appeared unconcerned about “the fate of other peoples, past and present.”  
Mayer contends that instead of Holocaust memory being used to combat genocide around the 
globe, it has “justified repressive excesses against Palestinians, which they fear will corrode 
and ultimately destroy Israel.”  Accordingly, Mayer contends that the Holocaust has been 
constructed as a wall behind which Israel can defend itself with impunity.
19
   
Another criticism against the prevalence of Holocaust discourse in Western culture is 
that it has perpetuated a culture of victimization, where ethnic groups compete for victim 
status in order to gain political capital.  Charles Maier’s now famous complaint that “modern 
American politics…has become a competition for enshrining grievances,” could also be 
directed at Canadian politics.
20
  Much of this controversy has surrounded the construction of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Jurisprudence of the Holocaust (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005); Dan Stone, The Holocaust, 
Fascism and Memory: Essays in the History of Ideas (London: Palgrave, 2013).  
19
 Arno J. Mayer, “Memory and History: On the Poverty of Remembering and Forgetting the Judeocide,” 
Radical history Review 56 (1993): 5-20.   
20
 Charles S. Maier, “A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy and Denial,” History & 
Memory 5 (Fall-Winter 1993), 147. 
  9 
the Canadian Museum for Human Rights in Winnipeg.  This project was conceived after a 
proposal to include a Holocaust Gallery in the Canadian War Museum that would highlight 
Canada’s poor record on rescuing Jews during the war.  It was rejected in 1998 due to 
pressure from veterans groups, who were aggravated by what they perceived as Jewish 
efforts to overshadow the sacrifices of Canada’s military to save democracy.21  The remedy 
was a separate, government-funded museum with a decidedly positive mandate, which 
included the guiding principle of “celebrating Canadians’ commitment to human rights.” 22  
While human rights advocates worry that the museum will present a sanitized version of 
Canada’s human rights abuses, various ethnic groups complain that their grievances are 
being overlooked or minimized to preserve the Canadian identity as a champion of human 
rights.
23
   Timothy Snyder has also spoken against the usefulness of the West’s tendency to 
identify with the victims rather than perpetrators or bystanders, since not only do perpetrators 
of human rights violations claim victim status, but also “the identification with the victim 
affirms a radical separation from the perpetrator.”  This “othering” of the perpetrator erects a 
barrier to understanding the conditions and motives that move perpetrators to commit 
                                                     
21
 A fair presentation of the debate is found in David Monod, “‘Who Owns History Anyway?' The Political 
Assault on North American History,” in Marburger Ahornblätter, ed. Beiträge zur Kanada-Forschung  
(Schriften der Universitätsbibliothek Marburg: 1999), < http://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/sum/90/sum90-
5.html>.  
22
 “Mandate and Museum Experience,” Canadian Museum of Human Rights website, 
<http://humanrights.ca/about-museum/mandate-and-museum-experience>. 
23
 For instance, Ukrainian-Canadian leaders have complained that their exhibit is stuffed in the back of the 
museum by the washrooms, Palestinian-Canadian lobbyists are upset that their grievances have been 
overlooked, and the First Nation advocates are irate that European colonialism of the New World has not been 
termed ‘genocide.’ National Post, 27 September 2013.   
  10 
genocide, and works to limit international intervention to stop the violence, therefore doing a 
disservice to victims.
24
 
This thesis builds on both of these methodological strains, acknowledging that 
historical memory is a social construct guided by contemporary political considerations, but 
also keeping in mind that the individuals who worked to make Canadians aware of the 
Holocaust were humans and therefore affected emotionally by what they learned regarding 
Hitler’s Holocaust.  In other words, the experiences and memories of Hitler’s persecution of 
the Jews during the 1930s and 1940s made an impact on Canadian Jewry and they tended to 
view contemporary events through the lens of Holocaust memory, even when there was little 
resemblance between events in the 1950s and the 1930s. 
Historiography  
 The study of Jewish responses to the Holocaust in the immediate post-war era has been of 
little interest to historians, especially in Canada, as the common conception is that the West 
knew little about the extermination of European Jews. Historiography since the 1980s and 
1990s was almost unanimous in its position that, until at least the 1960s, the world remained 
silent about the Holocaust.  This theory was first fully articulated by Leon A. Jick in 1980, 
when he argued that American Jewry “sought to forget” about Hitler and the extermination of 
the Jews because of the emergence of the Cold War.  According to Jick, with McCarthyism 
spreading in the 1950s like a plague across America, the established Jewish community was 
careful not to associate themselves with Communism, lest they awaken latent antisemitism 
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and be ostracized.
25
  Therefore, Soviet crimes, such as the massacre of Polish officers in the 
Katyn forest, were the only Second World War atrocities discussed.  The argument suggests 
that Jews did not want to sully West Germany’s reputation, especially during the 1950s when 
it was being integrated into NATO.  Moreover, discussing the Holocaust was apparently too 
painful for Jews.  Historians present Jews in 1950’s North America as seeking to melt into 
society and become “normal” by redoubling their efforts at upward social mobility.  As Jick 
argued, “the breakthrough in the process of coming to grips with the reality and bringing the 
Holocaust to the center of Jewish consciousness came in 1967.”  With the fear that Jews 
faced a second Holocaust, this time in Palestine, American Jews were jolted out of their 
silence and embarked on a massive campaign to raise awareness and educate the public about 
the Holocaust, specifically by raising the spectre of American indifference and apathy 
towards the destruction of European Jews in the Second World War.
26
 
 Jick’s arguments are compelling for most historians in the field, perhaps because 
many remember the fear that gripped the Jewish community in the late 1960s, and have been 
repeated in nearly every history dealing with Jews in North America following the Second 
World War.  For most historians, the construction of the Holocaust as a central landmark of 
the American landscape emerged due to the development of an intimate relationship between 
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the United States and Israel in the 1960s.  This argument was made most convincingly by 
Peter Novick, who takes the position that the idea of the Holocaust was “something that 
would not have been recognizable to most people” in the 1940s and 1950s and is therefore a 
“retrospective construction” of the 1960s and 1970s.27  Tim Cole proclaimed that it was only 
in the 1960s that “that anything like widespread awareness of the ‘Holocaust’ began to 
emerge.”28  Gerald Sorin has even, somewhat fantastically, declared that “Holocaust 
survivors and American society” colluded in a “conspiracy of silence.”29  Alan Mintz points 
to the Adolf Eichmann trial in 1960-1961 as the “crucial event” that pushed the Holocaust 
into mainstream consciousness, an event that he proposes gave American Jews “licence...to 
pay more attention to this aspect of their own past and make it the object of broad and intense 
inquiry.”30  Most historians of the postwar America emphasize that the Jewish community 
censored discussions of the Holocaust since it did not fit into the melting pot of American 
liberal culture.
31
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 In the United States, the emergence of Holocaust consciousness is closely tied to 
America’s relationship to Israel.  For Novick, prior to the 1960s, a relationship with Israel did 
not have a special place in the heart of Americans, including American Jews, and he goes so 
far as to say that the “notion of Western guilt as the godfather of Israel...is quite false.”32  It 
was the spring of 1967 that was the “dramatic turning point in American Jews’ relationship 
to Israel,” and thus “marked an important stage in their changing relationship to the 
Holocaust.”33  Agreeing with such argumentation, Michael Morgan is able to say that since 
“Israel’s survival became for many Jews the core, if not the totality of Jewish identity,” the 
prospect that the West would sit quietly by while the Arab nations attempted to wipe Israel 
off the map precipitated “an acknowledgement of the Holocaust, Auschwitz, the memory of 
the catastrophe.”34  Novick goes one step further when he argues that American Jews did not 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of the Second World War.  Like most historians of postwar American Jews, she attributes this ‘silence’ to the 
“new integrationist possibilities open to them” and the worry that discussion of the Holocaust would “stir up the 
specter of anti-Semitism.”  Moreover, she contends that “the Holocaust distracted from the priority of Zionism.”  
Echoing Peter Novick’s arguments, she claims that “Jews were also eager to avoid the stereotypical association 
of their people with communism.  By ‘dwelling’ on the crimes of Germany, Jews were associated with the new 
American enemy, the Soviets.”  In short, “America did not want to hear.”  See her Echoes of the Holocaust on 
the American Musical Stage (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2012), 11.  Also making this case, and perhaps more 
widely read, are Edward Shapiro’s A Time for Healing: American Jewry Since World War II (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 213-16 and Howard Sachar’s A History of the Jews in America (New York: 
Knopf, 1992), 839-47.  More recently, the case has been stated in see David B. MacDonald, Identity Politics in 
the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation (New York: Routledge, 2008), 18-20.   
32
 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 71. 
33
 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 148. 
34
 Michael L. Morgan, “To Seize memory: History and Identity in Post-Holocaust Consciousness and Liberal 
America, 1957-1965,” in Thinking About the Holocaust: After Half a Century, ed. Alvin H. Rosenfeld 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 158.  For other works that point to events surrounding Israel in 
the 1960s that brought the Holocaust into the forefront of both American Jewish life and American mainstream 
culture, see also Edward S. Shapiro, A Time for Healing: American Jewry Since World War II (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1992):  213-5; Edward T. Linenthal,  Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create 
America’s Holocaust Museum (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 8-9; Jeffrey Shandler, While America 
Watches: Televising the Holocaust (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 132.  Perhaps best known is 
Jonathan D. Sarna’s widely acclaimed American Judaism: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004), where, on page 333, he presents the interpretation of American memory of the Holocaust as delayed.  He 
writes “In the case of the Holocaust, it was Israel’s capture of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann in 1960, his trial in 
  14 
raise awareness of the Holocaust and American indifference to the Jewish extermination 
merely because of the prospect of a second Holocaust in Palestine, but also to solve the 
problem of “Israel’s increasing isolation in the world.”  By emphasizing Jewish victimhood 
and using the Holocaust as a “benchmark of oppression,” thereby “trivializing crimes of 
lesser magnitude,” Israel became beyond reproach.35   
While Novick’s work was polemical, Norman Finkelstein inflamed the debate over 
the politicization of the Holocaust by writing that American Jewry only brought the 
Holocaust into the public forum in the 1960s because it was “the perfect weapon for 
deflecting criticism of Israel.”  He dismisses the notion that Jews were concerned about a 
second Holocaust in 1967 or 1973 as naive: “The avowed concern for Holocaust memory 
was as contrived as the avowed concern for Israel’s fate.”  Finkelstein adds that “concern for 
survivors of the Nazi holocaust was equally contrived: a liability before June 1967, they were 
silenced; an asset after June 1967, they were sanctified.”36  Pointing to Israel’s poor treatment 
of Palestinian refugees, Finkelstein continues, “The Holocaust has proven to be an 
indispensable ideological weapon.  Through its deployment, one of the world’s most 
formidable military powers, with a horrendous human rights record, has cast itself as a 
‘victim’ state, and the most successful ethnic group in the United States has likewise 
acquired victimhood.”37   
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 The near consensus of historians regarding the absence of Holocaust consciousness in 
the two decades after the Second World War has begun to crack in the last ten years, 
especially in the United States.  Lawrence Baron was one of the first to point to early 
scholarly research on Nazism that delved into the nature of the Holocaust, although he said 
considerably less regarding the impact that these studies had on mass culture and political 
discourse in the United States.
38
  Kirsten Fermaglich’s American Dreams and Nazi 
Nightmares: Early Holocaust Consciousness and Liberal America, 1957-1965 also argues 
that the Holocaust entered American consciousness in the late 1950s by exploring the 
writings of a number of Jewish intellectuals, such as Stanley Elkin, Betty Friedan and Robert 
Jay Lifton.  She finds that these social activists used analogies of the Holocaust to explain 
contemporary American problems.  For example, Betty Friedan called the American home a 
“comfortable concentration camp” to show that “suburban women, like concentration camp 
inmates, participated in their own oppression.”39  According to Fermaglich, American Jewish 
writers “emphasized the evils of Nazi concentration camps as a means of expressing 
prevalent intellectual concerns with bureaucracy, alienation, and conformity and of 
criticizing American society from a liberal perspective.”40  Historians have been swayed little 
by her work, however, insisting that just because Americans were drawing lessons from 
concentration camps does not demonstrate that they “were indeed familiar with the Nazi 
extermination of European Jewry.”41 
                                                     
38
 Lawrence Baron, “The Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945-1960,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 17, no. 1 (2003): 62-88. 
39
 Fermaglich, American Dreams and Nazi Nightmares, 2. 
40
 Fermaglich, American Dreams and Nazi Nightmares, 23. 
41
 For a useful critique of Fermaglich’s thesis, see Benjamin L. Alper, “Review of American Dreams and Nazi 
Nightmares,” American Jewish History 92, no. 4 (2007): 502-4. 
  16 
Hasia Diner’s effort to show that all previous historians in this field “have erred 
grievously” made more than a ripple.  Diner is one of the preeminent historians on American 
Jewish life and she managed to assemble an impressive array of sources to show that the 
American Jewish community did remember and make the Holocaust central to their 
communal identity.  Moreover, her title We Remember With Reverence and Love: American 
Jews and the Myth of Silence after the Holocaust, 1945-1962 was a challenge to historians 
who held the opinion that Holocaust commemoration was motivated solely by a political 
agenda.  Not surprisingly then, her study tends to focus more on listing hundreds of instances 
of commemoration at the expense of discussing the political context behind these 
representations of the Holocaust or how representations of the Holocaust have shifted over 
time to reflect changing political circumstances.
42
   
Nonetheless, her work has made many historians reassess their thinking on the role of 
the Holocaust in the postwar Jewish experience.  David Cesarani is one of many historians 
who believe that Diner has “landed a knockout punch” against the dominant position.43  
Inspired by her research, Cesarani adjusted his own view of the conspiracy of silence theory.  
In his own research over the past few of years, he has found that Jews both on and off the 
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European continent were obsessed with the Holocaust in the years immediately following the 
war, but the sheer bombardment of Holocaust-related material quickly left audiences bored.
44
  
Dan Stone also agrees that the notion that Jews were silent about the Holocaust in the late 
1940s and early 1950s is misleading.  Although his historiographical analysis of Holocaust 
scholarship focused exclusively on research during the past twenty years, he writes that “it is 
no longer possible to claim that there was silence in the postwar period.”45 
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Canadian historians, however, have been reluctant to challenge the conventional view 
that the Holocaust was rarely discussed in the postwar era.  The definitive monograph in 
Canadian historiography that makes the case for the Holocaust remaining outside public 
discourse in the immediate postwar era is Franklin Bialystok’s Delayed Impact: The 
Holocaust and the Canadian Jewish Community.  Bialystok contends that the “Holocaust 
was not part of their [Canadian Jewish] world,” for at least a generation after the Second 
World War.  Not only did the trauma of the Holocaust cause Jews to repress Holocaust 
memories, according to Bialystok, but there was also “a sense of shame in commemorating 
an event that...had occurred without resistance by the victims”46  Relying on the testimony of 
many Holocaust survivors, Bialystok finds that the established Jewish community in the 
1950s had little interest in hearing about the experiences of Jews who escaped from Nazi-
occupied Europe.  Disinterest turned to antagonism as recent displaced persons were seen as 
a burden on the Canadian Jewish community.  The newcomers’ strange customs and lack of 
English skills led to derogatory name calling, such as addressing them by using the term 
“greenhorn,” and a psychological rift tore the community in half.   According to Bialystok, 
the Holocaust only emerged in Jewish consciousness in the 1960s, thanks to the efforts of 
Holocaust survivors who used their testimony to shake the established Jewish community 
into action against the threat of antisemitism at home and abroad.  With the surfacing of Neo-
Nazism throughout the West, including Canada, and prospect of a war of extermination 
against the surviving remnant in Israel in 1967, frightened Holocaust survivors saw these 
events as eerily similar to the events of 1930’s Germany.  According to Bialystok’s account, 
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the more established Canadian Jewish community believed such talk constituted fear-
mongering and would only “alienate Canadian society.”  Bialystok argues that with the 
Canadian Jewish community split over this issue, it was only after the joint Syrian and 
Egyptian attack on Israel in October 1973 and after Holocaust survivors had made significant 
headway into Jewish institutions that “the legacy of the Holocaust surfaced as a marker of 
ethnic identification for most Canadian Jews.”47     
Historians of Canadian Jewry have typically found themselves in agreement with 
Bialystok and have accepted his interpretation.  The leading expert on Canadian Jewry, 
Gerald Tulchinsky, recently wrote that it was only by the 1980s or even the 1990s that “a 
growing awareness of the Holocaust entered into Jewish life in Canada.”48  Even Michael 
Marrus writes that “for us, at that time [the late 1950s and early 1960s], the holocaust was 
simply absent” from university curricula, “non-Jews, but also Jews, did not speak about the 
Holocaust.”49  More recently, Harold Troper has merged Bialystok’s “delayed impact” theory 
with many of the reasons outlined in American historiography when he writes that “this ‘pall 
of desperation’ [that coincided with the threat of Egypt’s impeding attack on Israel in 1967] 
reflected an emergent Holocaust consciousness percolating in the Jewish mind since the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann, a consciousness reinforced by the coming of age of Holocaust survivors 
as a force in the Canadian Jewish community and by fears of a growing neo-Nazi revival in 
both Europe and North America.”50 
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 The Canadian consensus over the “delayed impact” theory is largely due to a number 
of testimonials that have confirmed that this was the case, even though the vast majority of 
Canadian testimonies on record say nothing about Canadian interest or disinterest in the 
Holocaust in the immediate postwar era.  However, some Holocaust survivors were angered 
when they were not able to share their experiences, even within the Jewish community.  One 
survivor in an interview in the 1980s explained: “we were all anxious to tell of our 
experiences but we found no listeners, nobody wanted to hear about it, they say we heard 
enough.  Either they felt guilty or they felt sick listening to all this.”51 Another survivor said 
that he was also very “disappointed” by the Jewish community in Cornwall who he believed 
were “not interested” in hearing his story.52  A survivor who arrived in Winnipeg in 1958 
also noted that “no one asked about her experiences.”53  However, the vast majority of early 
Holocaust testimonials present the view that it was the Holocaust survivors themselves, 
rather than the established Jewish community, who were determined to limit conversation 
about their experiences both in hiding from the Nazis and life in concentration and 
extermination camps.  This difficulty in speaking about the Holocaust, even privately, is 
attributed over and over again in testimonials to debilitating fear.  Survivors who did discuss 
life in concentration camps almost always confided in close personal friends who also had 
shared a similar experience under Nazi rule.
54
  In one interview, a woman who was asked 
whether she spoke about the Holocaust answered, “No.  I told my children.  I tried to tell 
them but I can’t talk about it….I’m choking up even now.  So I try, my husband doesn’t let 
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me talk about it.  I still dream about it, I still scream at night so I try not to, not to think about 
it.”55  Another survivor who was very active in the Association of Survivors of Nazi 
Oppression and travelled across Canada to share his experiences with school children, noted 
that it took him twenty-five years to speak about the Holocaust: “I couldn’t talk about it, not 
even with…my children.”  When asked if people wanted to hear his story twenty years ago, 
he said that “people were reluctant because they were afraid they shouldn’t have 
nightmares…”56 
 This thesis demonstrates that despite the fact that only a few Holocaust survivors who 
arrived in Canada were initially able to share their experiences and shape representations of 
the Holocaust in Canada, Holocaust memory became an important aspect of Jewish identity 
in Canada during the war years through to 1956.  Holocaust discourse was used by Canadian 
Jews to understand threats facing Israel and the Jewish diaspora in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
Canadian Jewish role as bystanders to the European catastrophe and also as Allies against 
Nazism shaped how Canadian Jews understood the Holocaust.  Thinking about the Holocaust 
was framed within mainstream political discourse over Canadian identity and Canada’s role 
on the international stage.  Since Nazi Germany was viewed by Canada as the antithesis to 
Canadian ideals of liberalism and a pluralistic harmonious society, it reaffirmed Canadians’ 
self-identification as a tolerant society and memories of the Holocaust thus did little to 
challenge prevalent racist attitudes in Canada.  Canadian Jews, however, especially the many 
Canadian Jews who still had relatives in the Old World who were trapped in Hitler’s regime, 
were deeply shaken by what they witnessed during Hitler’s reign.  During the war years, 
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Canadian Jews presented Jewish deaths in Europe as heroic martyrdoms in the defense of 
freedom and Western Civilization.  They utilized the memory of these martyrs to support 
liberal international governance projects, such as the UN and the Genocide Convention, 
which they hoped would make the world safe for Jews.  However, Jewish idealism began to 
wear thin by the early 1950s, especially amongst progressives within the Jewish community, 
who lost faith in the ability of the international system to prevent the re-emergence of 
antisemitism.  By the mid-1950s, Holocaust memory in Canada had become closely tied to 
supporting Israel as Canadian Jews were convinced that the appeasement policies of the 
1930s were still being applied to antisemitic regimes such as the Soviet Union and Egypt.  
Worried that the West would sacrifice Israel in order to preserve peace and maintain the 
West’s balance of power in the Cold War, Canadian Jews embraced the image of Holocaust 
casualties as ardent freedom fighters.  Representations of the Holocaust in the 1950s also 
opened a rift in the Jewish community between liberal Jews and socialist and communist 
Jews.  
Chapter one examines the liberal paradigm through which the Canadian Jewish 
community encountered the rise of Hitler’s antisemitic regime.  In order to understand 
Canadian memory of the Holocaust, we must explore how Canadians understood Nazi 
antisemitism in the 1930s.  What role did rise of Nazi racism in Germany play within 
Canadian political discourses?  How did Canadian Jews make sense of the persecution of 
Jews in Germany and how did these events shape the Canadian Jewish community’s 
identity?  This chapter explores Canadian Jewish responses to the rise of Hitler’s regime and 
the Nazi implementation of antisemitic laws, the advent of state-sponsored violence against 
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Germany’s Jews in 1938, and the emergence of the Jewish refugee crisis.  It argues that 
Canadian Jews understood the Nazis’ persecution of Europe’s Jews and the subsequent 
Jewish refugee crisis of the 1930s within the context of Canada’s association with the British 
Empire.  Germany’s attack against its Jewish citizens was decried in Canada not because of 
their racist nature, but because they were an affront to the liberal order and perceived as a 
threat to the stability of Europe.  While Canadian Jewish efforts to convince Canadian 
opinion to open Canadian borders for Jewish refugees failed, they helped popularize the view 
that Hitler’s attack on Jews constituted a threat to the international order. 
The second chapter delves into Canadians-Jewish responses to the mass murder of 
Europe’s Jews during the 1940s.  It argues that Canadian Jewry understood the Canadian war 
effort through the paradigm of Hitler’s war against Jews. This association was not inevitable, 
due to efforts by the Canadian Government to obscure the Holocaust from the Canadian 
public. In fact, Canadian Jews worked to associate the mass murder of Jews with casualties 
from underground resistance and partisan movements in order to suggest that Jews were 
Allies fighting in the struggle for liberty behind the frontlines.  The Canadian Jewish press 
covered the Holocaust closely during the war years and many Canadian Jewish youths 
volunteered to fight in Canada’s military in order to help rescue Jews in Europe.  During 
these years and well into the 1940s, Canadian Jewry wrestled with making sense of the 
Holocaust.  While many Jews questioned their religious convictions, others began to attend 
synagogue to find answers.  With the cessation of hostilities, Canadian Jews turned to relief 
efforts for the remnant left in Europe.  However, with the solidification of communist rule in 
Eastern Europe and the persistence of European antisemitism, Canadian Jews came to see 
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Jewish life in Europe as untenable and turned to support Israel and democratic international 
organizations as the best home to protect Jewish life.   
The third chapter analyzes Canadian Jewish reactions to the rearmament and 
integration into NATO of West Germany in the early 1950s.  The “German problem” was 
especially controversial in Canadian Jewish circles and highlights the degree to which the 
Holocaust had become rooted within Canadian Jewish identity and thinking.  The chapter 
plots the rift in the Canadian Jewish community between liberals, whose turn from idealistic 
internationalism to supporting realist Canadian Cold War priorities led them to support West 
German rearmament, and communist Jews, who were not willing to welcome West Germany 
into the community of nations for fear that West Germany would initiate a second Holocaust.  
The rift was laden with emotional exchanges, leading to the expulsion of communist 
organizations—namely the United Jewish People’s Order—from the CJC.  Although the rift 
was certainly motivated by ideological differences, at its core was concern about Holocaust 
memory.  For communists and some socialist Jews in Canada, the Holocaust became a 
distorted lens through which they viewed 1950s’ West Germany and they therefore 
adamantly rejected Canada’s position to support West Germany’s entry into NATO, arguing 
that such an act was tantamount to reinstating the Nazis.  While many in the Canadian Jewish 
leadership found such arguments compelling, the political necessity to contain the Soviet 
Union, which was beginning to exhibit a strong antisemitic tendency, forced the CJC to cut 
ties with the Jewish communists and support German rearmament.  The corresponding 
agreement that West Germany signed to make restitution to the victims of the Holocaust 
prior to West Germany gaining sovereignty did little to induce either liberal or socialist Jews 
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to forgive Germany, even if the financial payout was seen as important to rebuild destroyed 
Jewish institutions. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the growing relationship between Zionism, the rise of 
antisemitism in the Arab world, and Holocaust memory in Canada by examining Canadian 
Jewish responses to the Suez Crisis and the Sinai War in 1956.  It argues that Canadian Jews 
interpreted the political tensions of the 1950’s Middle East in light of the Holocaust. The 
Egyptian dictator, Gamal Nasser was perceived by Canadian Jews as Hitler, and his 
antisemitic domestic policies were analogous to the Nazis’ anti-Jewish discrimination of the 
1930s. The Cold War climate caused Canadian Jews to fear that the west would once again 
sacrifice Jews in order to appease a dictator and prevent global war. This time the result 
would be the destruction of Egyptian Jews and the newly formed Jewish State of Israel. The 
fear of a second Holocaust pressed Canadian Jews to instigate a public relations campaign 
aimed at preserving Israel as a Jewish safe-haven. 
Holocaust memory in the immediate postwar years was not inconsequential to 
Canadian Jewish identity, but was fundamental in sculpting the ideological makeup of 
Canadian Jewry in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Holocaust thinking became a paradigm 
within the Jewish community and was formed within the context of national debates over 
Canada’s role on the international stage to protect democracy.  This lens sometimes skewed 
perceptions of international developments, and sensitivity to perceived rises in antisemitism, 
such as in the case of West Germany during the early 1950s, leading to panicked responses, 
and, at times, dividing  the Canadian Jewish community along ideological lines. 
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Chapter 1 
“Hitler’s Assault on Civilization”: Canada’s Response to Nazi 
Germany’s Persecution of Jews, 1933-1939 
A significant recent trend within the fields of Holocaust memory and Holocaust 
representations is for scholars to begin their analyses after 1945, thereby suggesting that 
thinking about the Holocaust was enigmatic during the war years.
57
  This approach is often 
taken due to the accepted position that the Holocaust was rarely discussed in the public 
sphere until the liberation of Europe, when Allies stumbled into concentration camps to see 
the wreckage of Nazi atrocities.  The limitation of this approach is that it presupposes that 
Holocaust thinking had to be framed within the dialogue surrounding the Cold War rather 
than built on an established discourse that had been constructed during the years of Nazi rule.  
This assumption is peculiar considering that memory begins to form during an event and is 
constructed as individuals attempt to interpret the collective experience.  Thus, in examining 
how the Nazi assault on European Jews shaped Jewish identity in Canada, it is important to 
look at how Canadian perceptions of German atrocities were formed while these crimes 
happened. 
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Moreover, the Holocaust was not a singular event, but a process that began by 
isolating and removing Jews from German society through cultural, economic, and legal 
means, and only gradually turned to extermination under the cover of war.  While observing 
how Nazi antisemitism devolved from economic boycotts to deportation, ghettoization, and 
extermination, Canadian ideas also shifted regarding Nazism as Canadian national priorities 
evolved.  When discussing Canadian memory of the Holocaust, the context of the 1930s 
should not be ignored.  As American and British historians have pointed out, Western 
witnesses of Nazi atrocities in 1945 understood the horror found in liberated camps within 
political paradigms emanating from debates in the 1930s concerning appeasement and the 
binary threat of communism and fascism.
58
  Thus, in order to understand Canadian Jewish 
memory of the Holocaust, we must explore how Canadians understood Nazi antisemitism in 
the 1930s and the international response to Nazi persecution.  A number of questions are 
considered in this chapter. What role did the rise of Nazi racism in Germany play within 
Canadian political discourses?  How did Canadian Jews make sense of the persecution of 
Jews in Germany and how did these events shape the Canadian Jewish community’s 
identity? 
Since the presumption is that the Jewish tribulations were of little concern to 
Canadians, few historians have examined Canadian ideas concerning Nazi antisemitism in 
the 1930s.  One exception is Amanda Grzyb’s examination of the Canadian press’ coverage 
                                                     
58
 Laurel Leff, Buried by the Times: the Holocaust and America’s Most Important Newspaper (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 294-319; Joanne Reilly, Belsen: The Liberation of  a Concentration Camp 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 50-77, 187-89; Aubrey H. Newman, “British Reactions to News of 
the Holocaust,” in eds. Richard Bosbach and Thomas Brockmann, Religion and Politik in Deutschland und 
Großbritannien (Munchen: K. G. Saur, 2001), 139-44; See Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 65, 86-88; 
Norman Erwin, “Making Sense of Mass Murder: Toronto’s Media Coverage of the Liberation of the 
Concentration Camps and Trials of War Criminals, 1944-1946,” Major Research Paper, York University, 2007.  
  28 
of Kristallnacht.  However, her study is somewhat unsatisfying as she relies almost 
exclusively on the Globe and Mail for understanding Canadian responses, and does not 
contextualize news of Kristallnacht within the Canadian social and political context of the 
late 1930s.  After providing a straightforward analysis of her evidence, she comes to the 
rather strange and contradictory conclusion that the press pushed the European Jewish plight 
off Canada’s public agenda because Canadians were “either hopeful that Kristallnacht had 
been the worst of the violence, or [were] overwhelmed by a sense that Jewish suffering was 
somehow unsolvable, inevitable, eternal.”59 
Rather than explore Canadian perceptions of Nazism, the majority of Canadian 
research in the field focuses on Canadian racism as an explanation of why the Canadian 
government prevented Jewish refugees from entering Canada during the 1930s and much of 
the 1940s.  Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s monumental None Is Too Many: Canada and 
the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948, for example, copiously documents the formation and 
maintenance of regulatory barricades to Jewish entry into Canada.  Abella and Troper’s 
research argues that antisemitism was endemic within government circles.  Blurring the 
nebulous line between bystander and perpetrator categories, they argue that the “Nazis read 
rejection of the Jews, especially by the democracies, as tacit approval of their policies....  The 
Holocaust is a tragedy which also envelops and implicates the bystander.”60  While these 
historians conclude that Mackenzie King’s government had “read the public mood and had 
read it correctly,” they also suggest that antisemitism within Quebec was decisive in the 
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decision to prevent Jewish immigration, since opening the doors “risk[ed] alienating Quebec” 
and thus the collapse of the Liberal government.
61
 
Building on Abella and Troper’s foundational work, Canadian historians have sought 
to uncover a myriad of examples for how antisemitism had inundated Canadian society to 
explain Canada’s inhumane response to the Jewish crisis.  These historians reveal that 
institutional racism ran rampant during the interwar period.  The medical, legal, and teaching 
professions regularly insisted that applicants disclose their ‘race’ for the purpose of ensuring 
that only Christians were hired.  Quotas were placed on Jewish admission into universities.  
Even many vacation destinations frequently advertised that they were closed to Jews, since 
this was desirable for their clientele.
62
 The ownership of property and Jewish settlement in 
particular neighborhoods across the country was similarly restricted though covenants written 
into land deeds, to ensure that areas remained ‘white.’63  Cyril H. Levitt and William Shaffir 
contend that in Toronto in 1933, the impression that Jews were encroaching on a ‘white’ 
Protestant neighborhood was enough to set the conditions for the Christie Pits Riot.
64
  Fascist 
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movements sprang up across Canada during the Great Depression.  Since they held 
xenophobic and nativist attitudes, the fascists’ appeal rested on the “prevalent if largely latent 
anti-Semitism” throughout Canada.65  Though one may question whether the predominant 
fascist in Canada, Adrien Arcand, was an important player on the Canadian political scene,
 
what is particularly telling was the reluctance of Canadians to defend Jews from Arcand’s 
insidious attacks.  Thus, Martin Robin admits that fascism was weak and remained on the 
fringe of Canadian society; what he finds disturbing about the movement was that “Jews 
were permissible targets.”66 Canada’s most blatant antisemitic policy was directly tied to who 
was allowed to live within its borders.  The Canadian immigration policy privileged ‘white’ 
Western Europeans above all else, and created a “Special Permit Group,” for Jews and other 
undesirable ‘races,’ that was automatically banned entry unless permission was given by the 
Cabinet on an individual basis.
67
  Stephen Speisman writes that racially restrictive covenants 
on property deeds, which prevented land ownership from falling into the hands of Jews, were 
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not unusual in Ontario and were put in place to ensure that many neighborhoods remained 
‘white.’68   
Just as relevant to understanding mainstream Canadian thought towards Jews is the 
research exploring the relationship between Canadian antisemitism and religion. Historians 
are divided on the issue.  By far, the most nuanced and careful examination of Canadian 
Christian attitudes towards Jews is Alan T. Davies and Marylin F. Nefsky’s How Silent Were 
the Churches? Canadian Protestantism and the Jewish Plight during the Nazi Era.  They 
question the charge that Protestants were silent on the issue of the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews in the 1930s and 1940s.  While Davies and Nefsky find that certain denominations, 
such as the Lutherans and Mennonites were overtly antisemitic on occasion, they cite 
numerous examples of Canadian Protestants who vocalized their abhorrence of Nazi racial 
ideas and called for government action.  However, such balanced analyses are rare.  In a 
searing, if at times sardonic, indictment of the English-Canadian elite, Alan Mendelson 
makes the case that English-Canadian antisemitism was often rooted in a religious, not 
pseudoscientific racial, discourse, in which Jews were seen as tribalistic and stubbornly 
clinging to an antiquated religion.
69
  Even more controversial discussions pertain to the 
degree to which antisemitism formed the core of the Quebecois nationalist movement before 
the Quiet Revolution.  Esther Delisle has garnered enormous criticism for her in-depth, albeit 
somewhat haphazard, examination of the philosophy of the iconic Abbè Lionel Groulx.  She 
finds that Groulx and other Catholic intellectuals were influenced by the pseudoscientific 
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racism that was prevalent in Europe.  Nostalgic for a pastoral utopia in Quebec, Groulx 
blamed the Jews for all the ills associated with industrialization and urbanization, including 
the growing secularization of Quebec.
70
   
The barrage of work indicting Christians for antisemitism has garnered spirited 
responses.  Most notably, Pierre Anctil has demanded nuance in contextualizing French-
Canadian ideology.  He compares the Jewish admission rate between the Anglophone, 
Protestant McGill University and the Francophone, Catholic l’Université de Montréal in the 
1930s, and finds that neither linguistic group was immune from racism.
71
  However, 
apologists continue to persist.  More recently, Kyle Jantzen and Jonathan Durance have 
written an interesting, yet unequivocally one-sided analysis of Canadian Protestant responses 
to Kristallnacht.  Although they admit that antisemitism was “endemic in the Canadian 
society,” they suggest that Canadian Protestants were somehow immune to the racist ideas of 
the time.  According to these scholars, Protestants demanded that their government take 
action to save Europe’s Jews, including opening Canada’s doors to Jewish immigrants, either 
because of the liberal current in Protestant thought regarding the “brotherhood of man” and 
“equality in God’s eyes,” or the belief held by many practitioners that since Jews were God’s 
“chosen people” Christians were obligated to support them. However their argument that 
Canadian inaction towards Jewish refugees had more to do “with the ‘deafness’ of the 
government” and “less to do with the ‘silence’ of the churches,” miscarries because it 
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artificially isolates Christian discourse from Canadian national debate, when in fact religious 
belief informed political discourse and vice-versa.
72
 
While these studies into Canadian antisemitism are useful, the historiography tends to 
veer away from exploring what Canadians perceived and understood about Nazi Jewish 
policy. Importantly, they have failed to explain why Canadians, who are presented clearly in 
the historical literature as antisemitic, were so horrified by Nazi antisemitism. Why did 
Kristallnacht cement Canadian opinion against Hitler’s Germany?  Did the fact that 
Germany’s anti-Jewish policies had evolved into violence make Canadians question their 
own antisemitic ideas against Jews?  One of the deficiencies within the historiography is the 
tendency to examine sub-groups within Canadian society—be it clergy, fascists, civil 
servants, or the intelligentsia—at the expense of answering a larger question: did the rise of 
Nazism shift ideas of what it meant to be Canadian? 
This chapter attempts to redress this imbalance by arguing that ideas of national 
identity provided the framework for Canadian responses to the Nazis’ policy towards Jews 
and the ensuing Jewish refugee crisis of the 1930s.  Although many Canadians believed that 
Canada was a land of minorities, Canadian nationalism drew strength from Canada’s 
imperial connection to the British Empire. Great Britain was not just significant to Canadians 
because it was the “mother country” of Canada and the home of many Canadian ancestors, 
but also because it was the purveyor of the liberal order that ensured the longevity and unity 
of the Confederation. Within the last fifteen years, Ian McKay has challenged historians to 
think of Canada as not simply a geographical expanse on the map. Rather, he urges scholars 
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to conceptualize Canada as a “certain politico-economic logic—to wit, liberalism.” For 
McKay, at the centre of Canadian history is the liberal order, which is defined by the 
supremacy of the “individual,” a decidedly nebulous creature whose status is determined by 
where he or she falls in regards to gender, class, and race.
73
 Canadians prided themselves on 
being a part of the British Empire because liberal principles that defined Canadian culture, 
such as equality before the law, private property, and civil liberties, were safeguarded by the 
British institution of parliamentary rule. Moreover, Britain’s mission to bring Christianity to 
the furthest reaches of the globe led Canadians to see the British Empire as the bastion of 
Western civilization. 
Throughout the 1930s, discussions on Nazi racism dominated the Canadian public 
sphere.  However, this focus was not necessarily because of humanitarian concern for Jewish 
victims; rather, three underlining factors influenced Canadian discourse over Hitler’s 
persecution of Jews.  First, Canadian opinion in the mainstream media was directed against 
Nazi racism because it constituted an attack on the liberal order, which threatened to 
destabilize international relations, push Europe into another war, and threaten the Western 
democracies. The tidal wave of antisemitic measures that followed Hitler’s rise to power, 
including the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935, revealed to Canadians the illiberal nature of 
the Nazi state.  Following Kristallnacht in 1938, Canadians observed that freedom of 
consciousness and religious belief in Germany had gone up in flames along with the 
synagogues. With both German citizens and the state looting property and throwing Jews in 
concentration camps to suffer torture and even death, clearly the sanctity of private property 
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and the rule of law had left Germany.  In tandem with Hitler’s antisemitic domestic policy, 
his blatant disregard for international conventions to preserve peace increased Canadian 
concern that war would break out.  
 Another characteristic of Canadian responses to Nazi persecution in the 1930s was 
the emphasis in the mainstream press placed on discussing the role of the perpetrators at the 
expense of considering the Jewish experience in Germany.  The main reason for minimizing 
discussion on Jewish victims was because Hitler’s anti-Jewish measures had created a 
refugee crisis and many liberal Canadians, especially those in government, had no desire to 
fuel domestic pressure to alter Canada’s restrictive immigration policy to accommodate the 
suffering Jews.  However, another important reason was that Canadians viewed the German 
people—not exclusively the German Jews—as Hitler’s primary victims.  Antisemitism was 
presented as a device used to corrupt democratic institutions and strip power away from 
citizens.  
Canadians were also concerned about the implication his domestic policy would have 
on foreign relations.  As Hitler tipped the balance of power in Germany’s favour through 
annexation and strong-arm diplomacy, the Nazis’ antisemitic policies signified to Canadians 
that the bulwark of liberalism, the British Empire, needed to prepare for war, not to save 
Jews, but Western civilization itself. Thus, Nazi antisemitism made Canadians more assured 
of their own liberal values and did little to initiate any soul-searching regarding domestic 
antisemitism. 
This chapter examines both Jewish and non-Jewish Canadian responses to the Nazis’ 
legislative assault on Jewish rights, culminating in the Nuremberg race laws in 1935.  By 
  36 
examining the press coverage of Nazi persecution of the Jews, this chapter seeks to 
determine whether the Nazi turn to violence shifted Canadian ideas regarding Hitler or 
antisemitism.  Finally, to gauge how the plight of the Jews shaped Canadian attitudes about 
their international role, this chapter explores Canadian responses to the voyage of the SS. St. 
Louis and the pleas to find a haven for Germany’s Jews in the summer of 1939, before the 
eruption of the Second World War.  The content of articles, editorials, headlines, and letters-
to-the-editor is analyzed and contextualized within Canadian national discourse to determine 
how both mainstream and Jewish Canadian responses to Nazi antisemitism were 
constructed.
74
 
1.1 The Nazi Revolution and the Dismantling of Jewish Rights 
 
When Hitler became Chancellor in January 30, 1933, it was no secret that the Nazi Party was 
rank with Jew-haters, even if Hitler disguising his antisemitism during the Nazi campaign for 
leadership.
75
  Almost immediately after the Nazis gained full political control of Germany 
through the Enabling Act of March 1933, Hitler imposed a series of anti-Jewish measures to 
curtail the Jewish presence in German society. A boycott of Jewish stores was implemented 
on April 1, which was enforced through sporadic violence against Jews by Sturmabteilung 
(SA) thugs.  With the boycott largely unsuccessful, Hitler turned to legal measures to ruin 
Jews economically.  He effectively removed Jews from the civil service on April 7, with the 
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so-called “Law of the Restoration of the Civil Service.”  Other laws soon followed that 
prevented Jewish lawyers and doctors from practicing in Germany.
76
  These antisemitic laws 
and violence were widely reported and denounced in the West.
77
  In Canada, Pierre van 
Paassen, writing for the Toronto Star from Berlin in 1933, sent back detailed reports of the 
Nazis’ brutal treatment of Jews that were widely published throughout the Canadian press.78   
The Canadian Jewish community was quick to protest the state-sanctioned 
antisemitism and anti-Jewish violence in Germany.  Jewish MPs S. W. Jacobs, A. A. Heaps, 
and Samuel Factor appealed to Prime Minister R. B. Bennett in a personal interview on 
March 22 for the Canadian government to “ascertain the nature of the mistreatment alleged to 
have been suffered by German Jews,” since the Nazis had censored the press, and to put 
pressure on the German Government through the League of Nations, which was supposed to 
protect “racial and religious rights.”  According to the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, Bennett 
received the delegation “sympathetically,” but promised only to contact Under-Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, Oscar Skelton, to obtain an accurate report of the Jewish situation 
in Germany.
79
  A number of protest meetings sprang up across the country to voice Canadian 
outrage.  On March 26, a Montreal conference of representatives from over 90 various 
Jewish institutions who gathered to discuss the plight of Jewry in Germany, quickly evolved 
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into a mass protest meeting.  Thousands of concerned Jews descended on the auditorium at 
the YMHA to voice their protest.  The “undercurrent of indignation that was seething in 
every Jewish heart,” according to the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, was palpable at the 
meeting.  The editor of the Chronicle noted, from various telegrams received by Jewish 
community leaders, that “the feeling of animus against the blood-begrimed Nazis is gaining 
in intensity and together with Jewry the world over, a full-throated expression of horror and 
protest will go forth to the civilized world.”80  In a resolution proposed by H. A. Caiserman 
and adopted at the conference, it was decided that a committee would be established to set up 
a boycott of German-made goods should Jewish atrocities in Germany continue.
81 
 Moreover, 
mass meetings were to be coordinated across Canada to protest “the maltreatment of our 
brethren in Germany.”82   
In an attempt to give these protests greater impact, Jews attempted to align 
themselves with broader Canadian political discourse by securing prominent secular and 
Christian leaders to speak at mass meetings and by appealing to British and Christian values 
of liberty and freedom as a basis for opposing Germany’s attacks on Jews.  In Vancouver, the 
fortunate 1500 protesters who managed to arrive before Moose Hall was filled to capacity 
listened as clergymen and newspaper editors denounced Nazism as an affront to both 
civilization and Christianity.  The Archbishop of New Westminster, A. U. De Pencier 
proclaimed that the Nazis’ boycott was “the greatest anti-Semitic movement in modern 
times.”  Speaking for the absent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Vancouver W. M. Duke, J. 
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M. Coady agreed and commended the meeting as an example to Germans “of the tolerance of 
Canadian people towards those of other creeds and race.”  For the Jewish Western Bulletin, 
“master of oratory” Rabbi Ben Zion Bokser of Beth Israel Congregation provided the most 
“impassioned speech.”  He lamented that if the “moral consciousness of the world” was not 
“roused” by the news of Nazi atrocities, the basis of civilization would be thrown into 
question: “Shall civilization look on with indifference?  If it does then let us go home and 
weep, for civilization is dead.  No country in the world has the right to elevate racial 
persecution to be a national policy.  Nazi Germany challenges not only Jews, but the whole 
civilized world.  Nazi Germany challenges Christianity—for whatever our religion, we are all 
believers in the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man.  Is it not time that hatreds 
and bigotries were forgotten?”83 
Throughout the country, protesters gathered and passed resolutions that demanded 
that the Canadian government denounce the “ghoulish attacks of the German Huns” as these 
attacks were abhorrent to “all liberty-loving regardless of race or creed.”84  In Hamilton, 
2000 citizens, including MP C. W. Bell and Mayor Peebles, unanimously adopted a 
resolution to “express their protest, censure and horror at the anti-Jewish action in Germany 
which is denying Jews the fundamental rights of every human being in a spirit contrary to 
traditions of British freedom of religion and of liberty.”  The resolution demanded that the 
Canadian and British governments “use whatever humane methods are within their power to 
prevent continuance and recurrence of such abhorrent tactics and to alleviate the distress 
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necessarily following it.”85  About 1200 Canadians, from “various religious denominations” 
according to the Canadian Jewish Review, gathered in London and accepted a similar 
resolution.
86
 
In Montreal and Toronto, the largest gatherings followed similar patterns of 
denouncing Nazism as reactionary.  On April 2, 3500 Torontonians poured into Massey Hall 
and heard shouts that Hitler and his henchmen “may wade ankle-deep through Jewish blood 
and tears, but eventually they will pay for it, every drop.”  MPP Sam Factor, noting that “it is 
very tragic that in this age of enlightenment it becomes necessary for Jews to hold meetings 
to protest the treatment of their people in other lands,” announced that that he would lobby 
the Federal Government to delay renewing the trade agreement between Germany and 
Canada that had expired in March, until Hitler had given assurances that the Jewish 
persecution would stop.  Rev. Canon Plumptre, speaking on behalf of Bishop Owen, stated 
that the West needed to protest Nazi antisemitism because “when justice fails, civilization 
crumbles to the ground.  A great injustice has been done, an injustice that touches the very 
heart of civilization.”  In a rather ironic speech, Ontario Premier George Stewart Henry 
admitted that he was shocked that the German ‘race’ could retreat so far from the precepts of 
civilization, but was hopeful that the atrocities would quickly end:  
One would have thought that in these times of civilization such persecutions 
would have faded from the face of the earth.  Possibly as a citizen of the 
British Empire I expected too much.  I thought people the world over had 
achieved the enlightenment of our empire.  It is unbelievable to us that there 
should be persecution anywhere in the world. We have always stood for 
freedom of worship and of speech.  The German and the British have sprung 
from the same stock and so I hope that within Germany itself there will arise a 
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protest that will stifle this threatened violence.  The Germans are a great 
people.  Surely they, in this advanced state of civilization, will not permit any 
authority so to disgrace their country and their people. 
 
Not convinced by Henry’s racialized wishful thinking, MPP Sam Factor proposed a 
resolution that was accepted by loud applause.  This resolution demanded that a petition be 
sent to the German Government “to put a stop to all anti-Semitic activities” under the threat 
that “we shall proclaim a boycott and urge both Jews and non-Jews to co-operate.”87 
An astounding 10,000 protesters met at Mount Royal Arena in Montreal, where they 
heard, among others, Mayor Fernand Rinfret, MPP Honoré Mercier, and two Jewish MPs: S. 
W. Jacobs and A. A. Heaps.  Due to the minority position of the French Quebecois within the 
Confederacy of Canada, speakers laid emphasis on the government’s role in protecting the 
rights of minorities.  Former President of the League of Nations Assembly, Senator Raoul 
Dandurand, “lifted the meeting out of the atmosphere of strictly Jewish protest to a higher 
plane of moral and political principle,” according to the Montreal Gazette, by showing that 
Germany was breaking international law by not protecting its citizens: “Minorities should be 
treated not only justly, but even generously, so that they may forget that they are minorities.  
This, in my view, is the highest manifestation of civilization.”  Rinfret agreed, stating that 
Germany had “disregarded the essential ethics of humanity and justice,” and thereby “soiled 
the German flag.”  Mercier, like many Canadians, thought Germany could learn much from 
observing how Canada treated its minorities: “Our country has been built on tolerance and 
the protection of minorities.”88  Rabbi Harry Stern also addressed the assembly and continued 
in the vein of other Jewish speakers: Nazism was aimed at the “uprooting of democracy and a 
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negation of human freedom.”  In answer to isolated voices that claimed that Jewish 
persecution was a German “local matter,” and not the concern of the international 
community, Stern gave the ominous warning that “barbarism has been revived once more in 
a civilized world...and this savagery is threatening international idealism and the 
comradeship of nations.”89 
At the annual convention held in Nuremberg from September 10-16, 1935, the Nazis 
gathered to celebrate the destruction of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919.
90
  With Germany 
about to host the Olympic Games in 1936, the Nazi Party tried to make Nazi anti-Jewish 
policies more palatable to the international community by legally removing Jews from 
Germany’s body politic. The new Reich Citizenship Law stripped Jews of their rights as 
citizens.
91
  Although the plan backfired, garnering criticism from the free world, what is 
revealing about Canadian responses is that while Jewish suffering was bemoaned, it was 
clearly of secondary concern.  Canadian outrage was directed at the Nazi measures for being 
anti-liberal, rather than racist.  Canadians were primarily apprehensive that Nazi minority 
policies might destabilize European politics. 
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In the lead-up coverage to the Nuremberg rally, the Canadian press hoped that Hitler 
would put an end to the violent tendencies of the Nazi Party’s racial policy to avoid sparking 
an international crisis.  On September 11, the Winnipeg Free Press reported that “Hitler 
would concentrate his efforts at the gathering on healing the breach between the extremist 
and more conservative factions of the party.”  While Hitler’s antisemitism was widely 
known, his concern that unbridled violence against Jews would disrupt Germany’s 
international relations and trade was seen as a restraining influence by Canadian observers.  
However, the Winnipeg Free Press saw verbal clashes between the “radical champions of 
‘Aryanism’ like Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels” and moderates, such as Hjalmar Schacht, the 
Minister of Economy, as “a source of anxiety”92   
Therefore, Hitler’s legal solution to the “Jewish Question” shocked Canadians.  On 
September 16, editors voiced their outrage at Hitler’s abandonment of individual rights and 
equality before the law.  Headlines slammed the Nazi legislation as regressive and barbaric.
93
  
The front page of the Calgary Herald contained the bombastic headline:  “NAZIS BAR 
JEWS FROM CITIZENSHIP: Race’s German Status Back to That Of Middle Ages.”94 The 
Winnipeg Free Press printed an editorial from the Manchester Guardian that insisted that 
Hitler should now be considered “Germany’s ‘Jew-baiter-in-Chief’.”  Since Mein Kampf 
contained “the weightiest verbal attacks on the Jews” and demonstrated that Hitler was 
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consumed by his “hatred of the Jews,” the Guardian was convinced that Hitler was behind 
the persecution of Jews.
95
 
While the Canadian press frowned on Hitler’s anti-Jewish legislation, they did not 
place much importance on the Nuremberg Laws.  From September 2, 1935 to September 25, 
1935, the racial laws received minimal coverage, especially in smaller, regional newspapers 
like the Regina Leader-Post and Halifax Herald.
96
   Nonetheless, this coverage often hit the 
front page, with more detailed follow-up news items being printed in the foreign news 
sections of the paper. Since Jewish families still hoped that they would be tolerated in 
Germany and a refugee crisis was not yet in full swing, pressure to let Jews into Canada was 
minimal.  Thus, while Hitler’s attack on the individual liberty of Jews was decried, the matter 
was still seen as a German domestic issue, and held little concern for Canadians. 
Canadian Jews viewed the Nuremberg Laws on two levels.  First, they understood the 
Race Laws as a natural continuation of the Nazi anti-Jewish policy in 1933 and thus a means 
to legislate Jews out of German society. “The policy of segregation,” reported the Western 
Jewish Bulletin, “is being pushed to a point where it has become one of complete isolation, if 
not oblivion, for Jews, and this is calculated to breed hatred,” with the purpose of renewing 
the economic, social, and cultural boycott on Jews.
97
  Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath linked the 
Nuremberg Race Laws with the creation of a legislative ghetto without the “towering walls 
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and gates which might protect its unhappy denizens from the brutality of the riotous mob,” 
thus “carrying us back into the darkest depths of the Middle Ages.”98   
However, on a more fundamental level, Canadian Jews began to see Jewish 
persecution as part of a struggle for civilization that was being fought in Germany.  In the 
Canadian Jewish Review’s “every Friday” feature, the columnist suggested that the 
significance of the “brutal defloration of a highly enlightened people by a ruthless robber 
band” went far beyond the threat to Jews alone, but constituted an assault on the values of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition: Germany was experiencing a “fight for the spirit of Hebraism, 
which includes both the Jewish and the Christian idealism, as against that paganism which 
threatens not only the Jews, but everything that is known as the Christian world.”  With 
antisemitism engrained within Nazi law, Jews were losing faith that German democrats could 
wrestle their country out of the grips of the Nazis:  “It still remains to be seen which will 
triumph as a guiding principle of governments, the maintenance of civil liberty or the 
curtailment of individual freedom and with it the denial of all the things of the spirit for 
which modern civilization is supposed to stand.”99   
However, many Canadian onlookers, including some Jews, had a propensity towards 
looking at Nazi antisemitism through the lens of German exceptionalism.  For example, 
Charles Bender, rabbi at the prestigious Spanish-and-Portuguese Synagogue in Montreal 
presented an early version of Germany’s Sonderweg that appealed to many Canadians.  In his 
pamphlet From Luther to Hitler: Why Anti-Semitism Is Indigenous To the German People, 
Bender argued that Hitlerism was no “historical accident”; rather, “for centuries past the 
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whole culture and civilization of Germanic thought have imbibed at a fountain of anti-
Semitism that has been flowing ceaselessly.”  Although Martin Luther initially “garbed 
himself in the mantle of humanitarianism” to convert Jews, he later “flew into a frenzy of 
hatred” and demanded that his followers “shun the Jews, to close them up in ghettoes, to 
drive them out if possible.”  It was Luther, according to Bender, who “laid the ground for an 
anti-Semitic movement which eventually became the national legacy of the German people.”  
By exploring the writings of German antisemites Wilhelm Marr and Herrman Ahlwardt, as 
well as the “renegade Englishman” Houston Chamberlain, the pamphlet asserts that 
antisemitism and “Teutomania” infused German nationalism.  The argument went that the 
distinction made “between Nazis and Germans are therefore unwarranted and untrue” since 
Hitlerism and antisemitism had become “woven into the tissues of the people.”  Bender 
suggested that since Germany was the “cradle of scientific anti-Semitism,” the persecution 
that Jews experienced elsewhere was because Germany “was not satisfied with creating the 
new anti-Semitism, but it managed to carry its virus into other countries.”100  The difficulty 
with blaming Germany for antisemitism was that Canadians then assumed that acts of 
antisemitism within Canada were anomalies; while antisemitic fascists might have peddled 
their antisemitic rags in Canada, Canadians could rest with clear consciences due to a long 
tradition of British individual rights. 
The press’ tendency to print news that emphasized the fantastical nature of Hitlerian 
antisemitism left Canadians bewildered by Nazi ideology and hindered many from seeing a 
correlation between Nazi racial thinking and antisemitism in Canada during the 1930s.  One 
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bizarre example of Nazi racial pseudoscience that raised Canadian eyebrows was German 
inventor Walter Schmitz’s pendulum.  In the days leading up to the Nuremberg rally, 
Schmitz made the ridiculous claim that the pendulum could detect Jews if swung over their 
“handwriting, finger-prints, and maybe other things.”  Schmitz believed that the pendulum 
worked because “All pure Aryan blood belongs to gold and platinum and Jewish blood to 
zinc and lead.”  Such antiquated thinking propelled the Montreal Daily Star to print the 
article on the front page.
101
  Originally published in Julius Streicher’s weekly publication 
German Health, the article made headlines in numerous Canadian newspapers. The fact that 
no Canadian newspaper under review specifically explained that the Nuremberg Laws used 
ancestral religious allegiance and linage, and not supposedly ‘racial’ science, to identify 
Jews, suggests that Canadians did not want to associate their own racialized thinking with the 
Nazis. 
For the Canadian Jewish community, however, the parallels between antisemitism in 
Germany and Canada were quite evident.  Beyond organizing mass protests and boycotts, the 
Canadian Jews also resurrected the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1934 so that the community 
could fight domestic antisemitism on a united front.  Certainly scientific racism had a long 
history in Canada.  It was “common sense,” to use James W. St. G. Walker’s term, for 
Canadians to believe that biology determined a ‘race’s’ mental acumen, labor abilities, sexual 
proclivities, and morality, since character and behavioral traits were thought to be passed 
genetically.
102
  Throughout the Western world, eugenicists were concerned that 
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miscegenation and the reproduction of “asocials” would lead to “racial degeneration.”  This 
phobia moved legislators in Alberta and British Columbia to implement a vigorous 
sterilization program against the “feeble-minded” to protect Canada’s Anglo-Saxon ‘racial’ 
stock.
103
  In Saskatchewan, statutes even prevented ‘white’ female laborers from being 
employed by “Chinamen,” because the “Oriental” ‘race’ was seen as primitive, driven by 
base desires, and posing a sexual threat.  Canadian eugenicists demanded that the state erect 
immigration walls to prevent Canada’s Anglo-Saxon racial stock from becoming 
contaminated.
104
  In 1923, through an Order in Council, the Canadian Government attempted 
to restrict immigrants by dividing applicants into three categories: Preferred Group, Non-
Preferred Group, and Special Permit Group.  Preferred Group referred to immigrants from 
North-Western Europe, as they were believed to have the “racial characteristics” necessary to 
integrate easily into Canadian society.  The Non-Preferred Group consisted of immigrants 
from Eastern Europe who would be admitted only if they were to settle in Canada’s 
hinterland and work in the agricultural and resource-development industries.  Jews, however, 
regardless of their nation of origin,
105
 were placed in the Special Permit Group, alongside 
“Orientals,” and automatically banned entry.  Thus, Jews could only enter Canada if the 
Canadian cabinet made an exception for a specific case.
106
  The policy was so clearly racist 
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that Harold Troper has declared that “in distinguishing Jews from non-Jews of the same 
citizenship, Canada predated the Nuremberg laws by more than ten years.”107 
Although racialized thinking was endemic within Canadian society well before the 
Nazi Revolution in Germany, the Great Depression had initiated a fascist movement within 
Canada that closely resembled Hitler’s Nazi movement.  An atmosphere of anxiety gripped 
the Jewish community as it became apparent that Hitlerism was infecting Canadian society.  
By 1933 Canadian youths were imitating Hitler’s brown-shirted SA and forming Swastika 
Clubs.  They marched along Toronto’s eastern waterfront intimidating Jewish residents from 
sunbathing on the beaches and occasionally instigating physical quarrels with Jews.  
Tensions came to a head on August 16, 1933 when, at the end of a minor league baseball 
game between St. Peter’s and the predominantly Jewish team Harbord in Toronto’s 
Willowvale Park, four youths from the Christie Pit Gang unfurled and displayed on the side 
of a hill a massive white quilt with a swastika painted on it.  One hundred Jews charged up 
the hill to destroy the banner and beat up those who had put it on display.  With cries of “Heil 
Hitler” being heard, the mob quickly grew to 10,000, according to the Canadian Press, and 
fighting erupted “as Jews recognized Gentiles.”108  In Quebec, Canadian fascists, such as 
Joseph Ménard and Adrian Arcand, published antisemitic tabloids that propagated the Elders 
of Zion’s mythical world Jewish conspiracy and the idea that Jews drink blood.109  However, 
antisemites were not just cranks.  Notable Catholic clerics in Quebec, such as Abbé Groulx, 
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demanded that Canadians boycott Jewish shops and “buy at home!”110  In his recent study of 
the early Canadian Jewish campaign to fight antisemitism, James W. St. G. Walker has 
shown that the Jewish approach was neither “‘passive’ or ‘apologetic’” in the 1930s.  
Canadian Jews utilized diverse strategies to subvert the Nazi threat in Canada.  However, 
since most Canadians saw Nazi antisemitism as a German problem and nonexistent within 
the Canadian experience, paramount in the Jewish agenda was educating Canadians of the 
presence of antisemitism in Canada.
 111
 
1.2  Kristallnacht: A Descent Into Lawlessness 
 
Throughout the night of November 9-10, 1938, the Nazis unleashed a coordinated attack on 
the Jews of Germany and Austria.  The murder of the German diplomat Ernst Vom Rath by 
Herschel Grynszpan, a Jew distraught over his family’s deportation from Germany, was used 
by the Nazis to unleash the murderous rampage.  Members of the Sturmabteilung, both in 
and out of uniform, systematically set ablaze hundreds of synagogues in Adolf Hitler’s 
Germany to destroy the Jewish community and drive them out of the Reich.  Jewish homes 
and businesses were looted and devastated.  This pogrom was given the euphemism 
Kristallnacht in an effort to shift the world’s gaze towards the seemingly innocuous shards of 
glass strewn on the streets from the broken windows of Jewish shops, and away from the 
ninety-one Jewish people who had been beaten to death by Nazi thugs.
112
  By November 12, 
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the Nazis had rounded up 30,000 Jewish men and driven them into concentration camps 
where many were killed.  To pay for the damaged property, an astronomically large fine of 
one billion marks was slapped on the Jewish community for allegedly provoking the riots.
113
 
In the days leading up to the November pogrom, the persecution of German Jews was 
of little concern to Canadians since it had little bearing on Western European politics.  
During late October and early November, Germany deported thousands of its Polish Jewish 
population, much to Poland’s chagrin. With antisemitism rampant throughout Polish society, 
thousands of Jews were denied entry into Poland and left stateless, trapped along the 
border.
114
 Canadians were, for the most part, indifferent.  Only the Montreal Star with its 
large Jewish readership printed several reports about “the fate of thousands of Jews stranded 
along the [German-Polish] frontier.”  The Montreal Star emphasized the human dimension 
and described the deteriorating conditions of trapped Jews.
115
  Most Canadian newspaper 
editors and their readers were unaware of the growing tensions that Nazi anti-Jewish policies 
were creating and therefore did not see Grynzpan’s shooting of vom Rath as very significant.  
Throughout November 8 and 9, the story gained more prominence as anti-Jewish 
demonstrations broke out across Germany and various Nazi officials began to threaten Jews 
with reprisals. On November 9, the Winnipeg Free Press printed the headline “Jews Fear 
Reprisals” followed by a British United Press (BUP) report claiming that “some well-
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informed quarters believed that measures were under consideration for expulsion of all 
foreign Jews from Germany.”  An unnamed high-ranking Nazi official told the BUP 
correspondent that “the Jewish question will now be brought to a solution.”116 
The article noted that Jews were “highly apprehensive” since the German press had 
become riddled with “anti-Jewish comment[s].”117  The call to “fight against the international 
Jewish danger” was warmly received in some German circles, and the Montreal Star 
specified that riots had erupted in Berlin and Vienna.
118 
 Using AP, the Regina Leader-Post 
and the Calgary Herald likewise printed that “reprisals against Jews” were already underway 
in Kassel and Bebra and that Nazis were in the process of “‘disarming’ Berlin’s Jews.”119  
Although most of the Canadian press contained clues of an impending attack on 
Germany’s Jews, when the story broke across Canada on November 10, nothing had 
prepared the Canadian public for the scale of the pogrom.  All Canadian newspapers gave 
Kristallnacht tremendous exposure.  The pogrom caught the Canadian public’s attention and 
it consistently appeared on the front page of most Canadian newspapers.  
Diligent coverage allowed journalists to expose the Nazi lie that Kristallnacht was a 
spontaneous outpouring of German rage against Jews.  The Montreal Star reported that the 
mobs were “carefully organized in advance.”  AP telegrams made it clear that the wrecking 
gangs were in fact made up of “groups of SA and SS men (the Elite Guards and Storm 
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Troops) wearing civilian clothes.”120  The following day, the Winnipeg Free Press pointed 
out that the police “merely kept the crowd back so the destroyers could work unhindered.” 
Making a mockery of German propaganda, the Winnipeg Free Press concluded that “the 
Jewish population was in terror, anticipating not only a continuance of ‘spontaneous’ 
demonstrations but a merciless official campaign of repression.”121  
On November 12, the Halifax Herald picked up the story and printed an AP release 
on the pogrom that showed that the Nazis were secretly behind the anti-Jewish rioting.  
Goebbels told the foreign press that “it is absurd to say that this thing (the demonstration) 
was organized,” claiming that the widespread damage was because “we did not have 100,000 
police available to put one before every Jewish shop.” However, the AP correspondent had 
none of it, pointing to the roundup of thousands of wealthy Jews throughout Germany.  The 
Halifax Herald agreed and printed the headline “German Police Launch Raids On Upper 
Class Jews” on its front page, suggesting that the pogrom was a Nazi initiative to take Jewish 
wealth.
122
 
In fact, most Canadian newspapers failed to examine critically the Nazi motives for 
organizing the pogrom.  The leading interpretation was that the Nazis had attempted to 
confiscate Jewish private property to bankroll the state.
123
  Headlines underscored this 
perspective by focusing on the widespread looting and destruction of property, such as 
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“Reich Jews Face Reign of Terror: 10,000 Shops Looted as Revenge for Paris Killing”124 and 
“Mad Torch of Hate: Nazis Burn, Smash and Pillage Jewish Shops and Synagogues.”125  This 
emphasis on the theft was reinforced when Hermann Göring announced a few days later that 
the Jewish population would have to pay a $400,000,000 fine to cover the damage caused 
during the pogrom. With economists saying that the cash available to Jews “would come 
nowhere near the total amount” demanded, it became clear to Canadians that the fine was 
meant to “strip Jews of every pfennig of ready cash and force the sale of holdings.”126 
The Canadian press noted that the Nazis had issued several decrees that prohibited 
Jews from owning retail stores and running any commercial or industrial venture.
127
  Under 
the headline “Synagogues Wrecked: Nation-Wide Attacks by Nazi Germans,” the Regina 
Leader-Post speculated that Kristallnacht “probably meant that shots fired in Paris have 
killed Jewish business in Berlin.”128 On November 11, the Calgary Herald confirmed that the 
Nazis had made a resolution to resurrect a Jewish ghetto in Berlin.  While such actions were 
meant to remove Jews from every aspect of German society, the AP report emphasized the 
economic consequences and noted that Jewish “shops would be tolerated only in sufficient 
number to supply the needs of the Jewish communities.”129  For the Canadian press, the 
pogrom was a decisive step in the Nazi drive to eliminate Jewish capital.  
The conspiracy theory that Jews controlled the world’s financial systems informed—
albeit subtly—the discourse on Kristallnacht in some Canadian newspapers.  Most notably, 
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the Halifax Herald’s coverage avoided any mention of Jewish terror in the face of vicious 
violence throughout the night of November 9-10. Only on November 14, when the fine and 
various Nazi decrees that targeted Jewish property were announced, did the Halifax Herald 
splash across its front page in bold, capital letters: “PANIC SPREADS AMONG JEWS.” 130  
The emphasis on Jewish concern over money, as opposed to the destruction of Jewish 
cultural and religious institutions, suggests that some members of the press were reluctant to 
question the racial stereotypes embedded within Nazi racial policies.   
The Montreal Star came closest to capturing the real essence of Kristallnacht, which 
was aimed at enacting the social death of Jews in Germany.  On November 12, it ran the 
headline “Nazis Bar Jews From German Culture: Reich Provides ‘Final Solution,’” under 
which it described various decrees issued in the aftermath of Kristallnacht that banned Jews 
from German cultural institutions, such as theatres and museums.  Although the article noted 
that Jewish stores and businesses destroyed during Kristallnacht were “not to be restored” 
and discussed the fine levied against Jews, this was presented as just one aspect of the Nazi 
campaign. After noting that tens of thousands of Jews were being hauled off to the Dachau 
and Buchenwald concentration camps, the Montreal Star recorded an interview with Dr. 
James W. Parkes in Toronto.  This British authority on antisemitism eerily predicted that 
“years of poverty and humiliation, ending in practical extermination, is the tragic future for 
Jews in Germany unless the great democratic nations open their doors to refugees.”131 
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1.3  Nazi Racial Policies: A Threat to Civilization 
 
It was not the awful plight of Jewish refugees or Canada’s immigration policy regarding Jews 
that fuelled Canadian interest in Kristallnacht.  Rather, Canadians fixated on the savage 
means by which Hitler attacked Germany’s Jews and the anti-liberal nature of Nazism.  On 
November 17, the Halifax Herald’s award-winning cartoonist Robert Chambers captured the 
dominant Canadian opinion regarding the Nazis in the following cartoon which depicts Hitler 
taking Germany into a Hobbesian “State of Nature” where law and civilization do not exist. 
Ominously, the remaining steps that Hitler was about to take were not yet labelled. 
 
Halifax Herald, November 17, 1938, p. 8. 
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Chambers was not alone in suggesting that Germany had abandoned liberalism and 
thus posed a threat to civilization.  According to W. G. McCutcheon, Chairman of the 
Montreal Council of the Canadian League for Peace and Democracy, not only was “civilized 
humanity... challenged by the forces of darkness and evil now ruling in Germany,” but Hitler 
“threaten[ed] the destruction of liberty and in fact all civilized human values throughout the 
world.” McCutcheon demanded that Canadians boycott German goods and that the 
government embargo exports to Germany, hoping that these measures would bring “Hitler to 
heel.”  Similarly, the Conservative MP for Kitchener, Ontario stated that “if Canadians did 
not let Germany know that those who value British freedom stand aghast, it would not be 
long until Nazi doctrines would spread.”132 
Another aspect of Western civilization that Hitler was trouncing was Christian 
egalitarianism, particularly the notion that all humans were equal in God’s eyes and that 
salvation was open to all.  On the Sunday morning of November 13, Rev. F. S. Morley of 
Stanley Presbyterian Church preached against all forms of racial discrimination.  Pointing to 
slavery and Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia, he argued that racism has “justified more 
baseness and cruelty than any other terror in the world.” 133 The next Sunday, pastors from 
numerous denominations continued to condemn the pogrom as anti-Christian.  He was 
“amazed that such atrocities and barbarities could exist in a supposedly civilized country” 
and could “not but deplore and condemn the many people indifferent to these rights and 
privileges.”  While many Canadian Christians may have felt that the Jews were misguided in 
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their rejection of Christianity, evangelism and toleration were seen as the civilized approach 
to the Jewish people, not violence.
134
   
Many Jews agreed that Nazism was not Christian, but essentially pagan.  Temple 
Emanu-El’s Rabbi Harry J. Stern held that “anti-semitism is just another form of witchcraft.”  
Rather than suggesting that the religious conflict between Christianity and Judaism explained 
contemporary antisemitism, he surmised that “modern Christianity has learned to appreciate 
its debt to Judaism and has grown to respect the mother-faith of Christianity.”  Instead, the 
“myth of racial purity” was at the root of Jewish persecution in Europe.135  Rabbi Charles 
Bender suggested that Kristallnacht was part of a war between Nazi paganism and true 
religion.  Pointing to the persecution of Christians as well as Jews, Bender argued that “there 
is…a deeper significance to the present era of German frightfulness, for together with the 
tragedy of the Jews, there is the onslaught against religious principles in general and the 
downfall of complete civilization.”  To defend both religion and civilization, Bender called 
on Canadians to go beyond “emotionalism” and allow entry to Jewish refugees: “Our present 
government can make for itself a lasting monument by saving the lives of thousands of 
German Jews.”136   
On November 20, thousands of Canadians participated in dozens of memorial and 
protest meetings organized by the Canadian Jewish Congress.  These gatherings occurred in 
“practically every important community across Canada,” according to the Halifax Herald, in 
order to “reveal to Germany the feeling in this country, and to give proof to suffering Jews 
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that they had the sympathy of the Dominion’s people.”  Although the Canadian Jewish 
Congress had hoped that these gatherings would put pressure on the Canadian Government to 
alter its immigration policy to accommodate Jewish refugees,
137
 most of the discussion 
generated at the meetings tended to focus on the Nazi perpetrators.
138
  At His Majesty’s 
Theatre in Montreal, Chief Justice R. A. E. Greenshields told thousands in the audience that 
pogroms in a “civilized country... are almost unbelievable” and that Kristallnacht was 
“worthy of as severe a condemnation by the right thinking as the worst ever done by the 
barbarians of the dark days of the Middle Ages.”139  With some exceptions, condemnation of 
Nazism, not the plight of Jews, was the topic of the day. 
The disdain for Nazism emanating from Canada on November 20 sparked an 
immediate verbal retaliation from Goebbels’ propaganda mouthpiece Voelkischer 
Beobachter.  “But why should Canadians look abroad?” Voelkischer Beobachter fumed, “If 
Canadian journalists want to see real atrocities they need only go to the Indian reservations of 
their own country. There they will discover what inhuman treatment really means; how the 
old Indian population was destroyed by starvation and liquor.” It targeted the Montreal Star 
specifically for launching a “campaign of hatred unequalled in baseness” against Germany, 
which could only mean that the Canadian newspaper was controlled by Jews and ought to be 
renamed “the Star of David.”140 
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The Nazi effort to draw the West’s gaze away from Kristallnacht by citing racism in 
the democracies was seen by Canadians as an assault on their identity as a welcoming land of 
immigrants grounded on British liberties.  “CANADA ATTACKED BY NAZI PRESS,”141 
“We Are Strafed!”142 and “NAZIS HIT CANADA”143 were just some of the front page 
headlines that appeared across Canada.  Pointing out the hypocrisy of criticism by the Nazis 
who clearly cared nothing for the sanctity of civil liberties, Canadian editors were determined 
to contrast Canada’s racial politics with the Nazis’ by stating that Canadian conduct towards 
racial minorities operated within the confines of British liberty. 
144
  Under the header—
oozing with sarcasm—“Lo, The Poor Indian!” the Halifax Herald editor noted that “Indians 
have freedom equal to that of any of His Majesty’s subjects. They may own property, engage 
in business or the professions. On the other hand, those who choose to remain wards of a 
paternalistic government are given land, monetary grants, medical services, food when 
required, and education.”145  The Regina Leader-Post editor agreed, stating that the “Indians 
are, in the main, a well-treated people.”146  The Calgary Herald was convinced that poor 
conditions among the First Nations were due to “at worst, administrative sloth and not of the 
calculated ferocity which Germany has so well exemplified of late.”147 
Interestingly, just a few months before these “baseless charges,” the Canadian 
government had opened an investigation into the legal role of ‘race’ in Canada.  In March 
1938, the German government had inquired through its Consulate in Ottawa “whether the 
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Canadian laws governing the exercise of civil and political rights, the marriage, the 
illegitimate sexual relations, the exercise of a profession, the administration of schools and 
universities, and the immigration contain provisions which make legal consequences 
dependent upon a person’s belonging, or not belonging, to a particular race of colour.”148  
After a three month investigation that included contacting Director of the Immigration 
Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, F. C. Blair, regarding ‘race’ in 
immigration regulations,
149
 Under-Secretary of State O. D. Skelton came to the odd 
conclusion that “as a general principle...the laws of the Dominion and of the provinces do not 
make the race of a person a factor of legal consequence.”  Skelton then proceeded to list 
“exceptions,” such as the “immigration laws respecting some Asiatics, the provincial 
franchise law for Chinese in Saskatchewan, and certain provincial laws affecting Asiatics in 
British Columbia.”  In regards to Amerindians, Skelton argued that the provisions were 
“protective rather than restrictive and apply to Indians living on land reserves,” despite 
having a list of provincial statutes appended to his letter to the German Consulate General 
which disenfranchised “Indians” with no mention of residence status.150  That Canada was a 
democratic nation founded upon British ideas of liberty free of racism was so engrained 
within Canadian consciousness that Canadians were incapable of seeing any similarities 
between Canadian and German racial politics. 
1.4  Kristallnacht and the Coming of War 
 
                                                     
148
 H. U. Granow to O. D. Skelton, letter, 14 March 1938, in LAC, External Affairs Records, RG25-G1, vol. 
1875, file 558, “Germany Request on Canadian racial policies in 1938.”  
149
 F. C. Blair to M. Wershof, letter, 23 March 1938, ibid. 
150
 Skelton to E. Windels, letter, 27 June 1938, ibid. 
  62 
Canadian discourse regarding Kristallnacht was part of an international debate in the 
Western democracies about whether Western civilization could remain safe from Hitler if 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy persisted. Rather than 
presenting Kristallnacht in hindsight, as a “prelude to destruction,” to use Martin Gilbert’s 
phrase, it is important to see Kristallnacht as its Canadian witnesses did: within the prewar 
international context.  
The Canadian press was acutely aware that Kristallnacht had effectively destroyed 
Britain’s confidence in its appeasement policy.151  Former British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden, who had resigned his post in opposition to appeasement in February 1938, demanded 
that Britain re-evaluate its foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany in the context of the “fresh 
outbreaks of lawlessness or brutality.”152  Picking up on the shifting political climate in 
Britain, Calgary Herald correspondent A. C. Cummings reported that Kristallnacht was 
pushing elements within the British oppositional parties—Labour and Liberal—together 
under Eden to form a “popular front calculated radically to change Britain’s present foreign 
policy.”153  The Winnipeg Free Press agreed and noted that oppositional parties in Oxford 
City were even using the slogan “A Vote for Chamberlain is a Vote for Hitler.”154 
Similarly, deteriorating relations between the United States and Germany over 
Kristallnacht provided Canadians with ominous signs of an impending war. In the immediate 
days following Kristallnacht, the Canadian press reported a “wave of protests” emanating 
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from the United States.
155
  President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s response to Kristallnacht was 
widely reported across Canada.  He condemned Germany’s attack on Jews, stating that he 
“could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth century civilization.”156  
Although Roosevelt did not sever diplomatic relations, he did recall American Ambassador 
Hugh Robert Wilson to Washington for “report and consultation.”157 The Halifax Herald 
reported that American Attorney-General Homer S. Cummings described Kristallnacht as 
“uncivilized” and compared the attack to “the cruelties of 19 centuries ago when Christians 
were fed to wild beasts.”158  
With diplomatic ties between Germany and the democratic nations strained, the 
Halifax Herald published the following cartoon by Robert Chambers, illustrating Germany’s 
departure from Western civilization. With Canada’s gaze fixed on the Nazis, the victim is not 
German Jewry, but the German nation itself. 
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Halifax Herald, November 22, 1938, p. 6. 
With Kristallnacht isolating Germany, the Canadian press became obsessed with the 
prospect that Canada might face a second world war.  For W. C. Wansbrough, headmaster of 
Lower Canada College, “ferocious and insensate” aggression against Jews had made 
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democratic countries question whether Hitler and Germany would uphold the international 
treaties they signed, including the Munich Agreement.
159
 One writer to the editor of the 
Montreal Star believed Canadians were “on the very brink of another and greater world 
conflict.  Millions of men from democratic countries will be pouring forth their blood for the 
ideal of freedom, religious and racial toleration.”160  Just a few months earlier, during the 
Sudetenland crisis, Canadians were debating whether “we could attain ‘neutrality’ or merely 
stay home and keep out of the war.” However, with Hitler’s actions against civilization, the 
Montreal Star sensed that Canadians realized that war was unavoidable and the conversation 
had changed to “how we can best get ready to repel a quite possible attack on our own 
defenceless cities and vulnerable ports.”161 
Letters-to-the-editor unanimously decried Chamberlain’s appeasement policy.  One 
writer asked the Montreal Star editor “what is going to be our situation in North America 
when the Fascist bloc dominate the World, as they intend to do, and will do, if Mr. 
Chamberlain is allowed to continue his weak and pro-Fascist policy of surrender.”162 The 
Regina Leader-Post warned that since Canada had “no army, no navy, no air force,” it was 
“in no shape to get into a war with Germany.”  To ensure that Canadians went beyond “soap-
box oratory” and put teeth behind the mass protest resolutions that branded “the Nazis of 
Germany as barbarians,” the Canadian government would have to divert funds from “bigger 
                                                     
159
 Montreal Star, 17 November 1938, 20. 
160
 Montreal Star, 19 November 1938, 8. 
161
 Montreal Star, 21 November 1938, 10. 
162
 Montreal Star, 15 November 1938, 10. 
  66 
relief budgets” towards military equipment and training.163  Clearly, Canada was focused on 
Kristallnacht because they were concerned that it might trigger a war with Germany.   
1.5  Canada and the Jewish Refugee Crisis 
 
Although the focus of the press was on the perpetrators, Jewish persecution did move many 
Canadians temporarily to demand that their government open the doors to Jews, often using 
letters to newspaper editors to share these sentiments.  One such letter by Marguerite Strathy, 
expressed the “cold horror and deep pity that fill[ed] the soul” of many Canadians.  Noting 
the accomplishments of Jews and that Jesus was Jewish, she reasoned that Canada should 
view the refugee crisis as an opportunity.
164
  The strategy of presenting the Jewish refugee 
crisis as an economic opportunity for Canada was propagated by Constance Hayward, 
Executive Secretary for the Canadian National Committee on Refugees and Victims of 
Political Persecution.  While addressing the Women’s Canadian Club, she claimed that 
Jewish refugees were a “blessing in disguise” and could pave “a way to economic 
activity.”165 The Ottawa Citizen called upon Canadians to demonstrate the sincerity of their 
protest against Nazi persecution of Jews, stating that “it would be timely evidence of the 
genuineness of this Canadian sentiment to make it possible for more of the exiled and 
persecuted people to find sanctuary in Canada, where the natural resources are more than 
sufficient to support 20,000,000 people.”166 
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Noting this outpouring of support, journalists believed Canada was largely in favour 
of at least a temporary increase in Jewish immigration. The Montreal Star was convinced 
that if the Canadian government decided to “find room for several thousand Jewish 
refugees,” they would be “received sympathetically, we believe, by all right-thinking 
Canadian citizens.”167 On November 21, after learning of “sheafs of telegrams [that] came to 
the government this morning urging that it do something by opening the doors to Jewish 
refugees,” Calgary Herald’s Ottawa correspondent Charles Bishop told his readers to 
“expect Canada will open doors to [a] limited number of German Jewish refugees.” Although 
he estimated that the humanitarian crisis would prompt Canada to “admit a few thousand 
refugees at least,” the Government need to qualify their response and factor in “national 
considerations,” specifically the “expansion of defence expenditures.”168 
However, not all Canadians agreed that increasing Jewish immigration into Canada 
was the solution to the Jewish refugee crisis. Several letters-to-the-editor stated that Jews 
were to blame for their own persecution and advocated for the present practice of restricting 
Jewish entry into Canada.  One letter in the Halifax Herald demanded that Canada continue 
to increase its population through admitting “preferred nationalists, and not the acceptance of 
objectionable peoples that are continually at variance with their neighbours.” This reader felt 
it necessary to remind other readers of the Halifax Herald that “the vast majority of these 
refugees belong to a race that has been shunned by most countries in every age, and of 
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which, probably, there are already too many in our country.”169  On November 4, Whidden 
Graham wrote to the editor of the Montreal Star claiming that Jews were “Asiatics: 
descendants of Mongol or Tartar tribes.”  He was convinced that Canada should apply the 
same immigration restrictions to the Jews as it did to the “Chinese, Hindus or Japanese,” or 
else the unemployment problem would escalate by “displacing some of the industrial workers 
who are now employed.”170 
Although such antisemitic remarks were vigorously shot down, the notion remained 
that Jews must bear some responsibility for why they caused “antagonism” with their 
neighbours.  One reader in the Montreal Star explained that he and other Catholics “found it 
extremely difficult to immunize ourselves from the subtle poison of prejudice,” but the 
“consensus of opinion seems to be that the root of the evil rests, paradoxically, with the 
victims themselves.”  He hoped that the Montreal Star would provide “enlightenment” or 
“truth” on the matter, because as the case was currently presented, “one is led to believe that 
their own racial habits and characteristics are largely responsible for bringing down these 
torrents of abuse and ill-treatment upon their heads.”171 
Due to the belief that Jews did not make good citizens, editor of the Regina Leader-
Post, D. B. MacRae complained that “it is not good enough for Germany to say ‘If you want 
the Jews, take them.’ If Canada started to abuse her German, her Polish, her central European 
elements, would it be good enough for Canada to ask the other nations to come and take them 
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if they did not like what Canada was doing? It may be the easiest thing to say, but it is no 
answer.”  For this editor, Canada should not sacrifice its national interests by altering its 
“racial” and religious composition simply because of the illiberal actions of another 
country.
172
 Rather, MacRae argued that Canada should help alleviate the “refugee problem” 
by admitting Sudetenland Germans, “who are opposed to Nazi control.”173  The Canadian 
Corps Association suggested to Prime Minister Mackenzie King that “Africa might be a 
more suitable place for [Jewish] settlers.”174  King seemed inclined to agree, noting in this 
diary before Kristallnacht that “My own feeling is that nothing is to be gained by creating an 
internal problem in an effort to meet an international one....  We must seek nonetheless to 
keep this part of the Continent free from unrest and from too great an intermixture of foreign 
strains of blood....  I fear we would have riots if we agree to a policy that admitted numbers 
of Jews.”175 In fact, most discussion of how the Jewish refugee crisis was going to be solved 
focused on distant colonial holdings, such as Kenya, Tanganyika and British Guiana.
176
  With 
Canada on the verge of war to save civilization from Hitlerism, King was hardly willing to 
open Canada’s gates to Jews and risk national unity. 
Scholars have noted that the Protestant clergy were vocal in their criticism of Nazi 
racial policy.
177
  However, even the church was often hesitant to recommend whole scale 
Jewish immigration into Canada.  Focus remained for the most part on the ugly nature of 
German antisemitism and away from the racism of Canada’s restrictive immigration policy.  
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Many Christians did not necessarily believe that the solution to Germany’s “Jewish problem” 
was mass Jewish migration to Canada.  The hope was that world opinion would pressure 
Germany to reverse its anti-Jewish policy.  By arguing that antisemitism and racism were 
anti-Christian and noting the extreme nature of Nazi racism, Canadian Christians avoided 
confronting their own racist assumptions.  Myron O. Brinton, a Baptist preacher in Nova 
Scotia, reminded his congregation that the “Kingdom [of God] embraces all races and classes 
and nations wherein no race or nation is supposed to have special privileges, and our ideals 
of British justice demanding equal right to all and special privileges to none.”178  In a similar 
vein, the Catholic Archdiocese in Halifax instructed its parishioners to “pray fervently that 
God will assist them [Jews] in their affliction and also that God in His mercy may convert 
their tyrant persecutors to more humane ideals or in His justice may take from those 
persecutors their power of enslaving and crushing their fellow-men.”179   
When discussion moved towards Canada as a potential sanctuary for Jews, many 
Christians were quick to note that Canadians should not be too generous.  The Baptist 
Convention of Ontario and Quebec urged that Canada allow entry to “carefully selected 
individuals or groups of refugees.”180  The hypocrisy of condemning Nazis for antisemitism 
and upholding a racist immigration policy was not lost on some Christian ministers.  
Anglican minister J. E. Barret condemned fellow Christian organizations for their “half-
hearted” appeals to the government, noting that the continued demand for only “selected 
refugees” suggests that Canadian were “far more interested in what we can get from the 
                                                     
178
 Halifax Herald, 21 November 1938, 14. 
179
 Halifax Herald, 21 November 1938, 14. 
180
 Marilyn Nefsky, “The Shadow of Evil: Nazism and Canadian Protestantism,” in Antisemitism in Canada: 
History and Interpretation, ed. Alan T. Davies (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), 205. 
  71 
refugees than what we can give them.”181  While exceptions abound, it is evident that most 
Canadian Christians were shocked and appalled by Nazi atrocities against Jews, but were 
only willing to make a token gesture to disassociate themselves from Germany’s racism. 
During the summer of 1939, the Jewish refugee crisis had intensified and Jews were 
frantically trying to escape Germany.  In what has become one of the most famous efforts to 
escape Nazi Germany, 936 Jewish refugees boarded the MS St. Louis in Hamburg on May 
13, 1939, headed for Cuba.  However, when the St. Louis arrived in Havana after its two 
week voyage, the Cuban government denied entry to all but 29 Jews, even after the American 
Jewish Joint Distribution offered a $500 bond for each Jew admitted.
182
  With passengers 
desperate not to return to Germany in the aftermath of Kristallnacht, the ship floated 
frantically around the Atlantic for nearly a month during which time several passengers 
attempted to commit suicide.  Appeals to the United States and Canada to open their gates 
and permit the refugees entry were rejected.  Recently, documentation has come to light that 
shows that the State Department “worked behind the scenes to ensure that none of the 
refugees was returned to Germany,” not because of concern for Jews, but because they were 
worried that the crisis could “wreck British negotiations with Germany to avoid war.”183  
Ultimately, on June 6, 1939, the St. Louis sailed back to Europe, as Britain, France, Belgium, 
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and Holland agreed to admit them.  By 1942, 227 of these passengers had been rounded up 
and exterminated by the Nazis.
184
 
Despite Canadians’ intense concern for the Jewish situation in Germany in November 
1938, by the summer of 1939, their interest had again waned and the St. Louis received 
minimal coverage.  Articles rarely went beyond stating bare-bone facts and came almost 
exclusively from AP and UP.  On May 31, the story broke across Canada that Cuba had 
denied admission to the refugees and remained in the papers for the following few days.  The 
Montreal Star and the Halifax Herald printed the story first and emphasised the desperate 
state of Jews aboard.
185
  The next day, the Winnipeg Free Press picked up the story, noting 
that Cuban officials were concerned about the potential for a “collective suicide pact” among 
the passengers, or that the Jews might “mutiny” when the ship departed to return to 
Hamburg.
186
  Several newspapers briefly reported on June 3 that the Dominican Republic 
was willing to accept the refugees and the story nearly disappeared from Canadian 
newspapers for two weeks.
187
  There was only fleeting reference to the fact that plans to find 
a haven in the Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic, had fallen through.
188
    
Only the Montreal Star was willing to provide context and devote significant space to 
explaining that Cuba’s anti-Jewish policy was affecting other ships carrying Jewish asylum-
seekers to Cuba and that American Jewish communities were working to reverse the Cuban 
                                                     
184
 Rosen, Saving the Jews, 103, 120.  A total of 254 of these passengers died at the hands of the Nazis.  See 
Sarah A. Ogilvie and Scott Miller, Refuge Denied: The St. Louis Passengers and the Holocaust (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 174. 
185
 Montreal Star, 31 May 1939, 32; see also Halifax Herald, 31 May 1939, 1. 
186
 Winnipeg Free Press, 1 June 1939, 5. 
187
 The Winnipeg Free Press, 3 June 1939, 3, 31; Halifax Herald, 3 June 1939, 1; Regina Leader-Post, 3 June 
1939, 7; Montreal Star, 1 June 1939, 1. 
188
 Regina Leader-Post, 7 June 1939, 1. 
  73 
decision or find homes for these Jews elsewhere.
189
  Although coverage in the Montreal Star 
was sustained, the story only resurfaced in other newspapers on June 14, when various 
Western European countries announced that they would give asylum to the refugees.
190
  The 
AP report that appeared in various Canadian newspapers presented the episode as a triumph: 
“eager hopes turned first into tragic disappointment and then desperation, ended happily.”191  
With the exception of the Montreal Star’s pages, Canadians would have encountered little on 
the St. Louis saga in the Canadian press.  Rather Canadian attention was fixated on King 
George VI and Queen Elizabeth’s tour across Canada.   
When Jewish refugees were discussed in the press, Canadians continued to avoid 
presenting Canada as a potential haven.  Chas V. Hunter suggested to the editor of the 
Montreal Star that Russia would be a good candidate to take Germany’s Jews because it was 
“an immense country” and “there are thousands of wealthy Jews in the world who could 
become agriculturalists” in Russia.  Since “many British troops have shed their blood in 
order to maintain order and peace” between Jews and Arabs, this correspondent suggested 
Zionism ought to be abandoned.  Strangely, this writer ignored the fact that Canada could 
also welcome Jews as farmers.
192
  UP Correspondent Dana A. Schmidt even reported that 
thousands of Jewish refugees in Europe were receiving training in “agriculture” and 
“handicrafts” through ORT trade schools to revise “the charges perhaps most consistently 
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brought against Jews—that they are merchants, that they tend to concentrate in and dominate 
intellectual occupations, and that they shun manual labor.”193 
Jewish critics of Canada’s refugee policy argued that Canada was missing an 
opportunity.  Berlin Rabbi Joachim Prinz visited Canada in June and in an address to the 
Women’s Canadian Club in Fort Garry Hotel, reminded his audience that Canada is “an 
empty country and cannot prosper without selected immigration.”  For him, the Canadian 
government was pursuing a “short-sighted policy” by not considering immigrating Jewish 
refugees, who could “bring to this country valuable industries.”  Prinz was convinced that 
popular images that “these Jews are savages” were unfair since “most of them are college 
graduates.”194 
By the summer of 1939, Canadians were beginning to revise their assumption that an 
influx of labour would stagnate economic recovery and lead to greater unemployment.  The 
Winnipeg Free Press noted that these economic reasons had become the “chief objections” to 
welcoming refugees into Canada, since most were not farmers.  However, the Winnipeg Free 
Press editor insisted that “this is not altogether certain” and that “the exact opposite has been 
the case in other countries.”  Pointing out that refugees “bring new skills” and “additional 
capital,” the editor suggested that they could be the key to job creation.  While not all 
refugees were wealthy and “there are lawyers who have to be re-trained,” Jewish and 
Christian refugee organizations had ensured that “not a single refugee has appeared on the 
public charity rolls.”195  F. C. Brown, former president of the Canadian Manufacturers’ 
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Association agreed, stating that “skilled refugees” could be instrumental in creating “new 
industries” throughout Canada.  With the expense of the railroad, Brown insisted that Canada 
needed to increase its population simply to afford its infrastructure: “A nation with Canada’s 
vast network of railways and government services cannot afford to stand still.”196   
Although many Canadians supported increasing immigration and helping to resolve 
the refugee crisis, they were determined that decisions for admitting refugees into Canada be 
based on how refugees would strengthen the economy.  Grant Dexter, writing for the Regina 
Leader-Post, pointed out that Canada was already following this policy and that 20,000 
refugees would be admitted into Canada throughout 1939 if the practice of granting 100 
permits to refugees each week was continued.  Grant argued that refugees were making a 
positive impact on Canadian economic development. Although the refugees admitted were 
not Jews but mainly Sudetenland German refugees, Grant believed that there was little 
opposition in Canada for treating refugees “as immigrants,” rather than “considering refugees 
as human beings whose plight calls for action from a Christian country.”  Without opposition 
to this practice from Canadians, Grant was certain that “no change will take place.”197  When 
the Canadian Medical Association met on June 19, 1939, its members too were concerned 
that admitting Jewish refugees would threaten their jobs, especially considering that 
“Canadian universities are already graduating enough doctors to take care of present needs.”  
In response, the Calgary Herald insisted that the humanitarian crisis put a moral obligation 
on Canada: “where can these persecuted people go?”  The editor also felt the need to remind 
readers “all are not Jews.  There are hundreds of thousands of residents in Czechoslovakia, 
                                                     
196
 Winnipeg Free Press, 14 June 1939, 4. 
197
 Regina Leader-Post, 16 June 1939, 4. 
  76 
who are desperately anxious to escape from German Nazi terrorism.”  It was these refugees, 
according to the Calgary Herald, who “could make a valuable contribution to any country 
that would receive them,” not Jews.198  Therefore, voices demanding that Canada offer 
sanctuary to the desperate Jews aboard the St. Louis were silent in the Canadian press.   
1.6  Conclusion 
 
Despite the immense amount of attention Nazi racial policy garnered in the Canadian press, 
Kristallnacht did little to change Canadian attitudes towards Jews.  That Canada was a 
democratic nation founded upon British ideas of liberty was so engrained within Canadian 
consciousness that most Canadians were reluctant to see any similarities between Canadian 
and German racial politics. The shift of Nazi racial policy from legalized discrimination to 
state-sponsored violence and terrorism against Jews only served to reinforce the view that 
racism was a blight that had infected the German nation, but was largely absent from 
Canadian life.  Rather than looking at the underlining assumptions of racialism that informed 
racist decisions throughout the West, the Canadian media showcased the sensational news 
story that the Nazis had stripped Germany of the rule of law, the rights of private property, 
religious freedom, and individual liberty.  The focus of the press was on the Nazi perpetrators 
and the victimhood of the German nation, rather than the suffering of Germany’s Jews.  
Canadians felt confident that the British liberalism that was ingrained within Canadian 
consciousness and institutionalized through Canada’s legal and parliamentary system 
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immunized Canadian culture from racism and the ravages that were being unleashed in 
Germany.  
Yet Canadian debate concerning Jewish refugees during the late 1930s was framed 
within in a racist discourse.  Even following Kristallnacht, Canadians were often reluctant to 
perceive Jewish refugees as useful Canadian immigrants.  Racial assumptions moved 
Canadians to demand that their government be highly selective in admitting Jews.  In the 
minds of Canadians, the ideal refugees fleeing from Hitler were not the Jews, who were 
stereotyped as exploitative capitalist geniuses, but the ‘white’ Sudeten Germans, whose 
industrious ‘racial’ qualities and Protestant work ethic would fuel them to extract the wealth 
from Canada’s natural resources.   
Canada’s popular response to Hitler’s racial policies was therefore measured.  
Canadians voiced their outrage over Nazi atrocities against the Jews, holding that racism was 
both unchristian and uncivilized.  However, they refused to allow the Nazis to dictate 
Canadian immigration policy.  Hitler’s efforts to export Germany’s minority problem to 
Canada was seen as an effort to stir up racial tensions within Canada and weaken Canada’s 
potential war effort.  Few saw the contradiction of preserving an immigration policy based on 
racial stereotypes while condemning Hitler’s persecution of Jews. 
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Chapter 2 
The Canadian Jewish Encounter with the Holocaust, 1939-1948 
For Canadians, the realization that Nazi Germany’s persecution of Jews had evolved from 
discriminating laws and localized violence to systematic mass murder happened in the midst 
of Canada’s war effort.  Canadian newspapers slowly filled with details of Hitler’s campaign 
to exterminate European Jewry.  Reporters dug up grisly details of how Nazis tortured and 
then killed vast numbers of individuals whom the Nazis believed to be “racially” inferior.  
Files in the Canadian government quickly filled up as concerned citizens sent letters and 
telegrams pleading that Canada do something to help rescue Jews trapped in Europe.  
Publications and reports painted the grim picture that all of occupied Europe was being 
forced to submit their rights and their Jews to the Nazi state.  Governments-in-Exile, notably 
Poland, published reports describing how their populations were being ravaged by the Nazis.  
These revelations, forwarded to Ottawa, showed that Eastern Europe was being transformed 
into a German colonial hinterland and as a result was becoming a Jewish graveyard.  Jews 
had no place in the new Nazi racial order and were being exterminated, while other local 
populations were being enslaved.  The terror that the Nazi totalitarian regime would be 
imposed on Western Europe and eventually the New World was ultimately the main impetus 
behind Canada’s war effort. 
 However, the fact that the Canadian Government methodically prevented Jews, who 
were trying to escape Europe, from finding sanctuary in Canada has led historians to question 
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the notion that Canada was fighting the “good war.”1  How could Canada fight a war for 
“freedom,” to liberate the oppressed nations of Europe and do so little to provide sanctuary to 
Jews, knowing full well that they were destined for extermination?  To understand this 
seeming contradiction, historians have focused on three aspects of the bystander experience.  
First, they attempted to measure the level and nature of Canadian antisemitism and racism to 
determine whether Canadians were indifferent to the suffering of Jews.  Second, historians 
explored what Canadians knew about the persecution of Jews and when they discovered their 
systematic extermination.  Third, enormous scrutiny has been given to the efforts of the 
Canadian Jewish community to lobby the government and raise awareness of the tragedy 
befalling European Jews.  While these studies have shed light on the efforts of Canadians to 
end racism in Canada, due to the highly charged nature of the debate regarding Canadian 
culpability over the Holocaust and contradictory nature of the source record, the 
historiography tends to be polemical. 
 Books about Canadian antisemitism during the Second World War have provided 
grim reading, often leaving Canadians in disbelief.  Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s None 
Is Too Many provides copious documentation on the persistence of antisemitism within 
government circles.  Much of their criticism is directed at Frederick Charles Blair, Director 
of the Immigration Branch in the Ministry of Mines and Resources until 1943, who had a 
“strong personal distaste for Jews” and was given a free hand to exercise his “fetish for 
regulations” to keep Jews from entering Canada.  However, these historians recognize that 
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the decision to stop Jews from entering Canada in any significant number was a “a political 
decision, not a bureaucratic one.”  Consequently, they examined the attitudes of Canadian 
cabinet ministers, diplomats, and public opinion makers and found that antisemitic 
stereotypes of Jews were prevalent throughout Canada, making Canadians wary of opening 
their doors to Jews and apathetic to their suffering.
2
   
This study has been complemented by numerous publications throughout the English-
speaking world that suggest that the Allies were indifferent to the plight of Jews and that they 
put war goals ahead of rescuing Jews.
3
  Canadian studies have taken a regional approach to 
show that antisemitism was not uniform throughout the country, but manifested itself 
differently amongst the English-speaking elite, Quebecois nationalists, and populist 
movements.
4
  Historians have built on this research and plotted the various campaigns to rid 
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Canada of racism, often pointing out how legal and legislative reform was prioritized to 
transform attitudes towards minorities and minimize racial discrimination.  This research 
hints that the Holocaust provided ammunition to hurl at bigots following the war, but that 
racism was so embedded within the discourse over rights and freedoms that it endured in 
Canada.  As Carmela Patrias and Ruth A. Frager write, “widespread efforts to dispel 
prejudice and fight against discrimination after the Second World War were not spontaneous 
reactions against the horrific consequences of racism that had manifested themselves during 
the war, but the result of campaigns that were carefully and painstakingly orchestrated.”5 
 Despite the depth of research that has gone into uncovering Canada’s seedy past, 
many Canadians have found the picture too dark and have attempted to find other 
explanations for Canadian inaction with regards to Jewish refugees.  Utilizing content 
analytical methodologies that examine the frequency, location, and wording of news of the 
Holocaust in the press, a method that has become common practice in American 
historiography, some historians have examined whether Canadians actually knew that Jews 
were being exterminated by Hitler during the war.  Some American studies have cast doubt 
on whether the American public realized that Jews were being hunted and killed.  Deborah 
Lipstadt argues that American journalists were hesitant to give prominence to news of the 
Holocaust because they feared that the atrocities were exaggerated or fictionalized as they 
had been during the First World War.  Therefore reports on the Holocaust that crossed news 
editors’ desk were often omitted or buried in the back of newspapers because they seemed 
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too incredible to be believed and might undermine the newspaper’s credibility as an objective 
source of news.
6
  Similarly, Laurel Leff’s painstaking analysis of the New York Times’ 
coverage of the Holocaust came to the compelling conclusion that news of the destruction of 
European Jewry was minimized to belay the suspicion that the newspaper was a Jewish 
mouthpiece.  Moreover, the Times’ publisher, Arthur Hay Sulzberger, held the opinion 
accepted by American Reform Judaism that Jewry was defined by its religion rather than as a 
people group or nation and therefore the victims of atrocities ought to be referenced by the 
nationality of their residence.
7
   
Similarly, examinations of Canadian media coverage of the Holocaust during the war 
have cast doubt on whether Canadians realized that Jews were being exterminated.  Most 
historians agree that the Canadian Government only realized the extent of Germany’s war 
against the Jews in 1942, but are less inclined to speculate whether the Canadian public knew 
at that time.
8
   Historians have often argued that the Holocaust only came to the attention of 
the public sphere throughout the West when Allied soldiers, quickly followed by reporters, 
marched into the extermination camps of Eastern Europe and the concentration camps of 
Western Europe and saw the corpses of Hitler’s victims.  The graphic and disturbing images 
of mounds of bodies and the machinery of murder seemed to grab the attention of the West 
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and became a spectacle for newsreels, magazines, and newspapers.
9
  In Canada, Irving 
Abella and Harold Troper write that “with the discovery of the camps, the public, including 
the Canadian public, now knew what its governments had long known about events in 
Europe.”10  Similarly, Janine Stingel argues that the Holocaust became known “by the war’s 
end, [to] any Canadian who read a newspaper,” which makes abhorrent the fact that 
antisemites in the Social Credit Party had suggested that the Canadian Jewish community 
was exaggerating the extent of Jewish losses in Europe.
11
   
Yet some historians have suggested that Canadians had only themselves to blame for 
not understanding that Hitler was waging a war against the Jews, even in the last days of the 
Nazi regime.  David Goutor has found that the Canadian press woefully neglected attention 
to the Holocaust by de-emphasizing the Jewish identity of the victims in reports of the 
liberation of the concentration camps.  This trend was not due to a “climate of disbelief in 
Canada about the Holocaust,” but because Canadians were indifferent to Jews.  Because of 
this prejudice, the press neglected to inform Canadians “of the centrality of antisemitism in 
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Nazi ideology” and minimized coverage of Canada’s criminally negative response to Jewish 
refugees frantically trying to escape Hitler’s empire.12  
Nonetheless, the claim that Canadians were ignorant of Hitler’s diabolical plan to 
make Europe Judenfrei is not without its critics.  Gerald Tulchinsky, a historian who has 
devoted the last forty years to understanding the development of Canada’s Jewish 
community, insists that the frequent reports in both the Jewish and mainstream media of 
Jewish massacres after mid-1942 led Canadians to realize the scope of the Holocaust: “Soon 
reports were appearing regularly in the Canadian press, and by 1943 the destruction of the 
Jews of Europe was indisputable.”13  Ulrich Frisse has conducted a study of the Toronto 
Daily Star in which he argues that the Holocaust was a “recurrent and overall continuous 
theme that allowed Canadians to understand the true nature of the destruction process.”14   
The suggestion that the Western public remained unaware of Hitler’s destruction of 
Europe’s Jews has become a damning indictment against the Jewish communities throughout 
the free world.  In the United States, accusations have been made that the wealthy American 
Jewish community was more interested in upward social mobility and keeping step with the 
Roosevelt administration than with prioritizing rescue.  Haskel Lookstein has stated that he 
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looked “in vain…for a sign that American Jews altered some aspect of their life-style to 
indicate their awareness of the plight of their European brother.  There was no need for civil 
disobedience; some small gesture would have sufficed to keep the matter at the forefront of 
their consciousness and to generate feelings of sympathy and solidarity….The Final Solution 
may not have been unstoppable by American Jewry, but it should have been unbearable for 
them.  And it wasn’t.”15  David Wyman has noted that the fragmentary nature of the 
American Jewish community—racked by divisions over religion, class, and Zionism, and 
without effective leadership—delayed the formation of the War Refugee Board and 
forestalled efforts to rescue Jews before the majority was killed.
16
   
Similar criticism has been launched at the Canadian Jewish community, although the 
debate is less contentious than in the United States. Irving Abella and Harold Troper initially 
set a moderate tone in the historiography by noting that the diplomatic approach that the 
Canadian Jewish community chose to win support for opening Canada’s gates was 
understandable for the times: “Without doubt, mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, 
hunger strikes and protest marches to Parliament Hill, although perhaps cathartic to a Jewish 
community seething with the anguish of rejection, would only have confirmed what many 
Canadians believed—Jews were a disruptive, selfish and dangerous group.”  Ultimately, the 
Canadian Jewish community lacked clout in Ottawa.
17
  Franklin Bialystok has gone one step 
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further, condemning Canadian Jewish leadership for being “unduly timorous in their efforts 
with the government.”  Although he admits that the “Jewish community was weak, 
fragmented, and outside the power structure of Canadian decision-makers,” he finds that 
Canadian Jewry became focused on the war effort at the expense of helping their brethren in 
Europe: “Concern about the murder of European Jewry was submerged by the war effort 
itself.”  This led to lackluster fundraising campaigns for devastated Jewish communities in 
Eastern Europe and weak relief and rehabilitation efforts in the few years following the 
war.
18
  Max Beer has pursued this line of inquiry and agrees that Canadian Jews were more 
interested in being perceived as patriotic than in saving European Jewry: “as the war 
progressed loyalty to Canada and support for the war effort became the overriding issues for 
the community and the leadership and concern for their European brethren faded into the 
background.”19  Adara Goldberg, a student of Bialystok, concurs, noting that budgets for the 
rehabilitation of Jewish refugees who managed to secure entry into Canada were 
“miniscule,” suggesting that the community lacked interest in Holocaust survivors.20 
This chapter will attempt to unravel the various conflicting interpretations that 
surround the Canadian Jewish response to the Holocaust by moving beyond the simplistic 
question of whether Canadians “knew or not” about the extermination of Jews, to examine 
how Canadians understood Hitler’s atrocities against Jews.  I argue that Canadian Jewish 
responses to the Holocaust were conditioned by the Canadian war effort and a keen 
awareness of domestic antisemitism.  Whereas the Canadian Government attempted to 
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universalize the victims and focus on the perpetrators of the crime to solidify Canadian 
support for the war, Canadian Jews sought to build Canadian sympathy for Jewish victims by 
presenting European Jewry within the confines of Canada’s struggle to defeat tyranny.  For 
Canadian Jews, framing the Holocaust around the theme of resistance—rather than 
victimization—worked to attempt to give meaning to the enormous loss of life, but also to 
justify the need for Canada to rethink its antisemitism and allow Jews to escape to Canada.  
Moreover, by presenting Jews as an ally fighting Nazi Germany, Canadian Jews hoped to 
support the opening up of Palestine as a means to reward Jewish war efforts.  Due in part to 
the grotesque nature of Germany’s campaign  against the Jews and the Government’s 
reluctance to bring the Holocaust into public debate, Hitler’s crimes against the Jews did 
little to move Canadian society to rethink their own racist assumptions.  Rather, mainstream 
Canadian discourse delved into the corrupting and degenerative effects that antisemitism 
wrought on the perpetrators rather than trying to understand the perspective of the victims.  
When Jewish survivors were discussed in the Canadian press, they were often presented as a 
lens through which Canadians could glimpse the pathology of the Nazis.  For Canadian Jews 
though, understanding Jewish resistance went beyond political arguments to address the 
spiritual crisis gripped by the community. 
2.1 The Effort to Keep the Holocaust out of its ‘Good War’ Against Nazism 
 
When Canada declared war on Germany on September 10, 1939, its stated purpose was to 
defend freedom, the British Empire, and Western civilization.   Canadian parliamentarians 
would certainly have remembered Kristallnacht, but Canada’s decision had less to do with 
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protecting Jews and more to do with protecting the liberal order in Europe.  Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King’s three hour speech made no mention of Jews since they were seen as one 
group of victims among many.  With the Nazi encroachments into Poland, it was clear that 
Nazi lawlessness had shifted from the domestic scene to the international sphere.  Hitler’s 
“wanton disregard of all treaty obligations” and dastardly use of “terrorism and violence,” 
according to King, demanded that Canada join the Christian crusade against Nazi Germany 
and save the liberal order: “The forces of evil have been loosed in the world in a struggle 
between the pagan conception of a social order which ignores the individual and is based 
upon the doctrine of might and a civilization based upon the Christian conception of the 
brotherhood of man, with its regard for the sanctity of contractual relations and the 
sacredness of human personality.”21 
Following the declaration, the Canadian Government embarked on a public opinion 
campaign to solidify support behind the war effort by creating national pride around it.  To 
emphasize the necessity of sacrificing lives in the pursuit of a total war to defeat Nazi 
Germany, especially following the fall of France in June 1940, the Government depicted 
Canada as the antipode of Nazi Germany.
22
  Although a significant aspect of the program to 
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demonize Nazi Germany was shedding light on Nazi atrocities, the Canadian Government 
neglected drawing attention to the extermination of Europe’s Jews.  King’s speeches 
throughout the war explicitly excluded any mention of Jews, even when he addressed 
German mass murder in Eastern Europe.  Rather, he persisted in defining Nazi atrocities as 
actions against liberalism and examples of Nazi godlessness. 
At Chateau Laurier on September 17, 1941, King presented Germany’s expansion in 
light of his own research on industrial relations, arguing that just as “industry must recognize 
that it existed to serve the needs of humanity; not that humanity existed to serve the greed of 
industry,” Germany’s military ambitions were an example of “the evil of national power 
when it exalts itself above humanity.”  At the core of Germany’s national chauvinism was the 
Prussian militaristic mentality: “It is the real force behind the Nazi terror.  It is the real secret 
of German power.  It remains the implacable foe.  The German war machine, the inhuman 
monster which the Prussian mind has created and continues to direct has already ravaged a 
whole continent and impoverished, enslaved, strangled or devoured millions of human lives.  
It is a dragon which can only be slain by fighting men.”23  King’s problem with the Prussian 
mentality was the ideology of racial hierarchy, which, as he explained at the start of the Third 
Victory Bond Drive on October 16, 1942 in Montreal, threatened minorities and by extension 
the Canadian way of life, given that Canada was a land of minorities: 
Our nationhood is not based on the superiority of a single race, or of a single 
language.  Canada was founded on the faith that two of the proudest races in 
the world, despite barriers of tongue and creed, could work together, in mutual 
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tolerance and mutual respect, to develop a common nationality.  Into our equal 
partnership of English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, we have 
admitted thousands who were born of other racial stocks, and who speak other 
tongues.  They, one and all, have sought a homeland where nationality means 
not domination and slavery, but equality and freedom….  Only by extending 
throughout the world the ideals of mutual tolerance, of racial co-operation, and 
of equality among men, which form the basis of Canada’s nationhood, can 
nationality come to serve humanity. 
24
 
 
For King, the wholesale mass murder on the Eastern Front was endemic to Hitler’s imperial 
war: “where the master race fears the greater fertility of other races, wholesale extermination 
by starvation, disease, and even by mass murder, has been in evidence.”  Atrocities were not 
committed “in the heat of battle, or for purposes only of terrorization, but as the deliberate 
instrument of Hitler’s racial policy.”  However, perhaps surprisingly, while King exclaimed 
that Canada was fighting to end “mass murder,” “racial extermination,” “destruction of 
culture,” and “persecution of religion,” he failed again to mention that the prime targets of 
Hitler’s ‘race’ war were Jews.25   
There are two reasons why King specifically minimized the Jewish tragedy in his 
speeches.  First, he was more concerned about Hitler’s threat to Christianity than to Jews.  In 
a tortuous line of logic, King became convinced that Hitler was murdering Jews in order to 
destroy Christianity.  King arrived at this notion following a meeting with two prominent 
Zionists, Archibald J. Freiman and Chaim Weizmann on May 9, 1941.  Weizmann was 
visiting Canada in an attempt to gain support for the position that increasing Jewish 
immigration into Palestine would facilitate the creation of a valuable ally in the Middle East 
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against the Axis.
26
  However, King interpreted Weizmann’s point that Nazism was an 
antichristian philosophy to mean “that Hitlerism was not aimed against the Jews 
fundamentally but at Christianity through the Jews.  That what Hitler was out to destroy was 
Christendom.  I believe in this he [Weizmann] is right.  He [Hitler] does not want a 
brotherhood of man.  He wants to have his fellow-men ruled by an armed guard.” 27  
Therefore, in King’s mind, the attacks on Jews were a means to solidify power in order to 
destroy Christendom.   
The second reason that King kept focus away from the Jewish tragedy was that 
Canadians were uninterested in Jews at best and hostile to the idea of Canada becoming a 
haven for Jewish refugees.  In fact, King appeared more concerned for the fate of British 
citizens in the wake of the collapse of France than for the fate of Polish Jews who were being 
sealed inside ghettos.  After reading Hitler’s “A Last Appeal to Reason” speech of July 19, 
1940, in which Hitler called for Britain’s surrender to avoid further casualties, King wrote 
“Words cannot describe my feelings as I read Hitler’s speech, particularly with its threats of 
extermination of the peoples of Britain.  There is something terribly diabolical about a nature 
that could express its determination to destroy human life regardless of its innocence or 
extent.  A man who had sold himself to the lower depths of hell could not have expressed 
himself more damnably.”28   Sensing astutely that Canadians were more concerned with the 
immediate aspects of the war than with the murder of European Jewry, King mandated that 
government propaganda avoid the topic.  He told as much to Emil Ludwig, a German-Jewish 
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historical writer, who appealed to King on June 11, 1944 to allow Jewish refugees to settle in 
Canada to escape Hitler: 
29
 “I explained to him again the nature of the political problem, the 
difficulty of a leader of a govt. bringing up this question on the eve of an election but agreed 
that Canada would have to open her doors and fill many of her large waste spaces with 
population once our own men had returned from the front.”  To rescue Jews trapped in 
Europe before the war’s end would not be politically expedient.  Frustrated that offering his 
sympathy was not enough, King wrote in his diary following Ludwig’s visit: “I must say 
when one listens to accounts of their [Jewish] persecutions, one cannot have any human 
sympathies without being prepared to do much on their behalf.”30  While there was political 
capital to be gained by decrying Hitler’s atrocities, focusing on the Jewish aspect of the 
Nazis’ murdering rampage was counterintuitive in King’s mind. 
The obscuration of the Holocaust was mandated throughout the Canadian propaganda 
infrastructure. The two government agencies that controlled information regarding Canada’s 
war effort—the Wartime Information Board31and the National Film Board—were 
remarkably silent about the mass murder of Jews, even during the liberation of the 
concentration camps.  Throughout most of the war, both agencies were led by John Grierson, 
the WIB’s General Manager until 1944 and the commissioner of the NFB.  As his biographer 
Jack C. Ellis wrote, Grierson’s “social conscience and vision led him to accentuate the 
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positive and avoid the negative propaganda of hate so easily available.” 32  While he focused 
on presenting different aspects of the war effort to build unity among Canadians,
 33
 Grierson 
also produced documentaries that dealt with aspects of Nazi atrocities; however, these were 
carefully edited and scripted to avoid referencing the unique tragedy befalling Jews. When 
asked by his American Jewish friend Arthur Gottlieb in the summer of 1942 why the NFB 
“has maintained a virtual silence about Hitler’s war against the Jews,” Grierson initially tried 
to excuse the NFB’s lack of response, claiming that “there just is no contemporary footage 
about the rumours we keep hearing about.”  Gottlieb remained unconvinced that this was the 
reason and pressed Grierson further: “you know bloody well the killing machine against the 
Jews goes on unchecked.  Let’s face it.  Canada is an anti-Semitic country that couldn’t give 
a damn about the Jews.”  Grierson admitted that he was not entirely wrong and that the 
government was “willing to be led, rather than to lead a Canadian public opinion that is 
frankly anti-Semitic, particularly in Quebec.”  On why the NFB had produced no 
documentary on Jewish refugees, Grierson explained that his hands were tied:  
The Cabinet War Committee declared Canada’s information policy on this 
issue: remain silent.  Ottawa ordered all atrocity stories held up until they 
could be verified….Government policy has spared Canadian civilian morale 
and some possible guilt feelings.  Mr. King’s government has long depended 
upon Quebec’s votes and seats in Parliament, and English Canada fears 
becoming awash in a sea of Jewish refugees.  The government is not prepared 
to lose votes on the Jewish issue.  It is a closed subject at the NFB.
34
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This censorship of the Holocaust was maintained throughout all of the NFB 
productions for the duration of the war.  Although the NFB’s first major series, Canada 
Carries On, described the war experience from multiple perspectives, its World In Action 
series delved into the political implications of the Nazis’ bid for hegemony in Europe, and 
took exceptional care to avoid discussing Europe’s Jews.  For example, Geopolitik – Hitler’s 
Plan for Empire argued that the West was slow to react to the threat of fascism, but instead 
of emphasizing Germany’s assault against the Jews in the 1930s and the West’s 
unresponsiveness to the ensuing refugee crisis, the documentary criticized the West’s 
indifference to the overthrow of the Spanish Republic.
35
  In another documentary produced in 
1942, War for Men’s Minds, the NFB examined Nazi ideology at length, but did not mention 
Hitler’s antisemitism.  According to the writer, Stuart Legg, at the heart of the Nazi “creed 
was violence,” which the narrator contrasted with the British liberal tradition: “And in every 
quarter of her [Britain’s] Empire – wherever her subjects aspired to the freedom of self-
government – Britain held up this old liberal ideal of change by gradual reform.”  Legg’s 
simplistic message was that the democracies would be victorious if they remain united: “with 
this weapon of human brotherhood firmly in our hands, we are discovering the real meaning 
of the war for men’s minds.”36  Even in the documentary covering the liberation of 
concentration camps, Behind the Swastika: Nazi Atrocities, the NFB continued to minimize 
Jewish victims by claiming that atrocities were directed against individuals who challenged 
the Nazis’ tyrannical rule.  In one scene, as the camera panned across liberated emaciated 
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prisoners, the narrator declared “These are the men who dared to defy the Fuehrer, free 
thinking men who believed in the democratic principles, Jews and Gentile.  Their only crime 
was that they were anti-Nazi.  They were herded into concentration camps and left to the 
mercy of sadistic guards, who beat, starved, and murdered them in thousands.”  The 
remainder of the short film documented the Allied soldiers, politicians, and journalists 
witnessing the human carnage.
37
  The intent of Canadian propaganda was to reinforce the 
paradigm of Canada as a tolerant, liberal society by “othering” Nazi Germany and presenting 
it as the antithesis of Canadianism.
38
 
The practice of reinforcing Canadian self-perceptions as a harmonious multicultural 
state by “othering” the Nazis and avoiding discussion of the Holocaust is also evident in the 
Canadian Government’s fundraising efforts.  Posters demonized Hitler, insisting that Canada 
had to defeat Nazi Germany to avoid enslavement.  These posters did little to draw attention 
to the Holocaust.  
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War Victory Bond Poster, 1943, LAC
39
 
Rather, the focus was on differentiating between German nationalism and the 
Canadian experience, suggesting that racism was being imported into Canada by a Nazi fifth 
column determined to foster disunity and weaken Canada’s resolve for war.  Harry 
Mayerovitch drew one poster that featured a Nazi spirit rising out of a grave clutching a 
paper inscribed with “Race Prejudice, Discrimination, Intolerance.” The poster was 
captioned: “We’ve Buried the Body…Let’s kill the Spirit,” essentially tying Canada’s fight 
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against racial discrimination to the military conflict.
40
   In 1943, the campaign against racism 
in Winnipeg embraced the slogan “Be Canadian.  Act British,” enforcing the mentality that 
tolerance and acceptance of difference creeds and ‘races’ was the essence of British North 
America. 
                                                     
40
 Harry Mayerovitch, “We’ve Buried the Body,” n.d., in LAC, Harry Mayerovitch fonds, MG30-D400, vol. 1, 
“Second World War artwork, posters and designs.” 
  98 
 
The Winnipeg Tribune, 6 November 1943, 5
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The most elaborate fundraising operation, “If Day,” simulated the occupation of 
Winnipeg by mock Nazi forces on February 19, 1942, but also paid no heed to the Nazi 
persecution of Jews, despite its intended purpose of awakening the Canadian imagination to 
the horrors of the Nazi threat.  Terror was envisaged through an emergency blackout at 7 AM 
amid the screaming of air raid sirens to recreate the London blitz.  The Nazi attack on liberty 
was embodied by troops attired in Wehrmacht uniforms who burnt books in front of the 
public library and reprinted the Winnipeg Tribune in German, renaming it Das Winnipeger 
Lügenblatt.
42
  Premier John Bracken, his cabinet, and the mayor were arrested, churches 
were closed, and a curfew was imposed.  However, there were no reports in the local press 
that these mock Nazi soldiers rounded up Jews specifically.  No indication that the shops 
looted were owned by Jews.  In fact, Life magazine coverage of the spectacle noted that the 
“‘Nazis’ close[d] the Protestant and Catholic Church,” apparently leaving synagogues 
alone.
43
  Presumably, due to the absence of antisemitism in this fake Nazi assault on 
Winnipeg, the Canadian Jewish press refused to cover the event.
44
 
The Canadian Government’s decision to keep the Holocaust out of the public 
spotlight was certainly not due to a lack of information coming out of Europe regarding the 
extermination of Jews.  Information on the Nazi atrocities was being digested and published 
by Jewish organizations as early 1941.  One key source that Canadian officials could have 
acquired, although they did not, was a study by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, entitled Jews 
in Nazi Europe, February 1933 to November 1941, which was presented at the Inter-
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American Jewish Conference in November 1941.  The plus-100 page document copiously 
tracked the persecution of Jews by country, noting the deteriorating conditions of Jews in 
German-occupied areas.  The report’s analysis of Polish Jewry indicated that the Nazis 
intended to murder its population: “extermination is the main object of the whole policy of 
the Germans toward the Jewish population both in Poland and in Germany.” 45 
Although the Canadian Government did not seek out available information on the 
Holocaust, it nonetheless had a fairly substantial quantity of intelligence on the issue that had 
been collected and analyzed by foreign governments and forwarded to the Department of 
External Affairs and even the Wartime Information Board.  One of the most detailed and 
earliest sources available was a confidential series entitled “Report on Jewry,” prepared by a 
team of researchers in Britain’s Ministry of Information.46  Using intercepted correspondence 
between Jewish informants in Europe and the Middle East often to American Jewish charity 
agencies, such as the Joint Distribution Committee, the British compiled lengthy reports on 
the conditions facing European Jewry, attached translated copies of the correspondence, and 
distributed the material to its Allies.  The fifth report, dated February 9, 1942, but only 
received in Ottawa on May 14, 1942, covered the period from September to December 1942, 
and began by making clear that the latest information “brings the toll of deportation and mass 
murder a stage further towards the apparently intended climax of complete extermination.”  
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With regards to Jewish efforts to effect rescue, the writer noted that “it is an ironical fact that 
considerable facilities for immigration have now been offered by the Western Hemisphere 
when apparently insuperable barriers have arisen in Europe.”47  What followed was a 
breakdown by occupied country of the anti-Jewish laws being enforced and the number of 
Jews being deported to the East.  Of particular note was the section on Poland, which 
documented the acceleration of the Final Solution from “first hand accounts from deportees 
in Poland, sent by underground routes through neutral intermediaries to London.”  Under the 
header “Mass Murder on Polish Territory,” the British author warned that the Nazis were 
speeding up their extermination campaign against Jews, chronicling that “during September 
rumors began to accumulate from many sources regarding a plan for the wholesale massacre 
of the Jews deported to Russia and Poland.”48   These “rumors” were now facts, according to 
the report, and there was solid evidence that “there was a plan behind these measures 
[deportation] to exterminate immediately the largest possible number of Jews.”  According to 
various sources listed, half of the Warsaw Ghetto had been “liquidated” by October 1942.49  
As early as November 12, 1943, External Affairs also had accounts from Jewish partisans 
who witnessed the Jewish communities of Bendin, Dabrowa and Sosnowiec being rounded 
up and sent “to the annihilation camp at Oswiecim.”50 
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External Affairs also was receiving reports from Governments-in-Exiles, specifically 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, which revealed that Jews were being hunted and murdered en 
masse throughout Europe.  Following the razing of Lidice, Dr. Hubert Ripka, the 
Czechoslovakian Secretary of State, informed Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for 
Canada in London, on two separate occasions, June 2 and 17, 1942, of the terror unleashed 
by the Nazis at Lidice and Lezaky in retribution for Reinhard Heydrich’s assassination.  On 
February 26, 1943, Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, brought Massey up to 
speed on the continuing efforts of the Nazis to squash resistance in Czechoslovakia, noting 
that in the week following Heydrich’s death, 1,288 individuals had been murdered by the 
Nazis.  Interestingly, Masaryk also pointed out that Kurt Daluege, who was appointed as 
Protector of Moravia and Bohemia following Heydrich’s death, had “intensified the anti-
Semitic measures” and “expedited the deportations.”  By the end of 1942, only 18,000 Jews 
remained of the 90,000 prewar Jewish populations of Bohemia and Moravia.  In Slovakia, an 
additional 76,000 Jews had been deported to Poland, leaving only 19,000, most of whom 
Masaryk said were awaiting their own deportation to concentration camps.
51
   
Information on the Holocaust was not restricted to confidential files in External 
Affairs; detailed reports of the Holocaust also made their way into Wartime Information 
Board files, which could have been used as a source for its fundraising campaigns and 
propaganda materials.  In late 1942 the WIB received a copy of Bestiality…unknown in any 
previous record of history, a grisly documentation of the crimes perpetrated against Poles.  
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Although this report was commissioned by the Polish Government-in-Exile, and thus framed 
Germany’s crimes against all Poles, it did contain a section on the “destruction of the Jewish 
population,” which outlined the escalation of the mass murder of Jews.  Ghettos were 
described as places of death, which had “incredibly miserable conditions, the mortality is 
enormous, and it is an everyday phenomenon for dead bodies to be lying in the streets.”  
However, the method of murder had quickened from death by starvation and disease to mass 
shootings and asphyxiation.  British Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, was quoted 
as estimating that 700,000 Jews had been murdered in Poland by the summer of 1942.  Most 
of the Lublin ghetto had been transported “over a period of several days to the locality of 
Sobibor…where they were all murdered with gas, machine-guns and even by being 
bayoneted.”  The Poles warned that the “Jewish population in Poland is doomed to die out in 
accordance with the slogan, ‘All the Jews should have their throats cut, no matter what the 
outcome of the war may be.’” 52    
Numerous research papers were also collected in the WIB files discussing Nazi racial 
thinking, most notably Wiener Library’s The Nazis at War bulletin, which translated and 
contextualized Nazi press statements and speeches about war aims.
53
   Many other analyses 
on Nazi racism in the WIB files were written by Britain’s Ministry of Information.  In one 
document on German education, the author noted that “the Nazi system is based on the twin 
myths of racial purity and racial superiority.  Its aims are the glorification of the German 
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people and their domination of all other peoples by conquest.”54  In another document 
discussing German war aims, the author gathered copious amounts of documentation to 
demonstrate that Hitler was carving out a colonial empire in Europe based on a racial 
hierarchy, which would be achieved in two stages.  Germany sought “mastery over all other 
races” through conquest and enslavement.  As “a master race is liable to decay if it leaves the 
work to inferior peoples,” the Germans would “ultimately exterminate and replace other 
races.”  The German extermination of the Jews was presented as essential to this mission and 
therefore Jews were being targeted first: “Nazi Germany aims to go back not only to the days 
of slavery, but ultimately, to the still more primitive times before slavery, on which 
enslavement in its day was a forward step, -- namely the times when victors simply 
exterminated the vanquished, as in the jungle.  The start has been made with the Jews, then 
with the Poles, -- to be continued elsewhere.”  Despite this 20,000 word document only 
referencing Jews in two other locations, this minimization of the Holocaust should not be 
taken to mean that information was unknown.  Rather, Hitler’s crimes against Jews were so 
familiar, that the report explained that its minimal treatment of “the systematic German 
policy of extermination of Jews everywhere and taking over their places by Germans are too 
notorious to need quotations in proof.”55 
While lack of intelligence cannot explain the Canadian Government’s silence on the 
Holocaust, there is evidence that any Government effort to tie Canada’s war effort to Hitler’s 
atrocities against European Jews would alienate Quebec opinion.  The most palpable 
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expression of antisemitic derision over Canada’s fight against Nazism was a series of anti-
Jewish riots in Montreal in anticipation of the April 27, 1942 plebiscite on whether the 
Government should be released from its promise not to institute the draft.  On March 17, 
1942, following an anti-conscription meeting with Liberal MP Jean-Francois Pouliot 
sponsored by the “League for the Defense of Canada,” an estimated 450 youths paraded 
down St. Lawrence Boulevard through a predominantly Jewish section, yelling “À bas les 
Juifs!” smashing several shop windows, and initiating several violent altercations with local 
Jewish residents in front of the YMHA.  The police managed to chase the demonstrators 
away, arresting eight youths.
56
  Although a larger and more violent anti-conscription riot had 
rocked the city a month earlier following a speech by Henri Bourassa, which left a dozen 
police officers injured, it had been devoid of antisemitic expression.
57
  The Montreal press 
was insistent that the antisemitism in Quebec should not be exaggerated.  Torchy Anderson 
of the Montreal Gazette wrote: “don’t think that all the people of Quebec are shouting ‘À bas 
la conscription,’ and breaking Jewish shop windows.  The great majority of them are reading 
the world news in the newspapers—and understanding it.”58  The Montreal Daily Star 
agreed, insisting that “these young men should not be taken seriously.”59  Yet Canadian Jews 
were not about to brush off these incidents as the impetuous acts of bored youths.  A. M. 
Klein called attention to the “prepared placards” and the coordinated march upon the Jewish 
district to show that “this demonstration was by no means a spontaneous manifestation.”  He 
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was convinced that “a hand, yet unseen, directs” these assaults and that a fifth column resides 
within Quebec.
60
  J. J. Glass, Ontario M.P.P., also brought this argument into Queen’s Park, 
saying that the riot “bears the stamp of the Nazis.  It is a well-defined principle of the Nazis 
to divide the people.”61  Due to these specific incidents and the general belief that antisemitic 
stereotypes abided in the hearts of many French Canadians, suggesting that Canada was 
sacrificing blood and treasure to stave off a Jewish crisis, rather than defending Canadian 
national interests, was not seen by the Government as a wise method of cementing support 
for the war effort.  Government statements on Nazi atrocities tended to avoid mention of 
antisemitism, as it was a dividing issue amongst Canadians.  To better serve the war effort, 
the Canadian Government framed the discourse on Nazi atrocities around Germany’s illiberal 
and anti-Christian policies, a propaganda strategy formulated in the 1930s. 
2.2 Canadian Mainstream Press Coverage of the Holocaust 
 
Although the Canadian Government did not specifically broach the subject of the Nazi war 
against Jews, Canadian newspapers did receive a copious amount of detailed reports 
concerning the mass extermination of the Jews, primarily through British and American 
wireless agencies.  Throughout the first three years of the war, the Canadian press framed the 
ghettoization and extermination of Jews within the context of Germany expanding its illiberal 
domestic policies into occupied territories.  Therefore, Nazi crimes against Jews were not 
treated as unique, but as just another example of German irreverence for human life and the 
liberal order in its aim to subjugate Europe.  When the press attempted to understand why the 
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Nazis were brutally suppressing occupied territories, it followed the Canadian Government’s 
line of reasoning that the Nazis were vigorously stomping out resistance to their tyrannical 
rule.  Thus, the victims—including Jews—were perceived as political opponents to Nazism, 
motivated by their religious convictions to uphold the liberal order.   
There is little evidence to suggest that Canadians doubted that Europe’s Jews were 
being murdered en masse since much of this information came from official channels, even if 
they were not coming from the Canadian government.  By late 1942 information about the 
Holocaust was widely available and the Allied governments confirmed that the Nazis’ racist 
ideology was motive for exterminating the Jews.  Mainly gleaned from the American press, 
Canadian newspapers began to fill with reliable information on the millions of Jews being 
murdered throughout 1942 and 1943.  The news reports that Heinrich Himmler had “ordered 
the extermination of one-half of the Jewish population of Poland by the end of this year 
[1942], and that 250,000 had been killed through September under that program,” was 
distributed by CP and made it clear that Jewish deaths were not incidental casualties of the 
brutal fighting along the Eastern Front, but specifically targeted by the Nazis.
62
  The Inter-
Allied Information Committee’s press release in December 1942, which stated that 99 
percent of Jews in Yugoslavia had been murdered and that Poland had become “one vast 
centre for murdering Jews” was printed throughout Canadian newspapers.63  In the Globe 
and Mail’s June 16 1942 “War Summary,” it was estimated that the 60,000 Jews living in 
Vilna, Lithuania had been shot en masse over the span of two weeks, which the editor 
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described as “probably the greatest manslaughter in all history.”64  A statement made by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, on October 29, 1942 which declared that Jews 
from across Europe were being murdered from as early as the age of two was printed in the 
Toronto Star under the headline “Exterminate Jews is Seen Nazi Aim.”65 
On November 24, 1942, WJC Chairman Stephen S. Wise made the statement that the 
U.S. State Department had verified the authenticity of the Gerhart Riegner Telegram, which 
confirmed that the Nazis were carrying out a campaign to exterminate the entirety of 
European Jewry.  The story was distributed by AP in Canada and noted that two million Jews 
had already been murdered in an “extermination campaign.”66  The Canadian newspapers 
also reported that U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt was “profoundly shocked to learn” that two 
million Jews had been murdered by the Nazis.
67
 
Following the State Department’s verification of the Reigner telegram, the United 
States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, in addition to various governments-in-exile 
issued a declaration on December 17, 1942 condemning the Nazi extermination of Jews, 
prompting a flurry of coverage in the Canadian public sphere regarding the Holocaust.  The 
declaration confirmed that the Nazis were “now carrying into effect Hitler’s oft-repeated 
intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.”  Geographically, the statement pointed 
to Poland as the “principal Nazi slaughter-house.”  The Allies warned that “those responsible 
for these crimes shall not escape retribution,” and appealed to “all freedom-loving people to 
overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny.”  The statement was quoted extensively in the 
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Canadian press, often making front page material.  Although the Canadian Government was 
not involved in drafting the declaration, the press noted King’s statement that his 
administration was “glad to associate itself with an Allied declaration.”68  King continued by 
stating that the Nazi atrocities had consolidated Canadian public opinion behind the war 
effort: “The Governments of freedom-loving nations have joined in this declaration in order 
to make it clear to Nazi leaders that their extermination policy, far from rendering the Nazis’ 
position in Europe more secure is having the opposite effect of speeding Allied efforts to win 
an early victory and to bring closer the day of retribution.”69 
With evidence piling up, the Winnipeg Tribune did not even believe that the Nazis 
were attempting to keep their extermination program a secret.  Following a report from the 
War Information Board in February 1943 on the horrendous conditions in Warsaw, editor 
John Bird wrote that “Nazism make no bones about the purpose behind their savagery—it is 
to wipe the Poles and the Jews from the face of the earth.”70  
Throughout the war, the World Jewish Congress and American Jewry were also 
regularly putting out press statements about the Holocaust that were picked up in the 
Canadian press.  In June 1942, the WJC issued a press statement noting that over one million 
Jews had been murdered since the invasion of Poland.  The report noted that Jews were being 
rounded up throughout occupied Europe, deported to Eastern Europe, and shot en masse by 
firing squads.
71
  In February 1943, the British branch of the WJC issued a statement that 
created a stir in Canada by providing evidence that the Nazis were issuing a new directive to 
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“speed and intensify the extermination by massacre and starvation of the Jews remaining in 
occupied Europe.”  The WJC report stated that numerous jurisdictions were to be “cleared of 
Jews,” including Berlin, Warsaw, Bohemia, and Moravia.72  Days later, Joseph Goebbels 
made a Freudian slip that generated attention when he declared that Germany was waging 
war to protect the European continent from the “Bolshevik” threat and that Germany had to 
deal with its ‘Jewish problem’: “we shall exterminate—” quickly catching himself “—
exclude them.”73  By the late summer of 1943, the Canadian press reported that an additional 
million Jews had been murdered, based on a research paper by the Institute of Jewish Affairs.  
It read in part: “more than 3,000,000 Jews have been destroyed in the four-year period since 
the outbreak of war by planned starvation, forced labor, deportation, pogroms, and the 
methodical murder in the German-run extermination centres of Eastern Europe.”  To 
emphasize that Jewish deaths were the result of an extermination campaign, the report noted 
that a mere eight percent of Jewish deaths were the result of military combat.
74
 The CP 
distributed a report in early 1944 which stated that “nearly the entire Jewish community in 
Holland—numbering 180,000—has been wiped out by the Germans.”75   By February 1945, 
Max Perlman, Director of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, announced in 
Hamilton’s Beth Jacob Synagogue that “of the six and a half million Jewish people in Europe 
in 1939, it is estimated that one an half million survived the Nazi extermination plan.”76  On 
January 4, 1943, The Toronto Star ran a strongly-worded column by “The Observer” arguing 
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that Hitler’s campaign against Jews surpassed the murderous hordes of Genghis Khan in 
terms of producing “slaughter, devastation and general misery.”  The journalist emphasized 
the brutality of the Nazis:  
I doubt if there is anything in the record of the barbarian for sheer, 
unjustifiable and inexcusable malignity to match this citizen of one of the 
most cultured and highly civilized countries in his savage hatred of the Jews.  
Not content with starving or working them to death in the refrigerator of 
Poland and the oven of the Sahara, Hitler has hung over the Jews of Europe 
that still survive the threat that he means to exterminate the total Jewish 
population of all the countries in Europe and Africa over which he exercises 
any control.  Three million Jews that still survive are to be wiped out. 
 
The article proceeded to outline the Jewish contribution to Western civilization and 
Christianity, which had become “embodied, in part, by all four great powers that are leagued 
against this supreme anti-Jew and anti-Christ of history.”77 
 The American War Refugee Board’s 25,000 word report in November 1944 on 
Auschwitz also received considerable attention in the Canadian press and gave undeniable 
evidence that Jews were being systematically murdered.  The report was based on two eye-
witnesses who escaped and was confirmed by the US State Department, which stated that 
“the governments of the United States and of other countries have evidence which clearly 
substantiates the facts.”78  An AP article quoted at length from the War Refugee Board 
report, describing how the Nazis were improving the efficiency of murder, with larger gas 
chambers being installed and techniques introduced to prevent resistance by disguising the 
murder chambers as showers, thereby increasing the number of people the camp could 
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murder to 6000 per day.  The Toronto Star stressed that the camp was primarily focused on 
killing Jews, estimating that 1,500,000 Jews had been murdered in Auschwitz between April 
1942 and April 1944.  Also quoting from the report, the article indicated that “on principle 
only Jews are gassed.”79  The UP account also noted that the camp was for Jews, describing 
that “Jews from all over enslaved Europe were transported to the two extermination camps 
[Auschwitz and Birkenau] in the hundreds of thousands.”80   
 Despite the abundant news articles on the wholesale massacre of Europe’s Jews, 
Canadian editors continued to perpetuate the interpretation that Nazi crimes against Jews 
were similar to German crimes against other nations, only appearing harshest because they 
were targeted first.  In an editorial entitled “Exterminating the Poles,” the Globe and Mail 
noted that the Germans were purging the land of Poles “so that the Nazis may go in and take 
possession of the looted territory.”81  Its editorial “Public Enemy Number One” on February 
5, 1940, extended the victims of the Nazis’ extermination campaign to anyone “incapable of 
becoming Germanized.”  “The policy of extermination is deliberate and coldblooded,” the 
Globe and Mail wrote, “it extends to non-Jews and Jews alike.  Especially victimized are the 
churches, priests and nuns, the Polish intellectuals and nobility.  The Jews were the first 
because they were the easiest victims, but the terror of the Gestapo now operates among the 
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Polish Catholics with a frightening thoroughness.” 82  As one victim among many, the 
murder of Jews was discussed extensively in the Globe and Mail.  On January 5, 1940, the 
Globe and Mail reprinted a New York Times article on the mass shootings of Jews in Poland.  
However, the explanation given to these mass killings was wide of the mark, suggesting that 
Jews were killed because they resisted being forced into slave labour.
83
  A report of the 
nazification of Lodz in the Globe and Mail also did little to indicate that the fate of Jews 
varied from that of any other residents.  The Globe and Mail correspondent, Jerzy Szapiro, 
wrote that “Jews will be expelled altogether,” but also that the “Polish middle class will 
disappear,” and that Polish workers would be forced into slavery.84  In fact, when mortality 
rates in the Warsaw ghetto were soaring and estimated to exceed 300 per day in January 
1942, a report from the New York Times was printed in the Globe and Mail which ‘corrected’ 
the impression held by many that the suffering of Jews was higher than the surrounding 
Polish population: “Contrary to what one might think, the Polish death rate is said by reliable 
observers to be even higher than that among inhabitants of the ghettos.”85  The Globe and 
Mail also printed an article by BUP correspondent Glen M. Stadler, who proposed that the 
mass shootings in Eastern Europe were actions taken to suppress the population and to allow 
Germany to plunder its resources for the war effort.  Under the headline, “Nearly 400,000 
Killed by Hun Firing Squads,” Stadler wrote that “the wholesale use of firing squads alone 
proved that Hitler’s dreamed-of ‘new order’ for Europe is not quite functioning as he 
desired.”  The mass shooting of Jews was mentioned briefly and restricted to the Baltic States 
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and Western Russia.  These deaths were motivated by plunder, according to Stadler, who 
thought that “the appropriation of Jewish property, carried systematically by the Gestapo, has 
contributed a large part of the $36,000,000,000 of German plunder in the occupied 
countries.”86 The Winnipeg Evening Tribune’s editorial “Living Room,” argued that Nazi 
atrocities were aimed at ensuring long-term German hegemony in Europe by reducing the 
population of rival nationalities: “‘Ruin the health, destroy the race’ is the Nazi axiom.  For 
this reason, as well as a lower birth-rate, Hitler keeps a million and a half French soldiers 
penned up in prison camps.  It is part of a plan of extermination.  Another phase of the plan is 
the cancellation of all visits to anti-tuberculosis clinics. This diabolical policy of weakening 
resistance to Nazi domination is being tried on the Poles and Jews as well as the French.  It 
will rank high among the crimes for which the Germans will have to answer at the bar of 
justice after victory.”87   
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Toronto Star, December 4, 1943, 6. 
The reportage of the liberation of the death camps in Eastern Europe did little to 
challenge the misinformation regarding Nazi atrocities.  The Lublin death camp Majdanek 
was liberated on July 23, 1944 and received extensive Canadian press coverage because the 
Soviet Union invited Western observers to investigate the camp in August 1944.  However, 
journalists tended only to describe what they saw—ranging from the large size of the 
facilities to the massive piles of clothes and other personal effects left behind by the victims, 
to the machinery of death, such as the gas chambers and crematoria.  Since reporters 
presumably experienced the same tour, their accounts varied little.  Notably absent from most 
reports was any mention of Jewish victims. When they were mentioned, they were listed only 
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as one among the many nationalities murdered.
88
  Instead of highlighting the camp as the 
embodiment of the Nazi racist ideology, reports tended to focus on the sadism of German 
guards and the degeneration of German society.  With the end of the war in sight, Canadians 
were wrestling with how to deal with postwar Germany.  One editor believed that 
acclimating Germans to democracy and liberalism was impossible and that the Allies would 
have to occupy Germany until this generation died off.
89
 The notable exception to journalism 
that universalized Nazi victims was an excellent piece in Maclean’s by Anna Louis Strong, 
an American socialist who had travelled throughout the Soviet Union investigating labour 
relations.  She had the language skills necessary to interview numerous Jewish survivors and 
described the process by which Jews were stricken from local economies, ghettoized, and 
finally murdered.
90
  Her emphasis on Nazi antisemitism as a cause for mass murder in 
Majdanek was exceptional due to her ability to talk to a broad range of survivors.
91
  
One reason for the continual presentation of Jews as only one victim among many 
was because the universalization of Nazi victims was a concept being perpetuated in the 
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United States,
92
 where most of the articles printed in the Canadian press originated.  For 
example, in his report to Congress on June 12, 1944, President Roosevelt stated that the 
American Government had made clear its “abhorrence” for the Nazi “program of mass 
extermination of minorities.”   
The statement, which was covered in Canada’s press, read that “as the hour of the 
final defeat of the Hitlerite forces draws closer, the theory of their insane desire to wipe out 
the Jewish race in Europe continues undiminished.”  However, Roosevelt continued that 
Jews were not the only victims, “this is but one example: many Christian groups also are 
being murdered.”93  While noting that Christians were also victims may have made the Nazi 
atrocities more personal for many Americans, it fit into the Canadian news editors’ narrative 
that Hitler was persecuting segments of the population who were politically opposed to 
Nazism because of liberal and democratic beliefs.  This argument was made by the Toronto 
Star’s editor George H. Maitland on September 2, 1943.  The editorial argued that wartime 
massacres against Jews were a natural extension of Hitler’s interwar assault on liberal 
institutions:  
The Nazis opened the first front in their war against civilization when they 
passed the Nuremburg decrees against the Jewish People.  This was the 
opening gun, as the world now knows, in their attack on Christianity, 
liberalism and democratic principles and ways of life.  They have stated 
constantly that liberalism, Christianity and democracy are of Jewish origin. 
They have said that they dislike the Jews because of their role in the scientific 
and liberal movements.  The Jews were the first sufferers in Hitler’s war 
against civilization.  They have had the heaviest losses of all the submerged 
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groups in Nazi-occupied Europe.  Over a million innocent people have already 
been put to death.  Hitler has declared his intention to exterminate them 94 
 
While news articles on the events of the Holocaust were abundant, there was a multiplicity of 
interpretations as to why Nazis were targeting Jews. Often Jewish victims were discussed in 
the same manner as other political opponents to Nazism in an attempt to show that all who 
suffered at the hands of the Nazis did so as a result of defending the liberal order. 
2.3 Canadian Jews Respond to the Minimization of the Holocaust 
 
Although information in the Canadian mainstream press on the Holocaust was spotty before 
the summer of 1942, the Canadian Jewish press was already filled with news articles that 
warned that the Nazi ghettoization had devolved into mass murder, either through methods of 
starvation and disease or from shootings as is evident by the coverage in the Canadian 
Jewish Chronicle.  The contrast between the sheer volume of information detailing the 
destruction of European Jewry in the Jewish press and the interpretation in the mainstream 
media that Jews were just one victim among many, led Canadian Jews to initiate a public 
campaign to raise awareness of the Holocaust.   
Much of information in the Canadian Jewish press came from the Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency (JTA) and the Jewish Press Service (JPS).  In 1941, the Nazi radio station in Prague 
declared that Jews would “be regarded as hostages for the anti-German war-mongering 
activity of the other half of world Jewry in Britain, the United States and elsewhere.”   The 
announcer declared that the “Jews will vanish from Europe like wolves” since Hitler was 
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determined “to eliminate all Jews from Europe.”95  Such proclamations did not immediately 
bring about the idea that the Nazis would literally murder every European Jew, but when 
reports of wholesale massacres began filling up Jewish newspapers, it made these stories 
more believable.  In one case, Sophia Ozerskaya, who had managed to hide her Jewish 
heritage from the Nazis, told JTA correspondent S. S. Rodoff of what she experienced in 
Nazi-occupied Minsk.  She recounted the immediacy, following the fall of Minsk, with 
which the Nazis cordoned off a dozen streets to form a Jewish ghetto.  On three different 
occasions she spied on the Einsatzgruppen rounding up tens of thousands of Jews, driving 
them outside the city and shooting them.  The first mass execution on November 7, 1941 
claimed the lives of 35,000 Jews.  Ozerskaya’s account was so detailed that she even noted 
the gendered nature of the extermination, with men being murdered en masse first, and 
women and children being murdered months later, in March and April.
96
  As early as July 
1942, the JTA reported that gas was being used to kill Poland’s Jews.  By this time, an 
estimated 700,000 Jews had been killed in this manner over the past twelve months.  Thirty-
five thousand Jews in the Lodz ghetto had been “executed in gas chambers carried on 
trucks.”  These trucks had been driven to the nearby towns of Kolo, Bugaj, and Isbica, and 
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used to kill their Jewish populations.
97
  This story was confirmed in August, when Canadian 
Jewish readers learned that “portable gas chambers” were being used to kill thousands of 
Polish Jews near Chelmno.  The source was three “Jewish grave diggers” who had escaped 
the “Chelmno castle.”  They told the grisly details of Jews being asked to strip and being “led 
to the ‘bath’, which actually was a platform from which they were loaded onto large grey 
trucks.”  After being “jammed inside,” they were driven into the woods while gas was 
pumped into the back.  The bodies were then dumped into a “pit.”98  There was no doubt that 
these gas chambers were the product of the Nazi plot to exterminate every Jew in Poland.  
Another news item even recorded Heinrich Himmler’s trip to Warsaw, where he had 
“worked out details of a plan aiming at the mass extermination of the Jews of Poland.”  The 
Nazi language of mass murder was easily decoded in the Canadian Jewish press: 
“‘deportation’ [was] a new Nazi term for execution.”99 
The Premier of the Polish Government-in-exile, Wladyslaw Sikorski, broadcast in 
June 1942 that “tens of thousands of Jews have been massacred in Lublin, Wilno, Lwow” 
and several other towns throughout the year.
100
  One widely distributed report stated that one 
million Jews had “already been annihilated by the Nazis in Poland and that Heinrich 
Himmler...has ordered the extermination of one-half of the entire Jewish population in 
occupied Polish territory by the end of the year.”  The report detailed that the Jewish ghettos 
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were being emptied.  Jews “were herded into cattle cars,” which had lime and chlorinated 
water “sprinkled” on the floors of the cars; the end result being that “when the trains arrived 
at their destination, half of the passengers were dead from suffocation.”  The Polish 
Government was certain that the Jews on the trains went to “special ‘extermination camps’ 
near the township of Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor, where they were murdered in wholesale 
massacres.”101  
Reports were not limited to Hitler’s quest of exterminating the Jews of Poland; it was 
clear that Jews were being wiped out even further East.  One report stated: “300,000 Jews 
Executed in Vilna and Kaunas Districts since October.”  What followed was an extensive list 
of the number of Jews murdered in various towns throughout Eastern Europe.
102
  Another 
report indicated that twenty-five percent of Rumanian Jews were already dead, with 
epidemics and starvation poised to rapidly kill the rest.
103
  As early as March 20, 1942, A. M. 
Klein could confidently state that the policy of the German High Command “is the total 
extermination of the Jews of Europe.” Although some Jews were kept alive for slave labour 
to help the Nazi war effort, Klein noted that even Jewish labourers were destined for death 
because “the mass-murder of Jews constitutes an end in itself.”104   
On December 17, 1942, the Jewish press widely covered the United Nations’ 
“Declaration of the Allied Nations on Nazi Slaughter of Jews.” The statement left no doubt 
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that Jews were being exterminated.  “Allied attention,” it read in part, “has been drawn to 
numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to 
persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been 
extended, the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler’s oft-
repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.”  The declaration highlighted 
the “appalling horror and brutality” of the conditions that Jews had to suffer in the cattle cars 
when the “ghettos established by the German invader are being systematically emptied.”  Fit 
Jews were “worked to death in labor camps” while the sick or elderly were “left to die of 
exposure and starvation or are deliberately massacred in mass executions.”105  Canadian Jews 
read that in Britain, after Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden read the Statement in the House of 
Commons and called on parliament to stand and observe one minute of silence, he was asked 
what the Allies were doing to rescue Europe’s Jews.  His response was vague: “There are 
immense difficulties standing in the way, but the allies are doing all they can to alleviate the 
horrors.”106   
Many Jews conceptualized the war against Hitler as a struggle between Judeo-
Christianity and Hitler’s inhuman tyranny, building on the Canadian discourse of the 
interwar period.  Foremost in making this case was Rabbi Harry J. Stern, spiritual leader of 
Montreal’s Reform Temple Emanu-el and champion of inter-religious dialogue.  Following 
the Allied Declaration against Nazi atrocities, Stern argued that the fight to save Jews needed 
to be conducted on two fronts.  First, he recognized the need to wage war against Nazi 
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Germany.  He believed that Hitler’s murder of European Jews and Hitler’s military conquest 
of Europe were both part of an irreconcilable conflict between the Judeo-Christian tradition 
that championed individual liberty and Hitler’s illiberal religion based on racial hierarchy.  
“Basically it is a war of ideas.  Two irreconcilable philosophies confront each other,” Stern 
said, “on the one side, the racial-national idea—that is the supremacy of the racial state as the 
one preeminent object of devotion, to which all persons much be subjugated; and on the 
other, the individualist-universalist idea—that is , the supremacy of persons, one by one, as 
the object of pre-eminent concern, and therefore a universalism, that, overriding national and 
racial lines see all humanity in terms of God’s Fatherhood and Man’s Brotherhood.”  While 
Stern presented the Jews as Hitler’s “first victim,” he also noted that Jews were also the 
“worst victim” in that they were suffering the most.  Second, Stern believed that more needed 
to be done to help Europe’s Jews before they were completely wiped out.  He lamented that 
the Allies had not intervened ten years earlier and “spared the world this holocaust.”  While 
he thought that the Allied declaration was “commendable” and appreciated that the Nazis 
would be punished “for having done to death two million Jews,” he believed the Allies ought 
to do something to save the millions of Jews still trapped in Europe: “I wish it were possible 
that practical action might be taken despite the recognized difficulties to rescue those living, 
starving and dying within ghetto walls who by Hitler’s decree are faced with 
extermination!”107 
With such ominous news coming out of Europe, Canadian Jews devoted themselves 
to supporting the war effort, as this was seen as the most likely means to end Hitler’s reign of 
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terror against Europe’s Jews.  The Canadian Jewish community did not see the Holocaust as 
distinctly separate from Hitler’s military campaigns since they believed that Hitler’s racial 
ideology was the driving force behind Germany’s expansionistic foreign policy.  Canada’s 
Jews hoped that if Canadians viewed Jewish resistors as Allies that they would pressure 
Britain to open Palestine up to European Jews.  
When Britain declared war on Germany, Canada’s Jews gave a sigh of relief.  Even 
before Canada was at war, A. M. Klein championed the West’s decision to fight the scourge 
of tyranny, even if it led to another world war or would “lead to a holocaust [of] stupendous 
proportions.”  The Jewish diaspora’s support of military conflict, for Klein, had been settled 
by Hitler years earlier: “The reaction of Jewry permits of no ambiguity.  For six years the 
Nazis have carried on a relentless war against our people, a war directed against the 
defenceless, inspired by no reason save the instincts of savagery, and conducted without let-
up, without restraint, without quarter.  Its objective has been shouted from the roof-tops, and 
has been echoed across the world—the utter destruction, the complete annihilation of Jewry.”  
Supporting the war effort was of the utmost importance since Klein rightly suspected that 
Jews “shall not survive a British defeat.”108  A. B. Bennett, a founder of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress, described this sentiment years later: “the feeling of helplessness, of aloneness in a 
world of cruelty gave way to a spirit of Militancy.  The Jews had allies in the fight against 
Hitlerism.”109  Supporting the war effort and saving Europe’s Jews were interrelated in the 
minds of Canadian Jews.  Ending Hitler’s reign over Europe and preserving the British 
Empire was paramount to saving Europe’s Jews.   
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Even in the early years of the war, Samuel Bronfman, president of the Canadian 
Jewish Congress, reiterated the sentiment that the lives of European Jews could only be 
safeguarded by the military defeat of Nazism.  Speaking at the Inter-American Jewish 
Conference less than a month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bronfman argued that 
“democratic ideals cannot be attained solely through an emphasis upon the rights of man,” 
but occasionally required a military response.  “Speaking for Canadian Jewry,” Bronfman 
continued, “that immediately as our country declared war against the Nazi barbarian, the 
Canadian Jewish Congress forthwith geared its activity to one end—a maximum war effort 
upon all fronts.  All other problems became, by the very nature of things, purely incidental; 
for the supreme objective included all the subsidiary goals.”110  In Samuel Bronfman’s 
fiftieth birthday address, he reaffirmed Canadian Jewry’s loyalty to the Crown: “How 
imperative it is for us, living in the land of freedom, to do all that we can, and more, to 
preserve the Empire, to save Europe from itself, to safeguard the principles of decent human 
conduct, and, by glorious deed, to ransom our brothers from their captivity.”111  Again on 
January 11, 1942, Bronfman confirmed the Canadian Jewish position that military victory 
was essential to the survival of European Jewry: “this is now a life and death struggle 
between civilization and barbarism.”112  While Bronfman emphasized that the freedom of all 
peoples was at stake, he made it clear that the Jews had a special interest in the war. 
Indeed many Jews joined Canada’s military because they wanted to strike back at the 
Nazis after reading about the persecution of the Jews, even if they did not yet know that 
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Hitler intended to murder them.  In a series of interviews in the 1980s by the Jewish Heritage 
Centre of Western Canada, several Jews from Winnipeg remembered that they enlisted in 
Canada’s military to fight the Nazis in large part because of the responsibility they felt to do 
something to protect their brethren in Europe.  One man recounted that he joined in 1940 
after reading newspaper accounts of Jewish persecution: “it bothered him when he heard how 
the Jews were being discriminated against in Europe,” the interviewer recounted.113  A 
Jewish woman recalled enlisting “partly because of the horror” enacted against the Jews, 
“though she soon realized that her efforts weren’t going to make the difference.”114  Another 
Jewish man joined the Army just days after Canada’s entry into the war, specifically noting 
that his “decision to join the service came with a clearer understanding of what was 
happening in Europe” and was “not motivated by patriotism” but by concern for European 
Jewry.
115
  Historian Gerald Tulchinsky notes that numerous Jews joined the military because 
they had a personal stake in defeating Nazism as both Canadians and Jews.  He quotes Rabbi 
David Monson, who tried to recruit Jews to join the Canadian military by arguing that Jews 
had even more to fight for than Christians: “if Hitler wins, Christians will be slaves.  Jews 
will be committed to death.”116 
During the first several years of the war, the Canadian Jewish Congress focused on 
promoting recruitment and fundraising.  In 1940, the CJC opened a recruiting center for 
Canada’s military in Montreal.  It distributed a brochure calling for volunteers, emphasizing 
that the military struggle was not only to protect the British Empire, but also Europe’s Jews:  
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The Nazi hordes are increasing the momentum of the war from day to day—
more and more millions of brave men are thrown into the life-and-death 
struggle for the preservation of their national existence.  Hitler has vowed to 
conquer the British Empire destroy the Jewish race, and to enslave the whole 
world.  Hitler is fighting desperately, making use of tremendous forces to 
attain his goal—to become the sole dictator of the world.  Hitler’s victory 
would mean the destruction of our Empire and the annihilation of our people.  
There is only one answer to this challenge: Hitler and his gang must be 
destroyed.
117
  
 
By January 1, 1944, 12,000 Jewish men had volunteered for military service.  The CJC also 
furnished and operated sixteen recreational centers across the country to help boost morale 
among military personnel.  Thousands of “comfort boxes” and millions of cigarettes were 
purchased by the CJC and sent to Canadian soldiers on the frontlines.
 118
  In 1940, Bronfman 
personally donated $250,000 to the Canadian Government to research the technology needed 
to speed up the defeat of Germany, this was in addition to the one million dollars of war 
bonds Bronfman purchased annually.
119
  In anticipation of the Fifth General Session of the 
CJC, Jewish journalist I. Medres interviewed Bronfman in December 1941 to learn what 
priorities the CJC would be focusing on in the coming year.  Not surprisingly, Bronfman 
emphasized Canadian Jewish dedication to the war effort: “Since the last plenary session of 
the Canadian Jewish Congress three years ago, world events have completely changed 
millions of lives.  Hundreds of thousands of Jews have been up-rooted from their homes, 
have been forced into slavery and herded into ghettos.  They have been living a life worse 
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than death....To remove this scourge is the mission of all remaining free peoples....They will 
not lay down their arms until Hitlerism has been completely destroyed.”120   
The CJC also felt compelled to publicize the immense contributions of the Canadian 
Jewish community to stave off criticism that Jews were not pulling their weight.  A common 
criticism was that Jewish recruitment was below the national average.
121
  This complaint was 
voiced by the Director of the Immigration Branch, F. C. Blair in 1943.  Writing to a former 
internee and now Jewish farm laborer who was disputing with his employer, Blair railed that 
Jews were shirking their duties to help Canada wage war:  
Now I want you to take a good look at your own situation.  You are not 
subject to military call-up or training or service.  No matter how many 
Canadian boys are called up and have to risk life itself by military service, you 
are exempt from this.  You know or should know that there is a very critical 
shortage of farm workers in this country and it should not be difficult for you 
to see why we insist on men in your position rendering national service by 
remaining at farm work….The purpose of the present letter is to tell you very 
frankly that unless you settle down and behave yourself and endeavor to 
render decent service that your employer has a right to expect and that you are 
under obligation to give, we propose to return you to the camp and leave you 
there as an example of a man who had no interest in helping the war effort of 
the country which had given him shelter. 
 
The farm worker was shocked by this and other inflammatory letters from Blair, and 
explained that he had the flu and had taken only one afternoon to rest in bed to recover.  
Moreover, he argued that he wholeheartedly supported the war effort by buying as many war 
savings stamps and certificates as he could afford.
122
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Gerald Tulchinsky has argued that the disparity between Jewish and non-Jewish 
recruitment is because the Canadian Jewish population tended to be more highly educated 
than the national average.
123
  However, during the last two years of the war, as information 
on the Holocaust became more widely known, Canadian Jewish recruitment jumped from 7.7 
percent of Canadian Jews serving in Canada’s armed forces to 10 percent.124  The CJC was 
eager to publicize Canadian Jewish contributions because it hoped that Canada would 
sympathise with the need to open Canada’s door and allow entry to Jewish refugees.  
Speaking at the Western Conference of the CJC on May 25, 1943, Bronfman outlined the 
contributions of Canadian Jewry to the war effort, and suggested that this service entitled 
European Jews to be granted “temporary asylum” in the free world and “permanent asylum 
and final rehabilitation in the land of their forefathers—Palestine.”125  
Percy Jacobson, a Jewish small business owner who kept a detailed diary 
documenting the political and social climate in Montreal during the war, was acutely aware 
of the deteriorating situation facing Europe’s Jews and this fuelled a hatred not of Germans, 
but rather a disdain for democracies that reveled in their tolerance of minorities yet offered 
no protection to persecuted Jews elsewhere:    
The mess we are now in is because expediency has been the guiding principle 
of England.  If England had stood for justice and righteousness when the Jews 
were first persecuted by Hitler there would today be a different England...and 
perhaps a different Germany.  I mention England because she has always been 
held up and held herself up as the champion of human liberty, of law and of 
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decency.  This I think is her crime against civilization and one which she will 
be judged for in history.
126
 
 
Nonetheless, with Britain’s entry into the war, Jacobson’s family were committed to the 
fight.  His son joined the RCAF in 1939, because, as Jacobson said, “we are Jews and 
Hitler’s persecution of the Jews will go down into history along with the stories of the 
Spanish Inquisition.”127   
However, when news from the Polish National Council in the summer of 1942 
reached Canada that nearly a million Jews had been slaughtered, the Canadian Jewish 
community sought to move beyond supporting the war effort to raising awareness of the 
Holocaust in mainstream Canada.  Ben Sheps wrote Bronfman on July 6, 1942, noting the 
lack of coverage of Jewish atrocities in the mainstream press at the time and demanding that 
the CJC do something to spur a media frenzy around the massacre of Jews.  Sheps pointed 
out that “with the exception of a few brief paragraphs in the daily press, little, if any 
comment has been made by the Canadian newspapers, in Western Canada at least, on these 
atrocious happenings.”  Sheps speculated that due to this lack of coverage in the mainstream 
dailies, “very many [Canadians] are unfortunately unaware of the slaughter of the Jewish 
civilian population which is taking place in German occupied countries at present.”  Hoping 
to return Canadian sentiment against Nazi antisemitism to what it was “shortly after his 
[Hitler’s] rise to power,” Sheps urged the CJC to launch a nationwide protest immediately, 
before an organization such “as the Jewish Branch of the League for Allied Victory, which is 
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Communist inspired, may take advantage of the situation and endeavor to capture Jewish 
sympathy.”128 
 Mass meetings began to be organized by the Canadian Jewish community to raise 
awareness of the Holocaust and were frequently reported in the secular press.  The Jewish 
Labor Committee was especially active in bringing experts on Nazi anti-Jewish policy to 
Canada to reveal the tragedy befalling Europe’s Jews and to raise funds to feed trapped Jews 
and help them escape.  One of the first mass meetings organized by the JLC was in Toronto 
and included William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, M. J. Coldwell, 
leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and S. Nutkevitch, a refugee 
who escaped from Europe.  Green interpreted Germany’s mass murders within the broader 
context of the political struggle for European hegemony.  He warned that the Allies needed 
more than military victory in order to defeat this “modern Haman.” Green called on 
Canadians to challenge racism: “we must exterminate the ignorance, the hate, the bestiality 
which breed and nourish such inhuman philosophies as naziism [sic] and fascism.  We must 
clean out the pestilence holes of Europe where tyranny constantly is reborn through the 
centuries.  We must activate the forces of democracy throughout the world offering freedom, 
opportunity and equal rights to all peoples.”  Although Green did not minimize the 
destruction of European Jews—noting that one and a half million Jews had already been 
slaughtered since the beginning of the war—he asserted that these deaths were attributed to 
political resistance, the victims having been “starved to death or killed in action resisting 
their merciless oppressors.”  Perhaps not realizing that the religious and philosophical 
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divisions that paralyzed the American Jewish community were largely nonexistent in 
Canada, he demanded that Canadian Jews “forget your own personal, petty and immediate 
interests” and devote their resources to winning the war.  Moreover, he did not present the 
Jewish situation as unique, instead arguing that “this is a war for survival—survival for Jew 
and Gentile alike, survival for the poor man and the rich, the worker and the employer.”  
Green’s interpretations were shared by Coldwell, who reiterated that Hitlerism needed to be 
abolished in order to lay “the foundation of a new and better world order based on social 
justice and universal peace.”  According to the report in the Toronto Star, Nutkevitch focused 
less on postwar solutions and more on recalling the horrors he had witnessed before coming 
to Canada.
129
  Several months later, the JLC invited Jacob Pat, a Polish journalist who had 
escaped to New York in 1938, to speak in Montreal on February 16, 1943 about the situation 
facing Polish Jews.  While Pat emphasized that the Jews were resisting the Nazis and were 
mobilizing, “awaiting the signal of invasion to spring upon the Nazis from behind,” he made 
it clear that they were desperate to escape Poland.  Pat complained that the JLC’s recent 
request to the Canadian Government that sixty exit visas be made available immediately for 
Jews hiding in France, Portugal and Spain, was being delayed: “for men threatened with Nazi 
arrest, every day of delay means the possibility of imprisonment, torture or death.”  His 
graphic descriptions of the Nazi murder of 10,000 children executed in gas vans in a single 
day in August 1943, and his description of a fifty square kilometer area around the town of 
Belgite “dotted with fires” radiating from pyres of burning corpses, made the local press.130  
General Secretary of the WJC, Arieh Tartakower, who had fled Poland following the Nazi 
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invasion, was invited to speak in Winnipeg about the ongoing efforts to save Europe’s Jews 
on April 4, 1943.
131
  The Winnipeg Evening Tribune described his talk as a “somber 
accounting of how 2,000,000 Jews have died in Europe under the scourge of Hitler,” and 
stressed that “if his figures erred, they erred as under-estimates.”  Tartakower insisted that 
what was needed was the immediate shipping of food stuffs to starving European Jews and 
the declaration of various allied countries to provide temporary havens for Jews who escaped 
to neutral countries, thus facilitating a route to safety.
132
   
During the summer of 1942, members of the Canadian Jewish Congress organized 
further protest meetings across the country to be held in August.  The purpose of the 
meetings was not simply to voice the “indignation of all civilized men against the 
abominable barbarism practised by the Nazi savages against our race,” but to create 
“resolutions and speeches stressing the unity of Jews and of the United Nations in their 
determination to stop at nothing short of freedom.”133  The organizers hoped not only to 
harden Canadians’ resolve to wage war, but also to stir up public sympathy and compel the 
government to change its refugee policy.
134
  One CJC executive sent a letter to the Montreal 
Jewish community, stating that “the inhuman sufferings and tribulations of our unfortunate 
brethren in occupied countries should arouse the conscience of every civilized man and 
woman.... We must arouse public opinion!”135 
                                                     
131
 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 3 April 1943, 2. 
132
 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 5 April 1943, 15. 
133
 Canadian Jewish Chronicle, 24 July 1942, 15. 
134
 For more on the Canadian Jewish effort to change government refugee policy see Irving Abella and Harold 
Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys 
Limited, 1983). 
135
 Michael Garber, “To the Heads of Jewish Organizations in Montreal,” 23 September 1942, in CJCCCNA, 
series ZA, box 2, folder 15,  
  134 
In October 1942, the Canadian Jewish community again organized three coordinated 
mass protests in Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montreal.  The Winnipeg Division of the CJC 
rented out the largest hall in the city, the Winnipeg Civic Auditorium, which the city rented 
to them at half price to show its support for the cause.  Basically, the entire Winnipeg 
intelligentsia, including church leaders, the political establishment, and foreign dignitaries, 
agreed to attend.
136
  The CJC hoped that the meeting “would focus public attention on the 
sufferings of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, and would bring about an authoritative 
expression of opinion which would be spread throughout Canada in conjunction with the 
meeting to be held in Montreal and Toronto.”137 
Besides protest meetings, Canadian Jews also conducted memorial services for the 
Nazis’ Jewish victims as a method to raise awareness of the Holocaust. Although some 
community members believed that mourning the dead was counterintuitive when the struggle 
to defeat Nazi Germany continued, Canadian Jewish memorial services were nevertheless 
held in 1942.  The Palestine rabbinate declared December 2 a day of mourning and the 
Canadian Jewish community followed suit despite A. B. Bennett’s disapproval.  Writing in 
his regular column in the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, Bennett argued that memorials were 
dangerous and could sap energy away from the war effort: “can we afford to divert our 
attention and energy from the practical tasks at hand and indulge in an orgy of unproductive 
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hysteria?”  One historian has taken Bennett’s words to mean that he was indifferent to the 
suffering of European Jewry and that this attitude was shared by much of the Jewish 
community.
138
  However, Bennett was not being apathetic; he believed that this was the time 
to redouble the Jewish community’s efforts to destroy Hitler’s hordes and save Jewish lives.  
He ended his column by writing: “does not God in His wisdom expect the human spirit today 
to speak forth His message in a voice of steel, in the accents of cannon thunder, to silence 
and [s]lay the rampant genius of evil.  Human beings have but measured reserves of nervous 
strength.  We must husband our powers for the great venture of annihilating Hitlerism.”139  
Yet memorial services were held in “nearly every community across the country,” the 
Canadian Jewish Chronicle reported.  In Toronto, Bennett himself opened the Kaddish 
service in Massey Hall, where several thousand participated.  Numerous synagogues 
throughout Montreal offered memorial services to mourners.  Non-Jewish politicians 
frequently spoke during these services, often using the Jewish community’s grief to 
consolidate their contribution to the war effort.  Although western Canada received delayed 
notice that December 2 was to be the day of mourning, the demand for these services was so 
strong that services were quickly assembled.  The services were not limited to Jewish 
institutions.  Thanks to fliers and posters being distributed throughout November, many 
public schools in Toronto and Montreal assembled their pupils, regardless of whether or not 
they were Jewish, and told them of the great suffering that Jews were enduring in Europe.  
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High school students were asked to observe a moment of silence and Jewish labour unions 
demanded that their workers be allowed to do likewise.
140
 
By December 1942, with news reaching the West that the Nazis were hunting down 
all the Jews throughout their occupied territories, transporting them to the General 
Government region and murdering them, Canadian Jews demanded that their leadership 
extend their efforts beyond supporting the military action against Nazi Germany and raising 
awareness of the Holocaust to pushing the Canadian Government to open its doors to Jews.  
While the CJC had been lobbying the Canadian Government to negotiate entry for some of 
Europe’s Jews to enter Canada, these negotiations were confidential, giving the impression 
that nothing was being done.   Canadian Jews thus urged their leadership to do something to 
alter Canada’s rigid immigration policy and bring hope to their European brethren. 
Several plans were discussed and rejected in 1943 to raise awareness of the plight of 
Canadian Jews and compel the Canadian Government to open its doors to allow Jewish 
refugees entry.  The Winnipeg’s People’s Relief Committee proposed a tag day, in which 
volunteers would hit the streets of Winnipeg to raise money for Jewish refugees by selling 
pins.  However, this proposal was rejected by the CJC because it would likely result in little 
money and raise the wrong kind of publicity.  Ben Sheps and Alex Freeman explained that 
“it should be our objective to arouse public sympathy among non-Jews, which would exert 
pressure on the Canadian Government and the United Nations to admit Jewish refugees to 
Palestine, and to Allied countries, and that soliciting small contributions from the non-Jewish 
public by a tag day would not help us in any way, but would on the contrary defeat our 
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purpose.”141 The Canadian Jewish Congress proposed that a petition demanding that Canada 
admit Jewish refugees should be circulated with the intention of garnering the signature of 
every Canadian Jew. Once signed, it would be presented at the inter-governmental refugee 
conference.  But with that conference scheduled to be held in Ottawa, and the Canadian 
National Committee for Refugees (CNCR) drafting their own petition tailored towards all 
Canadians, the CJC decided to abandon their own petition in favour of getting Canadian Jews 
to support the CNCR petition.
142
  The CJC printed fliers and pamphlets and distributed the 
petition to Jewish stores, manufacturers, and businesses to encourage the Jewish community 
to vote.
143
  Unfortunately, the petition was a failure.  Canadians were not eager to support the 
prospect of permitting more Jews entrance to Canada.  By January 13, 1944, less than 12,000 
signatures had been collected in western Canada.
144
  Two months later, the national figure 
was still far below the objective of 500,000 names.   
Total number of signatures for the CNCR Petition by Province 
Ontario    48,419 
Quebec    34,388 
Manitoba   15,714 
British Columbia  8,601 
Saskatchewan   7,689 
Alberta    6,230 
New Brunswick  2,294 
Nova Scotia   1,981 
Prince Edward Island  330 
Newfoundland (Canadians) 17 
Total:    125,663
145
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Not only did the petition gain less support than the Jewish community hoped, the John 
Baptiste Society had retaliated with its own petition against the admission of refugees, which 
had gotten 125,000 signatures.
146
 
Similarly, in December 1943, the Toronto and District Council of the Canadian 
Legion advised members not to sign petitions to bring refugees into Canada.  The Legion 
said that “mass petitions now being circulated for admission of refugees to Canada represent 
an objectionable form of ‘pressure politics’ not in accordance with Canadian democratic 
principles.”147  Letters poured into various newspapers arguing that restrictions needed to be 
upheld to ensure that refugees did not flood into Canada and steal jobs from Canadian men 
fighting overseas.  Writing to the editor of the Globe and Mail, O. T. G. Williams expressed 
the cynical view that Jewish organizations were manipulating Canadians by appealing to 
Christian values: “An appeal made in the name of Christianity is hard to resist for a people 
which is professedly Christian.  When the appeal is further strengthened by being made on 
behalf of victims of an oppression our men are dying to suppress, it, for many, becomes 
irresistible.”  Resist Canadians must, Williams demanded, not only because there was 
“doubt” that refugees were as “destitute” as they claimed, or because they would “step into 
vacancies created by our men who are overseas,” but most importantly because refugees 
would alter the racial makeup of Canada: “a country which owes its place in the world to 
British blood, and can hold her own only by being British.”148   
                                                     
146
 Minutes, 20 June 1943, United Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies (Central Division), in OJA, F. 17, 
S. 4-2, file 1. 
147
 Toronto Telegram, 7 December 1943, in CJCCCNA, CJC fonds, series Db 01, box 10, file 11: “Refugees-
newsclippings, 1943-44.”  
148
 Toronto Globe and Mail, 8 November 1943, in CJCCCNA, CJC fonds, series Db 01, box 10, file 11: 
“Refugees-newsclippings, 1943-44.”  
  139 
Polls by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion conducted in January 1943 and 
again one year later indicate that the Canadian National Committee on Refugees’ campaign 
had also created a strong backlash amongst French Canadians.   
“After the war do you think Canada should open its doors and 
permit people from all parts of the world to settle here, or do 
you think we should keep them out?” 
     1943  1944 
 
 Open its doors….  14%  13% 
 Allow some in ….  59  50 
 Keep all out….  21  29 
 Undecided….   6  8 
 
Favoring a closed door policy: 
     1943  1944  
 
British origin….  13%  18% 
French origin….  46  56 
Other origin….  14  15149 
 
But while the publicity generated by the Jewish community garnered backlash from 
many circles, it did draw some positive attention to the Holocaust.  Watson Thomson, a Scot 
whose résumé included teacher training in Jamaica and Nigeria and who had immigrated 
to Canada in the late 1930s to become Director of Adult Education at the University of 
Manitoba in 1941, was appalled at the apathy towards European Jews.  In a radio broadcast 
on CBC during Easter Sunday, 1943, he challenged Canadians to take a “few minutes” away 
from the festivities of Easter and “look at events in our own day which constitute nothing less 
than the crucifixion of a whole people.”  Watson elaborated on how two million Jews had 
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been killed to date and how “the killing still goes on.”  While he acknowledged that the 
West’s leaders had spoken against the atrocities and promised swift justice against the 
perpetrators upon defeat, he pointed out that they had said nothing “about immediate action 
to save his [Hitler’s]remaining victims.”  The lack of a concerted rescue effort, Watson 
believed, was not because “there is nothing we could do,” it was “because we care more 
about defeating and punishing Nazis than saving Jewish lives.”  Watson continued by 
contending that Canada was not exempt from criticism because “we have never said we 
wanted them [Jewish refugees] ourselves.”  Watson called on Canadians to go beyond 
expressing sympathy for the plight of Jews, but to write to their politicians and demand that 
Canada rescue Jews from Europe: “Upon us is a higher and harder obligation.  Not to pity 
the Jews, not to sentimentalize over them, not to pass resolutions about them.  But to rise up 
and act with all the passion of an awakened human conscience, and save Jewish lives.”150 
Nevertheless, by March 1943, following the decision to move the refugee inter-
governmental conference from Ottawa to Bermuda, Canadian Jews were giving up hope that 
the CJC would influence Canadian officials at all on the question of rescuing European Jews.  
A. H. Aronovitch, president of the Western Division of the CJC, lamented: “Our hope for 
immediate relief for the war sufferers in Europe is at the moment shattered and we can only 
pray that the individual British, American and Canadian statesmen charged with this grave 
responsibility are fully conscious of the fact that time is not preventing the murder of our 
brothers and other persecuted peoples.”151  The Bermuda Conference, was, in fact, a 
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complete failure.  Canada did not even attend and Britain and America gave no allowances 
for increased immigration of Jewish refugees to either country. 
Due to their failure to bring large numbers of Jewish refugees into Canada during the 
war, the Canadian Jewish community tried to save Europe’s Jews in two ways other than 
supporting the war effort: supporting Zionism and raising funds for relief.  The connection 
between Holocaust discourse in Canada and support for the State of Israel, which has become 
synonymous over the past thirty years, was certainly not inevitable.  In fact, in the early years 
of the Second World War, as news slowly reached Canada of the terror facing Jewry in 
ghettos, many Canadian Jews were openly hostile to Zionism.  This opposition was generally 
not based on ideological or religious grounds, but because Zionism pushed the focus, and 
often the relief funds, towards Jews in Palestine and away from what the community felt was 
the more urgent cause of rescuing and providing relief for Jews trapped in ghettos.  But by 
1943, Canadian Zionists began to gain support due mainly to the failure of the Western 
democracies to open their gates sufficiently wide enough to permit Jews to escape 
Europe.  Zionism, therefore, was seen one of the most plausible routes for Jews to find 
sanctuary. 
Although Canadian Jewry tended to be favourable to Zionism, seeing little conflict in 
being loyal Canadians while striving for Jewish nationalism in Palestine, the CJC was 
initially critical of the fundraising efforts of the Zionist Organization of Canada.  The Jewish 
community in Trail, B.C. refused to hold a fundraising meeting with the ZOC in 1941.  
Executive director of the western division of the ZOC Rabbi Aron Horowitz was astounded, 
and wrote the president of the local Jewish community, Max Goldstein, “It is hard for me to 
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reconcile myself to the idea that at a time when our people are decimated by slaughter and 
are bleeding under the whip and heel of the Nazi beast, there should be found even one 
Jewish community that should deny us a hearing.”  Not taking no for an answer, Horowitz 
visited the community anyway.  He argued that the Zionist purpose was to “answer the 
desperate call for help that comes to us from the millions of our tortured and humiliated 
people.”  In response, the United Palestine Appeal received a modest donation.152  Yet even 
some card-carrying Zionists were frustrated by the ZOC’s unwillingness to prioritize relief 
and rescue work in Europe.  The Zionist student organization at the University of Manitoba, 
the Avukah Society, lashed out against the ZOC’s fundraising appeal: “You ask me what I 
am doing to help the war effort and my brethren in Palestine.  How does supporting the 
U.P.A. help the war effort?  Do my brethren in Palestine need help more than my brethren in 
Europe?....Can I have confidence in and support your leaders who as so called Jew savers 
attempt to help ½ million settled proud Jews in Palestine and turn their backs upon the 
millions of destitute starving Jews in Europe?”153  For many Canadian Jews the answer was 
no. 
Horowitz complained to the ZOC’s national executive director Rabbi Jesse Schwartz 
that the CJC seemed “to think that other organizations have to obtain their sanction to 
conduct certain activities.”154  Zionist leaders in Canada argued that their work in Palestine 
was necessary to relieve the Jews caught in the European maelstrom by opening the doors in 
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Palestine and working to revoke the 1939 White Paper.  In 1940, the UPA campaign called 
on Zionists “to answer the desperate call for help that comes from millions of our miserable 
and homeless people.  The number of people—men, women and children—that will be saved 
and settled in our Homeland depends on the means that will be provided by American and 
Canadian Jewry.”155 
By 1943, with the realization that the Western democracies were unable or unwilling 
to save Europe’s Jews from Hitler’s extermination camps, the Zionist message began to take 
hold amongst Canadian Jews.  However, one significant difficulty for Canadian Zionists was 
to remain supportive of Britain while denouncing their position on Palestine.  While 
Horowitz attempted to walk this fine line by claiming that the British people and even 
Winston Churchill were in favour of lifting restrictions on Jewish immigration to 
Palestine,
156
 he did not mince words at a Calgary mass meeting on November 10, 1943, 
saying:  “At a time when our leaders speak of all sorts of freedoms, what a mockery this 
Paper is to the millions of our men, women, and children who have been choked to death, 
burned alive, and blown into shreds.”157  
The Canadian Conference of Christians and Jews was also supportive of the creation 
of a Jewish state to provide sanctuary to Europe’s Jews.  Rev. E. Crossley Hunter spoke to 
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the Sharon Zionist Club of Winnipeg on September 23, 1943 to voice his support for a 
Jewish state.  Like American theologian and political commentator Reinhold Niebuhr, who 
Hunter had read in preparation for his talk, Hunter argued that the West’s obligation to the 
Jewish people was a moral one.  He insisted that the West needed to protect the rights of 
nations and not just individuals: “justice in history is concerned with the collective as well as 
with the individual.”  While Niebuhr sensed that there was a great deal of guilt regarding the 
West’s ineffectual defence of the minorities under Hitler’s thumb causing support for 
Zionism, with the war effort so closely tied to Canadian Jewish efforts to save Europe’s 
Jews, Hunter saw no culpability on Canada’s part for the Jews’ “present plight in Europe,” 
though he argued that it did “warrant your [Jewish] right to a national home and state.”158 
Less controversial than supporting Zionism was sending relief to European Jewish 
refugees that had managed to escape the Nazis.  Saul Hayes later recalled that when the Jews 
were trapped in Europe “doomed to death by the hundred[s] of thousands” and Canadian 
Jews were praying that “the gates of Canada will be opened and the true, humane heart of the 
Canadian people will be evidenced,” the Canadian Jewish community’s “emphasis turned to 
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Europe and the life-saving work of the Joint  Distribution Committee, with its program of 
feeding the hungry, helping those able to smuggle themselves across the war-tautened 
borders and otherwise alleviating misery wherever possible.”159  In May 1942, the United 
Jewish Refugee & War Relief Agencies were spending $25,000 to send medical supplies and 
non-perishable foodstuffs to Polish Jewish refugees in the Soviet Union.
160
 Throughout the 
war, the Canadian community supported the United Jewish Relief Agency’s campaign to 
raise funds for the JDC.  These funds were used to ship supplies to destitute refugees who 
had managed to escape Hitler’s grasp early in the war and to help smuggle Jews out of Nazi-
occupied Europe. 
2.4 Discourse on the Holocaust and the Defeat of Nazi Germany 
During 1944, the Canadian discourse about its war effort shifted from how to defeat Nazi 
Germany to how the West would maintain peace once Germany was defeated.  This shift in 
perspective helped to propel Germany’s annihilation of Europe’s Jews further into Canadian 
national discourse as Canadians debated how to “win the peace.”  Canadians examined the 
mistakes of the interwar period that led to the rise of Nazism, including appeasement 
diplomacy.  Foremost among Canadian concerns was the subjugation of Germany to prevent 
a third world war.  Holocaust survivors were largely influential in drawing attention to the 
fact that Jews were the primary victims of Hitler’s mass murder campaign as their 
testimonies at war crimes military tribunals made front-page news because of the 
sensationalist nature of their stories.  While Canadians became familiar with the devastation 
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wrought against European Jews through the media coverage of the liberation of camps and 
the war crimes trials, Canadian attention to the tragedy of Europe Jewry was subsumed into 
the problem of Germany.  While Canadian Jews were interested in these debates, they 
perceived that while the war might be ending, the Jewish crisis would continue on for years.  
The Jewish community emphasized the need to continue sending relief to European Jewry 
and to open Palestine to survivors.  When Canadian Jews did memorialize European Jewry, 
they tended to emphasize Jewish resistance to the Holocaust, so that European Jewry 
constituted an Ally in the defeat of Nazism. This perception was not only meant to garner 
support for Jewish statehood but also to give meaning to the tragedy. 
When the concentration camps were liberated by Allied forces on the western front, 
debates about the incumbent peace revolved around the nature of German society.  Were 
Germans victims of Nazism as was generally believed during the 1930s, or was Nazism 
ingrained within the German psyche?  Should the occupation of Germany be dictated by a 
policy of retribution or rehabilitation?  Were Germans capable of being educated to embrace 
democratic and liberal values?  It was within the context of these questions, and not questions 
over whether Canada should change its immigration policy, that mainstream Canadian 
newspapers began to treat the Jewish annihilation as decidedly different from the Nazi 
treatment of other subjugated nations.  With the war coming to an end, the assumption was 
that Jews would return to their original countries, lifting the onus of responsibility from 
Canadians to welcome large numbers of Jews. 
Journalists focused on describing the horror that they had witnessed in the western 
camps and discussing the corruption of German culture that could have allowed such crimes 
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against humanity to persist.  George P. Vanier, Canada’s Ambassador to France, joined the 
American delegation of Congressmen on their tour of Buchenwald in April 1945.  He 
reported his experience in a broadcast on the radio on May 1, 1945.  Vanier followed the 
convention of giving a terse blow-by-blow account of what he witnessed.  He emphasized 
that Buchenwald was different from the extermination camps in Poland, since it was intended 
for “political prisoners.”  Vanier took special note that there were several hundred Jewish 
children still alive in the camp, but that their parents were undoubtedly dead due to “the 
barbarous treatment inflicted on Poles and Jews by the Germans.”161  Considering that of 
those liberated at Buchenwald, only twenty percent were Jews,
162
 Vanier gave an accurate 
explanation for why there were so few Jews left in the camp.  Seeing the machinery of death, 
he reflected on the degeneration of German nationalism in combining the science of mass 
production with the Nazi ideology of racial superiority: 
One is forced to the conviction that those who did these horrible things saw 
nothing wrong in them; perhaps they were actually proud of their efficiency in 
producing dead.  They are not as other humans, they are satanic.  Though they 
have a veneer of civilisation, deep down they must still be barbarians—in 
saying this one is unfair to the barbarian because there is a scientific 
refinement about these horrors which barbarians, uncouth and wild, living in a 
primitive state, could not invent.  Since the very beginning, many have 
considered that this war was really a Crusade; that it was a struggle between 
Christendom and satandom.
163
 
 
Jewish survivors were occasionally interviewed and discussed the slave labor they endured, 
making it clear that Jews were expendable in the Nazi labor system.  UP correspondent, 
Clinton B. Conger, visited an underground armament factory in Hanover and in April 1945 
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interviewed the Polish Jews who had been transferred to build the facility.  After taking note 
of the emaciated survivors’ appearances and being told that only 190 of the original 1000 
Jews had survived, he was told that they were being worked to death because “they were 
members of a race the Nazis wanted to exterminate.”  One teenager explained that Jews 
“under 10 were considered of no use” and “sent to the gas chambers.”164  Reports from 
numerous Jewish survivors indicated that the Nazis had hunted down Jews from across their 
empire and not only used a vast network of concentration camps to work Jews to death, but 
also extermination camps.  Bela Fabian, the former president of Hungary’s Independent 
Democratic Party and an escapee from a concentration camp, told American reporters that 
five million Jews from across Europe had been shipped to Auschwitz and gassed.
165
 
Of particular interest to Canadians was the idea of femininity within the Nazi 
concentration camp system, which contrasted strikingly with prevalent ideas of femininity in 
Canada.  While Canadian women’s roles moved out of the home during the war, this was 
seen as a policy of necessity, and female paid work in postwar Canada amongst the middle 
class was discouraged.  Although Canadian women’s experience frequently diverged 
radically from the prescribed gender role because many women did not have the financial 
resources or the inclination to remain fulltime homemakers, the dominant idea in Canadian 
culture was that society was best served by women performing a domestic role due to the 
prevalence of Victorian notions of women as the purveyors of morality.
166
  News stories out 
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of the Belsen and Buchenwald concentration camps suggested that German women had been 
corrupted by Nazism and were no longer providing a moral compass for German society.  
For example the Buchenwald commandant’s wife, Ilsa Koch, had the disgusting practice of 
decorating her home with tattooed human skin, which she used to make lampshades, book 
bindings, and knick-knacks.  The press focused on her perverse brand of consumption, in 
which prisoners would “line up shirtless” and “she would pick a design or mark she 
particularly liked.”  The prisoner would then be murdered and his skin removed.167   
Although historians have shown that the Nuremberg war crimes trials did not focus 
on crimes against Jews, many of minor war tribunals following the liberation of 
concentration camps did. These encounters between Holocaust survivors and perpetrators 
were covered extensively in the Canadian press. The British military tribunal in Luneburg 
against Belsen commandant Josef Kramer and his guards in September and October 1945 in 
particular gained much attention in the press because a number of female guards were also 
accused of sadistic crimes.  The trial went beyond the despicable conditions at Belsen to 
discuss Kramer and his guards’ roles at Auschwitz, where Kramer had been tasked with 
overseeing the gas chambers until late 1944.
168
  However, the media spotlight was on the 
nineteen female guards and their sadistic treatment of prisoners.  From photographs widely 
disseminated throughout the Canadian press, the female guards appeared to be ordinary 
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housewives, but from the testimony heard, they had no conception of moral decency.  Of 
particular fascination to Canadians was the 22 year-old guard Irma Grese, whose testimony 
made front-page news across the country.  Dozens of pictures were taken of her during the 
trial and printed throughout the press, giving her a peculiar celebrity status.  Even the 
Canadian Jewish press reveled in describing Irma Grese.  The Jewish Western Bulletin noted 
the contrast between her appearance as the “ideal Nazi woman,” and her disposition of being 
“terrifyingly brutal.”  Reporters commented that she had “a certain savage beauty…[with] 
the most cruel eyes.
169
  The Toronto Star claimed that Grese looked “more like a society 
fashion model than an accused murderer and torturer,” describing her as “a striking 
figure.”170  Canadian journalists frequently commented on her indifferent attitude towards 
Holocaust survival testimony and film evidence of Auschwitz during the proceedings.  Her 
testimony on the stand demonstrated for Canadian audiences how Nazism had corrupted 
German society.  The AP news report recounted a version of her life, in which her socially 
acceptable desire to become a nurse was perverted by Nazism to make her a vicious 
murderer: “her father, who knew nothing but hard work, was anti-Hitler in his views and 
forbade his five children to enter Hitler Youth movements.  But after her mother died, Irma 
said she became a nurse and volunteered for the S.S., being sent to the Ravensbruck 
concentration camp, north of Berlin, for training.”171  Witnesses at the tribunal recounted that 
Grese carried a gun, and appeared to enjoy frequently whipping and setting dogs on 
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prisoners, although she denied any involvement in sending prisoners to the gas chambers in 
Auschwitz.   
Despite Grese’s questionable celebrity status, the Belsen tribunal and other war crime 
trials provided opportunities either in person or through affidavits for hundreds of Jewish 
victims to remember and bring their grievances into the public sphere.  Day after day, 
journalists recorded the systematic murder of Jews.  Regina Rosenthal, a Polish Jew who 
survived Auschwitz, accused Kramer of forcing 300 prisoners into an inferno, where they 
were burned alive.
172
  Lydia Sonzajn discussed her failed efforts to blow up the Auschwitz 
gas chambers, and the murderous reprisals that followed when the plan was discovered by 
the Nazis.  She told the court that Kramer was “responsible for having my family sent to the 
gas chamber.”173  Other witnesses described the unbearable hunger that prisoners endured, 
which led to hundreds of cases of cannibalism.
174
  Pola Zynger recalled the traumatic 
experience of having one of the Belsen guards beat her unconscious.
175
  Helen Klein told her 
experience of being one of twelve hundred Polish Jews sent to Auschwitz who was fortunate 
not to be among the 800 who were immediately selected for the gas chamber.  She 
remembered seeing Grese on the platform inspecting the arrivals.
176
  Sigmud Bendall, a 
Jewish doctor from Lodz, worked in Auschwitz disposing of the bodies of Jewish victims.  
He recounted the process by which corpses had their teeth fillings removed, hair shorn, and 
bodies finally burned in “long trenches…fitted with tubes to drain off the fats from 
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bodies.”177  Zophia Litwinska, a Jewish Pole, recalled her horrifying experience of being 
selected alongside 3000 Jews for the gas chamber upon arrival in Auschwitz:  “I was led into 
a room like a shower bath where there were towels and even mirrors…I was terrified at what 
was happening that I had no idea how many people were there.  There were cries and tears.  
People shouted at each other, hit each other.  We were all terrified.  Then I saw the fumes 
coming in from a window.  I had to cough very violently.  Tears streamed from my eyes and 
I had a choking sensation in my throat.”  When she was inside the chamber “choking to death 
in the fighting, crying mass of people,” according to her testimony, a guard pulled her out of 
the chamber realizing she was married to a Polish officer.
178
  These dramatic memories 
showed Nazi deprivation at its worst.
179
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Toronto Star, 14 December 1945, 6. 
 
The Jewish experiences outlined in the trial testimonies confirmed the degenerated 
nature of German society, specifically in relation to science.  Editors discussed how German 
medical science had been perverted from healing its citizens to being used by doctors to 
perform fatal and sadistic experimentations on prisoners.  Experiments discussed in the 
Canadian press included high altitude pressure tests, acclimation to extreme temperatures 
through whole body submersion, introducing infectious diseases, and testing dangerous 
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treatments.
180
  The Toronto Telegram noted that the entire medical field in Germany had 
been “debased” by the Nazis.  While the Germans were inventing “scientific techniques to 
exterminate helpless civilians,” basic standards for the treatment of disease within German 
cities had dropped, with physicians not having sufficient access to plasma and whole blood.  
Mortality rates due to gangrene were soaring even though the disease was effectively non-
existent in Allied nations.  Basic medical knowledge, such as familiarity with Penicillin, was 
relatively unknown, leading to drastically higher death rates in German hospitals compared 
with Allied treatment centers.
181
 
With Nazism corrupting every aspect of German culture, the Canadian media 
questioned whether the German nation had indeed been victimized by the Nazis.  The 
Toronto Star noted that Germany had once been a leading nation in “science, art, music, 
scholarship, philosophy, religion, moral discipline and humanitarianism,” but that the Nazi 
revolution, illiberalism, and decent into violence had “destroyed not merely the human forms 
of men and women, but their genius and talent and the spiritual force of an entire nation.”182  
The Toronto Telegram suggested that Canadian sympathy for Germans was misplaced and 
that the Allies needed to impose a harsh peace on Germany: “for a long time they will have 
to be supervised as closely as the inmates of a madhouse.”183  In Maclean’s, Canadian Jewish 
journalist L. S. B. Shapiro referenced conversations he had with several Germans in Holland, 
and came to the conclusion that they were not remorseful for Nazi atrocities or for driving 
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Europe into war, but that they regretted only that they had lost.
184
  Shapiro called on 
Canadians to be “vindictive” towards Germans and “remain their masters” until Germany 
gained a “realization of her war guilt”185  Opinions ranged on how to re-educate the Germans 
from putting the German population into concentration camps and exploiting their labor
186
 to 
evangelizing Germany and bringing it “back to God.”187  Norman Rawson, the minister of 
Centennial Church in Hamilton, told congregants that there was no distinction between Nazis 
and ordinary Germans since the crimes against humanity were products of German culture: 
“They’re going to try to make us distinguish between Nazi and Germans.  Sob sisters are 
already at work….I tell you there’s overruling evidence the German people knew Adolf 
Hitler’s plan, knew what he intended to do—first with the Jews, with the Germans, then with 
the world.  It isn’t the Nazis who have enslaved the Germans.  History shows that the Nazis 
are a natural outcome of philosophers and writers of Germany since 1807.”188 
While Canadian saw the liberation of the concentration camps as a signal of the end 
of the war, for Canadian Jews the end of hostilities did not mean the end of Jewish suffering 
and dying in Europe. The liberation of the concentration camps did not immediately forestall 
the mortality rate of Jews, thousands of whom were starving and diseased.  Two weeks after 
Belsen was liberated over five hundred people were dying per day within its confines.
189
  In 
August 1945, Earl Harrison submitted a report to American President Harry S. Truman: “As 
matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we 
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do not exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our 
military guard instead of S.S. troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, 
seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy.”190  As 
news reached Canadians that Jews still languished in detestable conditions, the desire to 
mourn and remember Hitler’s victims became incorporated into relief efforts to save Jews 
who were still suffering due to the Nazi assault on European Jewry.   
In 1946 Saul Hayes insisted that the Jewish community go beyond expressing 
sympathy and memorializing Europe’s Jews to give money to save those who survived 
Hitler’s “biological warfare.”  Although Hayes admitted that the “senses become dulled to 
losses of life” when “the world is used to large-scale bombings,” and that “it is hard for the 
mind to be receptive to statements such as Jewry lost five million of its adherents or an entire 
ghetto of Lodz was cremated,” nonetheless it was important that Canadian Jews went beyond 
memorializing and gave money so that Jewish survivors could rebuild their lives.  In fact, 
Hayes was critical of the memorialization and sympathy garnered by the plight of European 
Jewry since it had produced little tangible help for DPs: “You may say that the Jews are the 
forgotten people.  Unfortunately they are not forgotten, they are too well remembered.  Every 
minor gauleiter remembered them, every important gestapo official proscribed them and at 
liberation they were not forgotten, they were too well remembered.  Everyone knew of their 
                                                     
190
 William I. Hitchcock, The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe (New York: 
Free Press, 2008), 320. 
  157 
plight and even talked about it but, like those who talk about the weather, they did little about 
it.”191  Now was the time for action, not words. 
Relief work accelerated in the postwar years, as Canadian Jews initially believed that 
survivors would be able to return to their homelands and rebuild their communities.  Clothing 
drives were quite successful and were not indicative of a lack of concern among Canadian 
Jews, as one historian has suggested.
192
  The reason why Canadian Jews organized clothing 
drives was because representatives of the JDC saw that there was a need for such items. The 
JDC interviewed Lucius N. Littauer, former manager of the Polish Telegraph Agency, who 
had spent several months in Poland following the Red Army’s liberation.  From this source, 
the JDC concluded that the Polish Jews “need in the first place not food, but clothing, 
includ[ing] shoes, and medicaments.” 193  By the summer of 1946, the CJC had collected 
100,000 items to be shipped overseas.
194
  In October 1946, Hayes estimated that the clothing 
collected thus far was valued at $160,000.  The CJC had also secured several sewing 
machines, worth $4,500.  The success of the clothing drive was not because Canadian Jewry 
did not want to support Polish Jewry with their wallets.  In the twelve months prior to 
October 1946, the CJC had raised $750,000 which had been wired overseas via the JDC.
195
  
The CJC National Executive estimated that during the 1946 calendar year, the UJA’s various 
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campaigns collected “approximately $1,500,000, if the value of the supplies in kind such as 
clothing, medicaments, etc. are added.”196  The next year, the CJC raised its fundraising goal 
for overseas relief to two million dollars.  The CJC managed to collect $1,850,000 of its goal 
in 1947, and earmarked $1,400,000 to be transferred to the JDC.
197
  The Western Division 
raised almost $400,000, and an additional $15,000 worth of clothing had been collected.
198
 
To revitalize religious and communal life, the Central Division of the CJC requested 
that each synagogue in Ontario donate one or more Torah Scrolls to the European Jewish 
communities.  Hoping to draw attention to the desperate situation that still existed in Poland, 
the CJC arranged a ceremonial service on October 2, 1945, in which “Orthodox patriarchs of 
the community” would congregate and “special prayers will be offered” for the survivors.  
The CJC promised that the event would “be one of the most significant moments in the 
religious life of Ontario’s Jewish community.199  
Within the Canadian Jewish community, controversy erupted over the state of 
Canadian Jewish aid to Poland, which many members of the community thought was 
absurdly low.  Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe in 1945, CJC General 
Secretary H. M. Caiserman and communist Jewish community leader Sam Lipshitz visited 
Poland to assess the condition of Polish Jewry in the aftermath of the Nazi occupation.  The 
trip was triggered by complaints from Polish Jews that Canadian relief supplies were 
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inadequate and that other national Jewish communities were being privileged over Polish 
Jews.  Historian Franklin Bialystok has suggested that the Canadian response to the needs of 
Polish Jewry was paltry and exhibited a general apathy towards Holocaust survivors.  Rather 
than sending much needed cash, Bialystok writes that “the Canadian Jewish community 
would do little but apply some band-aids.  Having satisfied themselves and their constituency 
that it had discharged this responsibility, its leaders quickly turned to matters of great 
importance.”  By “band-aids,” Bialystok refers to the meager financial aid and supplies sent 
to Poland as relief, which was simply inadequate to rebuild Polish-Jewish society.  Rather 
than help Jewish survivors rebuild their communities in Poland, Bialystok argues that the 
CJC misrepresented the Polish desire to leave.
200
  However, Canadian Jewish relations with 
the postwar Jewish population in Poland were complicated by misinformation and the belief 
that rampant antisemitism in Poland made the existence of a Jewish community in Poland 
untenable.  
One of the reasons why the Central Committee of Polish Jewry criticized the lack of 
contributions from Canadian Jewry was because money raised in Canada by the CJC was not 
transmitted directly to Poland.  Funds for overseas relief were handed to the JDC, which was 
responsible for putting the money to good use.  Until 1946, funds sent to the JDC had not 
been earmarked by their origin, which according to Saul Hayes, had the consequence that 
“the European beneficiaries were not aware of the fact that they were receiving contributions 
from Canadian sources.”201  H. Frank noted that “relief is a two sided medallion.”  While the 
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primary goal was to help “the sick, helpless and needy,” there was the secondary need “of 
identifying the relief with the giver.”   Since the JDC was unable to “make known to the Jews 
of Europe the Canadian Jewish interest,” one of primary reasons for sending H. M. 
Caiserman to Poland was to correct this misunderstanding.  A secondary goal was to help 
locate Jewish relatives of Canadians.
202
  Hayes instructed Caiserman to visit all the towns 
that had Landsmannschaften offices in Canada to find out “what happened to these 
communities.”203 
In Poland, the CJC delegation visited twenty communities and identified which 
supplies shipped by the JDC came from Canada.
204
  In a private letter to Hayes, Caiserman 
shared his initial impressions and noted that the “relations of the Central Committee and the 
JDC were strained,” with the institutions of the Central Committee—houses, schools, and 
hospitals—lacking many basic necessities of life.  Compounding the difficulties, the Central 
Committee was holding mass meetings accusing the JDC of failing to get reasonable 
currency exchange rates.  At the beginning of February 1945, both Caiserman and Lipshitz 
agreed that it might be necessary for Canadian Jewry to “rush money to purchase locally the 
necessary products and relieve the critical situation.”  However, Caiserman advised Hayes 
that nothing should be done until he had completed his investigation and determined that the 
Central Committee could “obtain a more acceptable rate of exchange than 100 Zlotes per 
dollar.”205  Three weeks later, Caiserman’s opinion had shifted, and he reported that the JDC 
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“gave up the exchange fight” and had made the exchange rate more favorable: between 100 
to 150 Zlotes per dollar.  Caiserman also believed that the JDC was “doing a very good job in 
spite of the abuses in the communist papers in Canada and the Central Committee leaders,” 
believing that the conditions would have been “catastrophic” without the JDC.   
On arrival in Lodz, the Canadian delegation was attacked by the Central Jewish 
Committee for not adequately providing relief, which Polish leaders blamed for the flight of 
Jews out of Poland.  On December 17, 1945, members of the Central Committee ridiculed 
the relief practices of Canadian Jews.  The clothes were “a disgrace.”  One Polish leader said 
that Canada’s idea of relief was “insulting.”  The practice of sending goods and supplies 
when money was needed was antiquated.  Give the Polish Jew the option to buy “according 
to his taste” and send money.  If money was available, the Central Committee felt confident 
that the 150,000 Polish Jews in the Soviet Union would return and that “a good percentage 
will remain.”  Although “we know that anti-Semitism reigns, and that underground black 
force aim to destroy us and the Polish government,” this leader insisted that “we have here 
the very best chances for a small good Jewish Community” and that the Polish government 
was working to stop antisemitic attacks.
206
   
During his travels throughout Poland, Caiserman sensed that the Central Committee’s 
view of aid was shaped by political ideology, rather than the view of Polish Jews.  He was 
impressed by the amount of Jewish rebuilding he encountered, but realized that the Jewish 
population in Poland was living in fear and eager to leave.  At a mass meeting in Bialystok 
on January 18, 1946, Caiserman was told of an antisemitic group called “Jeknik Polski” of 
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London, which “organized Jewish attacks in Poland.”  Since liberation, 46 Jews had been 
murdered in Bialestock alone.  At the closing of the meeting, Caiserman recorded that vice-
president Turek of the Central Committee requested that Canadian Jewry exert pressure and 
“demand [the] realization of Zionism.”  In Warsaw, Caiserman was informed that the Jewish 
population in August was 80,000, but now, in December, it had dropped to 50,000.  
However, the flight from Poland was even greater than the numbers led him to believe as it 
was counteracted by the fact that thousands of the 200,000 Polish Jews who had fled to the 
Soviet Union during the Nazi era were returning to Poland.
207
  Caiserman travelled to 
Ostrowicz on January 12 and met with the local Central Committee president, Aaron 
Freedenthal.  He was told numerous stories of mass shootings during the Nazi period.  
Amongst the 200 Jews who survived, Freedenthal said there was “terrific insecurity,” that 5 
Jews had been killed since liberation in the town, and that “emigration was the unanimous 
voice of the small community.”  When Caiserman said that he would still “recommend to our 
Congress aid for those who want to remain and those who want to leave,” he was chided for 
not understanding the situation.  According to Caiserman’s diary, “he [Freedenthal] felt that I 
am overlooking the overwhelmous [sic] opinion of Polish Jewry—the imperative need of 
leaving Poland.”208   
Upon their return to Canada in February 1946, Caiserman and Lipshitz went on a 
speaking tour across the country, discussing the work of the JDC and the conditions of Polish 
Jewry.  Caiserman reported that Polish Jewish rehabilitation was progressing faster than he 
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expected: “To my great amazement I found, first, that the remnants of Polish Jewry had the 
courage, the initiative and determination to organize and to unite.”  Jewish cultural 
institutions had been rebuilt—including a Yiddish newspaper, Jewish schools, libraries, and 
writing associations.  Caiserman noted that the Historical Department of the Central Jewish 
Committee in Lodz was documenting and printing volume upon volume of research on the 
Nazi mass murder of Jews.
209
  However, there was still desperate need for basic supplies, 
such as medicine, since nearly “every survivor suffered damage to his health because only 
those who lived in bunkers, underground sewers, caves or as partisans in the forests had a 
chance to keep alive.”210  Caiserman did not stress Polish Jews’ belief that Canadian relief 
was inadequate, but did note in his speeches that Polish Jewry was “unsatisfied with Jewish 
communities of the American continent” because “it is convinced that we did not do 
everything that could have been done to rescue Polish Jewry from the terrific extermination.”  
Certainly Caiserman was not going to take the reports of Polish antisemitism lightly and 
reported that “Jewish life in Poland is still not secure.”  Caiserman reasoned that the fact that 
the Nazis built the extermination camps in Poland “proves how satisfied they were with the 
ravages of Jew-baiting in Poland.”  With reports that 800 Jews had been murdered in Poland 
since liberation, Canadian Jews were apprehensive.
211
 
Lipshitz’s interpretation of Polish conditions varied drastically from Caiserman’s.  
Lipshitz attacked the CJC delegate for exaggerating the level of Polish antisemitism.  Instead, 
Lipshitz echoed the complaints raised by the Central Committee in Lodz, that the CJC was 
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not using the wealth of the monied Jews to offer adequate aid and were blaming antisemitism 
for the struggles to build a Jewish community in Poland.  Caiserman took offense to the 
claim that he was misrepresenting the Polish-Jewish situation, noting his belief that “the 
serious anti-Semitic situation in Poland is inherited from the furious anti-semitic propaganda 
before the war and the years of Nazi occupation.”212  In fact, while most of the murders that 
Caiserman was hearing about in postwar Poland were motivated by anti-government 
opposition and “banditry,” not antisemitism, it is easily understandable how the traumatised 
Jewish population would have seen it differently.
213
 
The CJC had even received information from the Central Committee Jews late in 
1945 which specified that the Polish government was cracking down on antisemitism.  The 
Central Committee wrote that “the Polish government knows perfectly well that anti-
semitism endangers the aims of the Polish democracy and is leading a systematic campaign 
against it, trying to guide and re-educate the public opinion.”214   It’s hardly surprising that 
Lipshitz and the Canadian Jewish communists found this statement reassuring, but for 
liberals within the CJC, assurances from a totalitarian regime that they were obliterating 
antisemitism were not convincing. 
Indeed, in 1946, a delegation of the Central Committee of Polish Jews visited Canada 
with dire reports of continued pogroms launched by the Poles following the Nazi retreat.  The 
delegation was led by Dr. Emil Sommerstein, whom one observer described as “the 
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personification of the Jewish tragedy in Europe…old, tired, worn, yet with head erect, white 
beard flowing and supported by a cane.”215  He recounted early efforts to rebuild Jewish life 
in Poland, including publishing a Yiddish newspaper, re-establishing a Jewish school in 
Lodz, and creating a Yiddish radio program.  Echoing previous Central Committee appeals, 
Sommerstein explained that the Jewish Poles were in need of basic necessities for survival, 
such as clothing, food, and medication.  His associate Zuckerman, a young Polish Jew who 
had been active in the Jewish underground, stated explicitly that there was no future for 
Jewry in Poland, and that Jewish youth were preparing to leave for Palestine.  Leon Crestohl, 
a Jewish lawyer and son of a Polish Rabbi, who served as President of the Federation of 
Polish Jews of Canada during the war and on the Presidium of the Jewish Community 
Council of Montreal, met the Polish delegates several times, in Canada, England, and France.  
He found that the Jewish Poles were divided on the issue of whether the Jewish community 
was viable in Poland along political lines.  Zionists, especially youth who had no emotional 
connection to Poland, were eager to leave and anti-Zionists were determined to use donated 
funds to rebuild their destroyed communities.  However, Crestohl estimated that 90 percent 
of Jewish Poles were “anxious to leave the country and go to Palestine.”  Even Sommerstein, 
who advocated for resources to be sent to Poland, Crestohl believed “would most easily 
favour an exodus of Jews from Poland…although it is not politic for him to publicly 
proclaim this desire.”  Nearly all the delegates believed, according to Crestohl, “that there is 
great danger of a violent antisemitic war developing in Poland.”  The reason for this concern 
was not only the history of Polish antisemitism, but also that Jews were “clamouring for 
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return of their belongings, houses, furnishings, machinery, places of business, dwellings” and 
Poles, also reeling from the economic pressures, tried to push Jews away.  Crestohl was told 
that in Radom, approximately 1200 Jews demanded the return of their property, only to 
receive declarations that “unless all Jews leave Radom by the 15th of a certain month, they 
would all be murdered.”  The five Jewish leaders who reported the threat to the police were 
brushed off and told it was a prank. They were found murdered just days before the deadline 
with notes “pinned to the bodies” warning that the threat was not a prank. The Jews fled.  
The incident was not isolated.  In Krakow, events reminiscent of Kristallnacht occurred, with 
synagogues set alight and 17 Jews murdered.   
In London, Crestohl attended the Zionist Organization meeting where he again sought 
out the Polish delegates.  What he found was a cacophony of opinions that left him “not only 
confused, but bewildered.”  Interestingly, Crestohl reported that the “one point only where 
they all agreed…was a reluctance to talk about the past.  They were all interested in the 
future.  They refused to paint the gruesome pictures with which World emotions have 
become terrorized.  They were only concerned with what the Jews of the World will do 
now.” The Polish delegates recommended sending relief supplies through a Swedish 
intermediary, Gilel Storch, who had been instrumental in releasing 3500 Jewish women who 
had been sterilized through Nazi experimentation and also in negotiating the release of 7,500 
Jews from German camps for the price of 500,000 Swedish kronen.
 216
  To ease the clothing 
shortage among Polish Jews, 52 sewing machines were shipped to DPs in Poland, 36 to Italy 
and 15 to Belgium.  The Canadian Federation also coordinated with the Polish Federation in 
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France to obtain visas for Polish Jews to emigrate.
217
 When Crestohl returned to Canada, he 
made it clear that the situation of Jews in Poland was desperate, as the Poles were conducting 
pogroms against Jews emerging from hiding and Britain was still refusing to settle Jews in 
Palestine.
 218
  The Federation for Polish Jews, led by Crestohl called on Canadian Jews to 
donate Yiddish and Hebrew books to repopulate libraries and enable Jewish students in 
Poland to continue their studies.
219
   
Throughout 1946, evidence became overwhelming that resettling Jews in Europe was 
untenable.  Not only was antisemitism resurgent in Poland, but Jews had little desire to return 
to the graveyard of their brethren.  Siemund Fischel, President of the Juedische Gemeinde, 
the Communal Association of Central Europe Jews in Shanghai reported to the CJC on 
August 22, 1946 that of the 18,000 Jewish refugees who had escaped into China, 2,000 had 
already died because of “climate” and “disease.”  However, “a return to Europe can also not 
be taken into consideration, as nearly all members of our Communal Association have lost 
their closest relatives by the Nazi-murderers in a beastly way,” Fischel explained.  He hoped 
that Canada would permit entry to these Jewish immigrants.
220
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2.5 The Impact of Holocaust memory on Canadian Jews 
 
It would be false to suggest that the politicization of the Holocaust was just a weapon that 
Canadian Jews used disingenuously to promote Jewish rights.  Canadian Jews also 
memorialized the Holocaust in less political ways.  For most Canadian Jews, the frequent 
discussion of the Holocaust in weekly Jewish newspapers and the insertion of Holocaust 
commemorative events into the Jewish calendar wove the Holocaust into the fabric of Jewish 
life.  Since commemorations were rarely Canadian initiatives, participation in the annual the 
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Memorial helped incorporate Canadian Jews into a global Jewish 
community that placed exceeding importance on remembering the Holocaust.  For example, 
in 1954, the World Jewish Congress called on Jewish communities around the world to 
commemorate the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising by initiating major projects that would revitalize 
Jewish culture and “repair the cultural losses” the world Jewry had suffered with the 
annihilation of its European members.  Projects were to be completed by 27 Nissan, 5714, 
Yom HaShoah, or Holocaust Remembrance Day, and were to be dedicated to the Jewish 
resistance against Nazism.
221
  Iran’s Jewish community of 100,000 erected a Jewish library; a 
Jewish school was created in Costa Rica; Chile’s 30,000 Jews ushered in a Jewish Division at 
the National Library of Chile.
222
  The next year, Dr. I. Schwarzbart, director of the World 
Jewish Congress’ Organization Department, called on Jews to extend these memorialization 
projects to “engrave the memory of the Warsaw Ghetto Fighters in the hearts of generations” 
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by producing research on the Holocaust.
223
  In Canada, memorial services were held across 
the country and reaffirmed Canadian commitment to remember the victims and prevent a 
second occurrence. Toronto’s Temple Emanu-El announced that Rabbi Harry J. Stern was 
presiding over a “special ritual of remembrance [to] be included in the Haggadah Service for 
the six million Jews who perished at the hands of the Nazis and for the heroes of the ghetto 
uprising.”224  On October 27, 1948, the Canadian Federation of Lithuanian Jews organized a 
memorial service commemorating the liquidation of Kovner [Kovno] Ghetto, featuring Jacob 
Rabinovitch and B. Shainson, both of whom escaped Lithuania.
225
  For some community 
leaders, helping Jewish DPs who had survived but were suffering was more important than 
memorializing the dead.  Saul Hayes, in a fundraising tour of the Maritimes a year after the 
war’s end, insisted that Canadian Jews focus on the surviving remnant in DP camps and 
donate to relief missions to avert the continuing death toll: “I have to leave the sackcloth and 
ashes to those both better equipped and perhaps with more time than I have.  I will listen to 
the El Molei Rachmin at a proper time and place and I will be as devout in the prayers for the 
dead as the next man, but I intend to exercise every ounce of energy and every fibre to save 
the living and not mourn the dead.”226 
Nonetheless, in the years following the Second World War, Canadian Jews also 
embarked on a number of literary endeavours in the postwar era to represent the nature of the 
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European Jewish experience during the Holocaust.
227
  Most notable was A. M. Klein’s 
masterpiece The Second Scroll, which parallels the structure of the Torah, and focuses on the 
journey from the despair and religious doubt resulting from the tragedy of the Holocaust to 
finding redemption in the creation of Israel.  First published in 1951 following his own visit 
to Israel, Klein’s fiction describes a Canadian journalist who travels to Europe in search of 
his uncle, a Jewish partisan in the Holocaust, only to find that he has recently died, but his 
spirit lives on in Israel.
228
  Although Klein’s allegory is one of the most widely-praised works 
of Holocaust literature, other Canadian Jews also wrote more modest contributions.  Henry 
Kreisel, a Jewish internee who arrived in Canada during the late 1930s after fleeing Austria 
during the Anschluss, wrote about the antisemitism that pervaded interwar Vienna and also 
about the guilt that Jewish survivors carried from making morally compromising decisions 
for survival.
229
  By the late 1940s and early 1950s, Holocaust survivors who entered Canada, 
such as Rachel M. Korn and Chava Rosenfarb, were able to write more intimate tales of 
Jewish life in occupied Europe, and although this literature was often written and published 
in Yiddish, it was important to Canadian Jews.
230
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Despite some historians suggesting that the drive to climb the social ladder distracted 
Canadian Jews from remembering the Holocaust, Jewish community-building was 
conceptualized as a response to the Holocaust.  During the postwar period, the Canadian 
Jewish community underwent a massive demographic transition.  From 1945 to 1956, the 
Jewish community welcomed tens of thousands of immigrants, increasing the number of 
Jews in Canada by 60,000 individuals or 31 percent.  Franklin Bialystok estimates that over 
half of these immigrants were Holocaust survivors.  In tandem with this rapid community 
growth, Canadian Jews were becoming more affluent, leaving their inner-city 
neighbourhoods and moving to more prosperous suburbs, and enrolling their children in 
universities to embark on professional careers.
231
 Canadian Jews were “bent on advancing 
from the fringes of the Canadian mosaic into the mainstream of Canadian society,” and in 
this effort, according to Bialystok, the Holocaust had no place: “As for remembering the 
Holocaust, for most Canadian Jews it was [a] painful reminder of Jewish powerlessness, of 
submission to unbearable dehumanization without resistance, which disturbed the new image 
of the confident Canadian Jew who celebrated the apparent miraculous rebirth of the Jewish 
state as both a historical and a spiritual emergence….Simply put, the vast majority of 
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Canadian Jews remained estranged from the memory of the Holocaust.”232  However, since 
the Holocaust was frequently on the minds of Canadian Jews, it is not surprising that 
community-building and Holocaust memorialization were closely related.  For Canadian 
Jews, the destruction of European Jewish culture put the onus of preserving Jewish life on 
North American Jewry.  Harold Lande, a Jewish judge in Quebec’s Provincial Court, noted 
that Jewish education had to become a greater priority to Canadian Jewry in the wake of the 
Holocaust:  
During the past twenty years, we have witnessed the most catastrophic change in the 
organic pattern of Jewish life in the world.  Until little more than a score of years ago, 
Eastern Europe was a great source of our cultural and religious inspiration.  Almost 
overnight in terms of history, the great stronghold of Jewishness has been wiped 
out….America alone is the hope for the preservation of the Jewish heritage in the 
present generation of Jews outside of Israel.  In the past, we relied for much of our 
leadership on tides of immigration.  If our own educational techniques were 
inadequate, there were always transfusions of blood from abroad, but there is no more 
blood plasma.  We are on our own and what we do with the education of our youth 
will determine whether we have or have not met our great historic responsibility.
 233
 
 
Lande hoped that Canadian Jewry would go beyond fundraising or “dollar Judaism” 
and begin creating a spiritual and cultural community based on Jewish values.
234
  This 
sentiment was shared by American Jewry, who believed that Jewish survival depended on 
transforming North America into the cultural centre of Judaism.  Canadian Jews therefore 
presented community-building as a necessary response to the Holocaust.  As Canadian Jews 
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moved to suburbs and rebuilt their community centers, they dedicated synagogues to the 
Holocaust martyrs.  One notable example was the building of the Beth Tzedec Congregation 
in Toronto in 1955 with the amalgamation of Goel Tzedec and Beth HaMidrash HaGadol.  
The panels in the sanctuary were sculpted by Ernest Raab, a Holocaust survivor whose 
parents had been gassed, and featured symbols of Nazi concentration camps.  In the 
dedication service, Rabbi Stuart E. Rosenberg stated that the building of this synagogue was 
an act of defiance against Hitler and an effort to carry on Jewish life:  
Not many nights have passed since the lights of our synagogues and schools 
went out all over Europe.  And with them, the sainted, the gifted, the learned, 
and the martyred.  And now, in a free land and a free society, in stately dignity 
and in quiet confidence—the Scrolls of the Torah are borne aloft once more.  
And this symbol proclaims a great truth: By this supreme act of faith—faith in 
ourselves, in our freedoms—because of the God of freedom—the Psalmist 
once again comes to life: ‘I shall not die, but I will live and proclaim the 
works of the Lord.’235  This ceremony is a symbol of hope.236  
 
Even before the Second World War ended, Canadian Jews infused the annihilation of 
European Jewry with religious significance by comparing it to the great acts of suffering and 
heroism in the Talmud.  Hyman Chanover, writing for the Jewish Western Bulletin, 
compared the struggle against Nazism with the Maccabees’ rebellion against Syrian 
oppression.  Comparing the liberation of German-occupied nations to lighting Chanukah 
candles, Chanover could marvel at the courage of Jews fighting Nazism, but not with a 
cheerful heart: “the lights that have been going on have also revealed unbelievably horrible 
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scenes of mass murder in the Nazi extermination camps for Jews.”237  For some Jews, the 
Seder table transformed from a joyful occasion celebrating the salvation of the Jews from 
their enslavement under the Pharaohs to a somber remembrance that Jews were being 
slaughtered in Poland.  Harry Musikansky, editor of the Jewish Western Bulletin, wrote on 
April 16, 1943 that “the ancient story of Passover is being relived by Israel.  The tyranny, 
enslavement and extermination practiced by the ancient Pharaohs were not very different 
from that of the modern Führer.  It is a discouraging thought.”238  The secular newspaper 
Winnipeg Tribune even noted that the 1945 Rosh Hashanah celebrations would be marred, 
despite the end of the war, because “half of European Jewry was exterminated by the Nazis, 
[and this] will be stressed in sermons.”239 
At Holy Blossom Temple, activities were transformed by the Holocaust.  At the 
Annual Congregational Dinner on April 12, 1945, the synagogue paid homage to the 
Canadian Jewish soldiers who had served both their country and their morals to fight against 
Nazism.  In a prepared speech, Rabbi Abraham Feinberg explained that the war and the 
destruction of European Jewry had shaken his congregation’s faith.  Canadian Jews had been 
traumatised by Hitler’s war against the Jews and he saw his role in maintaining Jewish 
morale: “Every current of conflict, every hurricane of disaster, even from far-off Majdanek, 
every cold blast of insecurity and fear sweeping through Jewish hearts, inevitably swirls 
around the Rabbi.”  Feinberg noted that membership at the Temple had “increased 
enormously” as Canadian Jews attempted to understand the spiritual meaning of the 
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Holocaust: “at no point in our tumultuous and tear drenched past has the danger of physical 
destruction and spiritual demoralization been as great.”   Its religious school had also 
dramatically grown in size, reaching nearly 300 pupils despite the facility originally designed 
for only 175.  Feinberg explained that under the leadership of Peter Hunter and Heinz 
Warschauer, the schools “has been enlarged in physical scope and in spiritual intensity.”  
Even children were questioning the Jewish practices and traditions as they heard the tragedy 
befalling European Jewry: “No Jewish child is exempt from the disillusioning impact of the 
Nazi extermination-program, anti-Semitic pressure in the immediate environment, the faith-
undermining growth of materialistic rationalism and the increasing indifference to Jewish 
practice and values in the average Jewish home.”240  As early as 1944, Holy Blossom Temple 
believed that it was important that children in its religious school discuss the Holocaust.  
Grade 10 students were asked to make scrapbooks on “The Warsaw Ghetto and its Fate” and 
“Palestine is being Rebuilt,” that could be deposited in the school library for future 
students.
241
  Younger children also were introduced to the Holocaust and to the Canadian 
Jewish role in helping refugees.  In the Kindergarten class, children were told of the suffering 
of Hitler’s victims and participated in fundraising efforts to “bring money for the children of 
Europe.”  Similarly, the Grade 5 program included a segment on “The Children in Europe,” 
which discussed the relief efforts of Canadian Jewry to send them “food, clothing, medical 
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and sanitary supplies.”  The course also discussed the “horrors and fear [and] years of death 
and darkness” that had enveloped Europe’s Jews.242 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The Holocaust became infused within Canadian Jewish life during the war years.  The 
struggle to save Europe’s Jews was invariably tied to the war effort for Canadian Jews, 
despite the Canadian Government’s effort to separate Canadian war aims from the European 
Jewish experience and frame the war as a liberal and Christian crusade against tyranny and 
oppression.  Although the annihilation of the Jews did make appearances in the Canadian 
mainstream press, especially after 1942, the story was rarely discussed from a Canadian 
perspective until Hitler’s defeat was certain and discussion switched to how Germany ought 
to be punished.  For Canadian Jews, the Second World War was an extension of the Nazi war 
to rid Germany of Jews.  Therefore, the Canadian war effort was understood to be a means to 
save Europe’s Jews from complete annihilation.  Canadian Jews certainly did lament the 
West’s unwillingness to launch any systematic rescue action to liberate Jews, but they were 
also conscious that winning the war quickly needed to be a top priority.  The end of the fight 
against Nazi Germany did not immediately bring an end to Jewish suffering in Europe.  Nor 
did Canadian Jews believe that the danger of antisemitism passed with the defeat of Hitler’s 
regime.  One of the greatest impact on Canadian Jews was a greater sensitivity to the dangers 
of antisemitism.  The Nazi period demonstrated that antisemitism was not only a social 
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disease that ate away at the foundations of democratic institutions, but that it could lead to 
the annihilation of millions of Jews if left unchecked.  Therefore, Canadian Jewish efforts 
turned towards creating international safeguards that they hoped would prevent further 
genocides and securing the State of Israel, where Jews could show a sign of strength to 
combat further assaults.
 178 
Chapter 3 
Conceptualizing the Postwar World Order in the Aftermath of the 
Holocaust 
Following the Second World War, the extermination of European Jewry was not forgotten by 
the Canadian Jewish community, but impacted their views on the postwar settlement.  The 
Jewish diaspora, including Canadian Jews, took part—as much as they could without having 
a seat at the negotiating table in the UN—in conceiving an international order that would 
protect Jews and other minorities from future state-sponsored mass murder.  To bring justice 
to the international order, Canadian Jews looked to the Holocaust for lessons and zeroed in 
on two main inter-connected factors that they believed created the conditions for Nazi 
antisemitism to evolve into the extermination of Jews: the insecurity of citizenship law and 
the impenetrable barrier of national sovereignty.  Canadian Jews realized that one of the first 
steps Nazi Germany took against Jews was to strip them of their citizenship, which 
dehumanized them in the eyes of the law, making them easier to murder.  For many Jews, the 
Holocaust also demonstrated the danger of maintaining the unfettered sanctity of national 
sovereignty.  In the 1930s, the Western democracies could look on, protest, and locally 
organize boycotts on German goods, but effectively do nothing while Germany stripped Jews 
of their citizenship, deported Jews to the limbo region of the Polish-German border, and 
organized a pogrom that caused the destruction of Jewish life, property, and liberty in 1938.  
Perhaps the one thing that would have helped—lifting the immigration quotas and allow 
German Jews to flee Europe—was not pursued largely because the national sovereignty of 
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Western democracies ensured immigration policies were determined by the perceived 
national interests and not humanitarian sentiment.   
This Holocaust discourse influenced Canadian Jews to press for human rights 
protection both domestically and in the international sphere.  In 1946, Canadian Jews 
attempted to use Canadian memories of the Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 1930s to 
insert a human rights amendment into the proposed Citizenship Act. While this effort proved 
unsuccessful, largely because Canadians had attuned themselves to disassociate Canada’s 
liberal culture from the problems that consumed Germany, and therefore saw little need to 
legislate against discrimination at the federal level, Canadian Jews exerted pressure on the 
international front to grant rights to humans beyond those enshrined in citizenship law.
1
  
Canadian Jews championed the need for international institutions, such as the UN and the 
Genocide Convention, which would further the cause of liberalism and justice between 
nations.   
While Canadian Jews remained united around these issues, a rift developed within the 
Canadian Jewish community along both class and ideological lines over the German 
problem.  Due to the Allied strategy to contain Soviet expansion, the Western Allies decided 
to welcome West Germany back into the comity of nations, making it an independent, 
remilitarized partner in NATO.  This decision was highly controversial among Canadian 
Jews, whose memories of German rearmament under Hitler were still fresh.  For much of the 
late 1940s, Canadian Jewry opposed granting Germany suzerainty.  When the Cold War 
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intensified, following the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, the Canadian Jewish 
leadership in the CJC shifted its position to support ending the occupation of West Germany, 
provided adequate safeguards were in place and that West Germany made restitution for the 
Jewish property it seized during the Hitler years.  For many working class Jews, especially 
those with communist affiliations, this was an abhorrent decision that could pave the way to a 
second Holocaust.  They claimed that antisemitism was on the rise in West Germany, that 
many top government officials were former Nazis, and that Canada should reaffirm itself as a 
moral superpower by opposing German rearmament.  While the Canadian Jewish leadership 
appreciated this position as they too had become hyper-sensitized to instances of 
antisemitism, eventually the CJC purged itself of communist-affiliated Jewish organizations 
over the issue of German rearmament. However, the division in the Jewish community was 
not due to a difference of opinion over the significance of the Holocaust, but a question of 
sincerity.  For working-class Jewish communists, the decision to back the rearmament of 
Germany was motivated by political pressure to back the Canadian government.  For liberal 
Jews, communist opposition to German rearmament was a smokescreen, as was evidenced by 
the disturbing news that the Soviet Union was engaged in its own antisemitic campaign 
throughout Eastern Europe.   
This chapter explores these events, showing the evolution of Jewish thought on 
Canada’s role in the international arena.  It shows that while the memory of the Holocaust 
was at the forefront of Canadian Jewish thought in the immediate years following the Second 
World War.  At times, the Holocaust worked to distort Jewish perceptions, particularly 
regarding the resurgence of antisemitism in West Germany.  Moreover, the fear of resurgent 
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antisemitism, be it in the Soviet Union or West Germany, caused Canadian Jews to abandon 
relatively idealistic positions and adopt more realistic arguments and strategies to safeguard 
Jewish life. 
Despite the centrality of German rearmament in the rift that erupted between 
communist Jews and the Canadian Jewish Congress, historians of the Canadian Jewish 
community have paid the story little attention.  One reason is that historians of the Holocaust 
have argued that the Cold War prevented Jews of the postwar era from speaking about the 
Holocaust.  It seems highly implausible that Jews would want to dredge up Germany’s past 
crimes when the Western democracies were trying to gain a rapprochement with West 
Germany. Perhaps due to this common assumption, historians in Canada have not examined 
the German rearmament crisis from the Jewish perspective.
2
  When this largely forgotten 
chapter in Canadian diplomatic history is discussed, it is typically examined in passing to 
note Canada’s role as a mediator between the United States and the other NATO powers, a 
role that Canada took in order to temper the influence of the United States.
3
  However, by 
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using untapped archival sources that shed light on Jewish reactions to German rearmament, 
an entirely different image of Canadian Jewish thought emerges than the one currently 
advanced by historians.  This chapter will attempt to fill this lacuna within Canadian 
historiography. 
3.1 Canadian Jews and the Making of the New International Order  
 
The Canadian Jewish experience during the Second World War of witnessing the Nazis strip 
Jews of their rights and murdering Europe’s Jews led many Canadian Jews to think that the 
traditional method of preserving peace through a network of alliances that facilitated a 
balance of power was fundamentally flawed.  For Canadian Jews, the Holocaust and the 
disruption of the peace were not isolated events, but both caused by the Nazi master race 
ideology which guided both Hitler’s domestic and foreign policy. To ensure that such events 
did not happen again, Canadian Jews pressed for an international order that would ensure that 
countries did not have carte-blanche in how they entreated with each other or even their own 
citizens.  Although liberal internationalism was present in Canada during the interwar period, 
it was not shared in Canada’s Department of External Affairs, whose position was 
multilateral, believing that Canadian security was dependent on strong alliances for its 
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defensive needs.
4
  Even after the Second World War, the Canadian Government had strong 
reservations about the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it would restrict 
Canadian authorities from effectively suppressing subversive elements in Canada.
5
  Canadian 
Jews, however, worked earnestly, if futilely, to reverse the Canadian position on a liberal 
internationalism by arguing that the Holocaust demonstrated that protecting human rights 
would also guard against expansionist European wars. 
One of the first opportunities that Canadian Jews had to address the question of 
international human rights following the Holocaust was at the San Francisco Conference in 
April 1945.  The purpose of the conference was to prepare a charter for a general 
international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.  The many 
statements that had been made over the course of the war regarding the purpose of the United 
Nations, including the Atlantic Charter and President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech, left 
Canadian Jews hopeful.  Saul Hayes, the national director of the CJC, was particularly eager 
to use this opportunity “to inform the world at large [of] the Canadian Jewish Congress’ 
views.”6  He lobbied the Canadian government by submitting a proposal to the Department 
of External Affairs.  Interestingly, Hayes’ initial drafts were scathing of the West’s response 
to Hitler’s war, demanding that the United Nations go beyond empty platitudes: “What do 
the Jewish people want in the new order?  Definitely they want their leaders of the free 
peoples not to speak out of both sides of their mouths at the same time with regard to the 
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needs of the Jewish people.”7  Clearly, Hayes was tired of receiving sympathetic remarks 
about the plight of Jews, yet no action.  However, fearing that such accusations would 
damage the Jewish cause, he adjusted his tone in the final draft.  Hayes argued that the 
horrors of the Holocaust demanded that the Jewish voice be heard:  
The stories of the shipments of cattle-car loads of Jewish women and 
children—not to speak of men slaves—from France, Belgium, Holland and 
Germany to the annihilation camps in Poland; the stories of the pogroms and 
persecutions for years, when peace ostensibly still reigned; the stories of 
Maidanek and Treblinka; the sagas of the Warsaw ghetto heroes—these are 
stories and sagas of nations of France and Holland and Belgium and of other 
lands.  But there is an extra touch to them, a Jewish touch....  Therefore the 
Jewish citizens of free countries...ask the representatives of their countries in 
the name of the cause of equity which they would serve to do justice to the 
Jewish cause.
8
 
 
Since there was no Jewish state at the time, Jews did not have a seat at the negotiating 
table to help shape the postwar world order and had to rely on representatives to plead their 
case.  The CJC wanted Canadian delegates to understand that the Second World War was 
driven by Hitler’s ideology, which was antisemitic at its core: “anti-Semitism is made of the 
stuff of Hitlerism.”9  The submission emphasized that Hitler’s war really began in 1933 and 
was initially directed against Jews.  Since the global military conflict was an inevitable 
product of Hitler’s master race ideology, an international system that did not safeguard 
minorities could not secure a lasting peace: “we still remember the practice of certain states 
before the war, of using alleged minority problems as subterfuges and excuses for provoking 
misunderstandings and tensions and ‘incidents’ that led to border troubles and eventually to 
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war.”10  Therefore, the CJC contended that the eradication of antisemitism needed to be 
prioritized:  
The constant association of virulent anti-Semitism with the incidence of 
Fascism and Hitlerism, either as a forerunner and spearhead of the latter, or as 
an invariable accompaniment justifies the assumption that the two are 
fundamentally interconnected.  The survival of anti-Semitic concepts of 
practices in the lands which have been befouled by Hitler’s domination will 
constitute a breeding ground for a fresh manifestation of Fascism and 
Hitlerism. The world cannot afford to run such a risk.  It is therefore essential, 
in the interests of realistic self-protection, as well as human progress, that the 
United Nations propound and proclaim a Bill of Rights guaranteeing human 
rights to Jewish people in all lands where such rights were undermined or 
violated by the Hitler disease.
11
 
 
The CJC also demanded that the United Nations’ “new machinery for safeguarding the rights 
of individuals and minorities” have “strong, sharp teeth, capable of implementing its 
important function.”12 
The CJC submission had little impact on thinking inside the Department of External 
Affairs.  Hayes had proposed submitting the statement in person to Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King or Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, but both 
Robertson and King declined.  The Jewish delegation was shunted off to meet with Acting 
Secretary for External Affairs Brooke Claxton and Acting Assistant Under-Secretary Dr. 
John E. Read, neither of whom went to San Francisco.  As per usual, the delegation was 
assured that their submission would be given due consideration and passed on to the 
Canadian representatives at the conference but there is no evidence that the submission had 
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any bearing on the conduct of the Canadian contingent.
13
  As Adam Chapnick describes in 
his The Middle Power Project, the Canadian delegation to San Francisco was “cautious,” 
rarely taking the lead on any issue because of the “importance of great-power harmony to 
future Canadian prosperity.”14  Ultimately, Canada voted to give veto powers to the 
permanent members of the Security Council in order to ease East-West tensions, even though 
the measure threatened to undermine the ability of the UN to police international relations.
15
 
Canadian Jews were disappointed in the weak structure of the UN and with the failed 
efforts to insert a bill of rights into Canada’s Citizenship Bill of 1944; they came to the 
unsettling conclusion that most Canadians did not believe there was a need for a bill of rights 
in liberal democracies.  Abe Arnold, editor of the Western Jewish Bulletin, wrote “all of us, 
of course, are pleased that the United Nations Charter included provisions for an 
International Bill of Rights, but we know that this will be valuable only to the degree that it is 
implemented.”16  Canadian Jews became especially disenchanted after witnessing Alistair 
Stewart and John D. Diefenbaker’s failed efforts to include a Bill of Rights in Canada’s 
constitution or amend its newly proposed Citizenship Act in 1946 to include a similar 
provision.  In support for the need for a Canadian Bill of Rights, Stewart cited numerous 
Canadian violations of human rights, including racial discrimination in the National Selective 
Service, racial quotas for admittance throughout most Canadian universities, the 
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displacement of the Japanese-Canadians and theft of their property, and racial discrimination 
in Canada’s immigration policy specifically relating to Jews.  However, the call for a 
Canadian “bill of rights” in 1946 failed in part because the Canadian government did not 
want to restrict its powers, but also because many MPs saw no need for it.  As Progressive 
Conservative MP, William Alexander McMaster wondered obliviously, “what defect was it 
[the bill of rights] intended to cure?”17  For others though, the Canadian need to safeguard 
individual rights was paramount.  MP Angus MacInnis of the CCF was extremely distressed 
by Canada’s treatment of Japanese Canadians and noted that “it is a well known fact that 
Hitler began with the persecution of the Jews, but he ended up by depriving everybody in 
Germany of liberty.  We have come pretty close to that in Canada.”18  
Despite the disappointment over the Charter and Canadian attitudes towards a bill of 
rights, Canadian Jews did not give up trying to create an international order that was safe for 
minorities.  Saul Hayes attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 in an effort to persuade 
delegates that the violence directed against Jews during the war had to be punished severely 
and that legal and practical sureties needed to be implemented so that neither Germany, nor 
any other state, could threaten minorities.  However, the conference was another great 
disappointment for Canadian Jewry.  Ill-informed, Hayes discovered upon arrival that the 
conference only concerned treaties with the minor Axis powers—Rumania, Hungary, Italy, 
Bulgaria, and Finland—and not Germany. More aggravating still for Hayes was that “the 
conference [did] not have powers,” since treaty drafts were to be written by the Big Four, 
who were concerned with “strategic and political considerations alone.”  There was little care 
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for either “the bitter experiences of war” or “the degree of war guilt, war criminality or war 
menace of the former axis powers.”  With the Jewish case being a “moral one,” Saul Hayes 
left the conference early, realizing that Jewish interests were not going to be reflected in the 
treaties produced.
19
 
Canadian Jews similarly had mixed feelings regarding the Genocide Convention and 
its ability to stop state-sponsored mass murder, since its purview only extended to members 
who signed and ratified the convention.  Canada’s hesitation to ratify the convention 
bewildered Canadian Jews, making many suspect that the UN adoption of the Genocide 
Convention was an empty gesture.  The Canadian Jewish Chronicle could not understand 
why anyone would question the need for such an international law.  “Does any one question 
it?  Is the murder of one man a crime, but the murder of six million merely a breach of a law 
which still requires to be written?”20  While Hayes could think of “at least half a dozen major 
arguments why Canada should support the convention,” he consulted with Maurice 
Perlzweig of the WJC to learn the “nooks and crannies” to help make a convincing case to 
External Affairs.
21
 Perlzweig instructed Hayes to approach Pearson on three fronts.  First, the 
case should be made that Canada played a lead role in establishing the “UN ideal,” and 
therefore was “under a strong moral obligation to align itself” with the Genocide Convention.  
Secondly, Canada had the opportunity to take the lead before any of the Big Five had ratified 
the Convention, thus securing Canada’s position as “foremost of the Middle Powers.  Will it 
now surrender this position?”  Finally, the Genocide Convention was paramount to stave off 
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the threat of antisemitism in Germany.  Since “the threat of Nazi resurgence is obvious 
enough to anyone,” Perlzweig believed that “there is no reason why the special Jewish 
anxiety in the matter should not be the subject of at least some reference.”  The supposed rise 
of German antisemitism was not the only concern for Perlzweig as “the Jewish minorities in 
the Middle East are under constant threat of annihilation.” Therefore ratification needed to be 
urgently pursued.
22
 
 On behalf of the CJC, Samuel Bronfman sent Pearson a letter on June 23, 1950, 
insisting that Canada ratify the Genocide Convention immediately so that it could take a 
stand against the “resurgence of anti-Semitism in Germany and anti-Semitic outbreaks in 
Moslem countries.”23  Pearson’s responded that he was “hoping” to bring ratification before 
the House “early in the next session,” but also did not want to give tacit approval to the 
reservations made by the Soviet bloc when they signed the convention.  Specifically they 
disputed Article IX , which stated that one signatory power could take another contracting 
party before the International Court of Justice.  Soviet states only consented to be brought 
before the International Court of Justice if all parties of the dispute consented.
24
  This 
reservation potentially made the Genocide Convention meaningless as it was highly unlikely 
that the offending party would submit itself to the mercy of the court.
25
  However, Canadian 
Jewish leaders doubted whether Canada’s delay was due to considerations about Soviet 
reservations or whether the Canadian Government had its own reservations.  Sensing this and 
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being pressured by Raphael Lemkin to press the Government, the CJC sent a submission to 
Pearson the next year on April 13, 1951, appealing to Canada’s tradition of multiculturalism.  
Bronfman argued that Canada’s unique multi-national makeup made it perfect to take the 
lead on the Genocide Convention: “Canada…reflects sober and sound attitudes in communal 
living and has an unblemished reputation in the relationships of the many diverse groups 
which combine to form the mosaic of Canadian democracy.”  Acknowledging the “legal 
problems,” Bronfman asked Pearson to think long-term and understand that if Canada 
ratified the convention: “Canada will be recorded for its moral leadership.”26  
When the ratification of the Genocide Convention went before the House in 1952, 
Canadian Jews and members of the CCF made the case that this act of international law was 
a useful first step, but needed to be expanded to prohibit acts of systematic racial 
discrimination.  Advocates made the case that Hitler’s extermination of the Jews did not 
begin with gas chambers, but with discrimination and persecution.  CCF MP Alistair Stewart 
agreed that the convention had “no teeth” and was a mere gesture, “but a gesture perhaps has 
its importance in the world today.”  He believed that the convention would serve as a useful 
educational tool, and help keep genocide at the forefront of international policy: “I think the 
world particularly remembers the horror which happened to the Jewish people under Nazi 
Germany when 6 or 7 million of them were exterminated, again in the name of national 
policy.  The question, however, is whether the next generation will remember these horrible 
things.”27  
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The two Jewish MPs, David Croll and Leon Crestohl spoke about the need for the 
Convention and applauded Canada’s decision to ratify it, but made it clear that more was 
needed to end the prospect of future genocides.  David Croll justified his decision to speak on 
behalf of the motion to ratify the convention by recalling his experience as an officer in the 
Canadian Army in 1945 who visited a concentration camp and saw a gas chamber
28
:  
I have met and known men and women whose whole families have been sent 
to the gas chambers and who have seen them tortured and afflicted.  I have 
seen the gas chambers….Today, years later, I still shudder as I recall vividly 
those gas chambers.  It was a horrifying experience long remembered which 
burns and sears the memory….I recall particularly the meticulous records the 
Nazis kept.  Nothing was left to chance.  Nothing was hidden.  The records 
were perfect.  On one side of the ledger the heading was Juden; on the other 
side were inscribed other unfortunate persons of all nationalities.  The side of 
the ledger headed Juden was by far the largest. 
 
For Croll, the Genocide convention was “a step against jungle law,” but more was needed.  
The fact that so little was done to save the European Jews before Hitler began to exterminate 
them was an indictment against Canada: “We are all responsible in some measure for the 
terrible persecution of our time….Those of us who stand by and permit these crimes to be 
committed cannot escape some portion of guilt.”   This convention would not prevent state-
sponsored mass murder, Croll warned since “a nation which signs a convention can also 
repudiate it.”  The Genocide Convention needed to be a guiding principle in Canada’s 
immigration and external affairs policies. “It is not an insurance policy against the future.  
And yet it can be a real weight to throw into the moral balance of the world.  It carried the 
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seeds of a new order for humanity.  But those seeds may be barren, unless the free nations 
cultivate the ground for them.”  Although such highly flourished rhetoric rang as idealistic, 
Croll wanted Canada to “strike at the causes of injustices,” by which he meant racism and 
racial discrimination, so that “in time, a convention like this should not be necessary.”29  
Perhaps due to receiving a number of talking points from Hayes,
30
 Leon Crestohl 
spoke more to the point and argued that the Genocide Convention should be seen as an 
“outcry” of world’s citizens to break down the wall of national sovereignty when it is being 
used to defend racial persecution.  As he explained, “the theory of non-intervention in a 
matter of so-called domestic jurisdiction…is no longer tenable with respect to crimes which 
are universally acknowledged as inhuman and immoral, and this notwithstanding the fact that 
traditionally criminal law has been considered as an expression of the right of a state to 
define and punish acts, which in its judgment are contrary to public order within its borders.”  
Crestohl had no doubt that this upheaval in public sentiment was motivated by the world’s 
disgust over the Nazi atrocities: “it is no secret…that modern civilization cringes in shame 
when we hear of crematoria, mass graves, gas chambers and other such hideous implements 
of murder.  The studied, scientific and systematic brutalities of the Nazis shocked the 
conscience of the twentieth century.”  However, he found it little consolation that the 
Genocide Convention could only be utilized after the crime: “by the time the perpetrators can 
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be brought to trial, it may be too late.”  He insisted that if the UN was serious about ending 
genocide, the UN Security Council should regularly “scrutinize” countries who may commit 
genocide and be given “adequate power and authority to call for an immediate cessation of 
those acts which may lead to, or in fact may be, genocide.”  Crestohl also wanted to revamp 
the sanctions procedure to make it a more speedy and effective system of deterrence.
31
  
While Crestohl’s proposals took no account of the Cold War power structure which 
hampered the UN’s effectiveness, they also ignored the possibility of one of the Big Five 
committing genocide. 
The Canadian Government had no intention of expanding its interpretation of the 
Genocide Convention, as became clear following Pearson’s speech in the House.  In fact, the 
Canadian Government’s concern was not wholly or even primarily about how to make the 
convention a useful tool to combat genocide, but about whether Canada could be found 
guilty of genocide, under its vague definition. Could acts besides mass murder be considered 
genocidal? Pearson assured MPs that this was not the case and that racial discrimination did 
not fall under the purview of the Genocide Convention, despite the United States Supreme 
Court ruling that it did:  
The judgment did comment on the genocide convention and might have given 
the impression that while genocide is, of course, literally, the murder of a race 
by extension it could be applied to any act detrimental to the welfare of any 
identifiable group, whether the lines of identification are religious, racial, 
cultural or national, and that it might apply to crimes against such groups short 
of extermination and might therefore really be aimed against any concerted 
determined discrimination against a minority….I think that interpretation of 
this convention is going too far: that is, that it could be interpreted as applying 
to discrimination against a minority.  While I would not have anything I say 
on this point interpreted as approving or condoning discrimination of this kind 
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in any shape or form, we would have our own way, I hope, of dealing with 
such discrimination. 
 
What the Genocide Convention was aimed at preventing, according to Pearson, were 
atrocities like those committed by the Nazis: “their systematic and ruthless policy, designed 
to uproot and exterminate a whole people, the Jewish people, [which] makes one of the most 
tragic chapters in the whole of human history.”  For Pearson, the purpose of the Genocide 
Convention was “to bring the law throughout the world up to the standard which I think we 
may say without boasting happily exists already in our own country.”  The idea that Canada 
could commit genocidal crimes was absurd.
32
   
3.2 The Canadian Jewish Protest against German Rearmament 
 
Although Canadian Jews were disillusioned by the Canadian Government’s response to the 
Genocide Convention, they remained optimistic that Canada would recognize and respond to 
the resurgence of antisemitism and racism in a foreign country, if not in its own.  In the late 
1940s and early 1950s, Canadian Jews became extremely jittery that antisemitism was being 
rekindled in Germany and that its remaining Jewish population was being threatened with 
persecution.  Reports coming out of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the Canadian 
press regarding the conditions facing German Jews were troubling, leading many Canadian 
Jews to believe that Hitler’s hatred of the Jews still lingered in the hearts of Germans.  
However, what threw the Canadian Jewish community into a panic was that diplomatic talks 
were being pursued between the Western Allies and the West German Government that 
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would grant Germany independence and allow it to rebuild its military.  Canada’s Jews 
attempted to warn the Western Allies that if Germany had not been purged of Nazi 
antisemitism, it was bound to repeat the pattern of the 1930s of first attacking the Jews and 
then embarking on an imperialist war for Europe. 
In the first six years following the liberation of Europe, Canadian Jewry was united in 
its support of retributive plans dealing with the “German problem,” such as the Morgenthau 
Plan. In 1946, the CJC submitted to External Affairs and the Secretariat of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers a position paper on Germany detailing a number of principles essential “if 
that Treaty is to be an instrument for the reconstitution of a moral society and the vindication 
of the principles for which the democratic world sacrificed blood and expended treasure.”33  
Although a repurposed submission drafted by the American Jewish Congress, it reflected 
Canadian Jewish concerns. “Germany must acknowledge her shameful guilt for her 
monstrous crime against the Jews” or the CJC warned that any peace treaty would just 
“distort the records of history beyond recognition.”  Jews also wanted the great powers to 
realize that while “Germany’s readjustment to the principles of democracy will be a slow 
process,” it would only be successful if a rigorous campaign was undertaken to “cleanse 
her...from the invidious poison of anti-semitism” and “race superiority.”  In part, this meant 
that “Germany must effectively punish all those who had a hand in the persecution of Jews or 
benefited from it.”  To prevent a second Holocaust in Germany, “the treatment of Jews 
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within her borders cannot be safely left to her discretion” the CJC cautioned, but must be 
subject to international supervision.
34
 
However, it was not practical for the occupying powers to leave Germany an 
industrial wasteland.  Not only was the economic cost of the occupational forces 
unsustainable,
35
 the West was convinced that Germans would only embrace democracy and 
capitalism if they experienced it.  To keep Germans from returning to reactionary political 
ideologies, such as Nazism or communism, the Americans poured billions of dollars into 
Western Europe, including West Germany, to revitalize the European economy and make it a 
profitable trading partner.
36
  Moreover, the heating up of the Cold War led American military 
experts to conclude that rebuilding West Germany was necessary to offset Soviet military 
power in Europe.  The Soviet blockade of Berlin in response to currency reform in West 
Germany pushed the Western Allies to create NATO, a defensive pact of democracies 
surrounding the North Atlantic, thus carving Europe into two hostile camps. In September 
1949, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb and ended American nuclear ascendency.  
By 1950, the military balance of power on the ground in Europe had swung decisively in the 
Soviet Union’s favor, making it essential that NATO quickly train and utilize West 
Germany’s manpower.37  Especially in light of American military obligations in Korea, 
United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson categorically stated that any “attempt to 
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defend Western Europe without German participation was impossible.”38  At NATO’s North 
Atlantic Council in September 1950, Acheson reiterated his government’s intention to rearm 
West Germany and have its forces “incorporated” into NATO under a unified command, to 
ensure that West Germany “would not have the capacity for independent action.”   Acheson 
admitted that this action qualified as “a complete revolution in American foreign policy and 
in the attitude of the American people,” but that rearming West Germany provided the West 
with the only real chance to “deter aggression against any of us and repel it if it should 
occur.”39  In May 1949, the Allies took the first step towards remilitarizing West Germany by 
merging the occupation zones of the Western democracies to form the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  The new democracy conducted its first election in August 1949, electing Konrad 
Adenauer’s conservative Christian Democratic Party into power.   
The sudden shift in the United States’ relationship with Germany brought anxiety to 
Canadian Jews, who were hearing reports of antisemitic actions in Germany.  Polls indicated 
that Germans were nostalgic for the Hitler days, perhaps because the German economic 
revitalization in the days before the war contrasted sharply with the food shortage epidemic 
in postwar Germany.  The newswire Jewish Public Service (JPS) reported that “German 
thinking with regard to Nazism and Nazi race theories has not changed fundamentally[;] if 
anything, pro-Nazi sentiment has grown since Germany’s military defeat.”40  A widely 
disseminated poll carried out by the American Military Government in January 1948 found 
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that 54 percent of Germans agreed with “Nazi theories” and only 37 percent “declared 
themselves more or less opposed to Nazism.”  Although the poll was vague in regards to 
what specific “theories” were being agreed with, the Canadian Jewish Chronicle assumed it 
meant racial theories and not economic theories.
41
 
Much of the Canadian Jewish concern over resurgent Nazism in postwar Germany 
originated from WJC reports and Jewish observers who visited Germany, rather than from 
the Jewish community living in Germany.  Nahum Goldman, chairman of the executive of 
the World Jewish Congress, warned that “violent anti-Semitic agitation...in some German 
cities, especially in the Western Zone constitutes a serious threat to the lives and security of 
Jewish displaced persons.”42   In April 1949, the WJC issued a “Statement of Policy on 
Germany,” calling for the Allies to “complete the denazification of Germany” before 
“granting political sovereignty to Germany.”43  The Jewish observers who travelled to 
Germany to assess the re-education program tended to agree.  Dr. Alfred Werner, an Austrian 
Jew who escaped Europe in 1940, spent three months interviewing Germans to assess the 
level of antisemitism.  When Germans did not realize he was a Jew, Werner reported that 
they “frequently tried to sell me the Nazi ideology.”  Concluding that it would take “decades 
to re-educate the Germans,” especially those who had been indoctrinated in Hitler’s Youth 
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and “had witnessed nothing but the absolute rule of hatred, brutality and ignorance,” Werner 
travelled throughout North America warning audiences that “Hitler isn’t dead.”44 
The resurgent antisemitism that Canadian Jews were reading about was a German 
xenophobic reaction to the arrival of thousands of Eastern European Jews, who had fled the 
pogroms of post-1945 Poland and come to the American Zone, where they hoped to 
immigrate to the United States or Palestine.  The Eastern European Jewish DPs appearance in 
West Germany coincided with the beginning of the American military occupation, and thus 
they became a symbol of defeat and occupation for Germans.
45
  German Jews also distanced 
themselves from the Ostjuden DPs, partly because of religious differences but also because 
they feared the Ostjuden were “reinforcing traditional stereotypes.”46  Antisemitic 
stereotypes that persisted throughout Western culture worked to tie Eastern European Jews to 
the corruption of social mores by facilitating the black market, organization prostitution rings 
and furthering public drunkenness.
47
   As Anthony Kauders argues, throughout the late 1940s 
and 1950s, “antisemitism, not philosemitism, was directed against displaced persons; 
documented in polls and surveys; and rife in all walks of life, often leading to violent assaults 
and the desecration of cemeteries.”48  However, it is too simple to suggest that the postwar 
German racism was the same as Nazi antisemitism, with the end goal of extermination.
49
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Postwar Germans tended not to lump German Jews with Polish Jews and American prejudice 
against blacks seeped into German mindsets, often turning nativist hatred against blacks and 
focusing on preventing miscegenation between Germans and blacks rather than between 
Jews and non-Jews.
50
  Moreover, such antisemitic acts did not have the support of the newly 
formed Bonn Government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, which did not take 
antisemitic acts lightly.  It prosecuted cases of libel against Jews, cracked down on the 
publication and distribution of antisemitic material, and banned pro-Nazi clubs.
51
  
Nonetheless, news stories of antisemitism in Germany immediately brought images of 
Kristallnacht to mind for Canadian Jews, and they feared that these incidents would 
eventually lead to gas chambers.   
The outbreak of a race riot on the eve of West Germany’s first parliamentary election 
in August 1949 cast doubt for Canadian Jews on the viability of democracy in West 
Germany.  What initiated the riot was Munich’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung newspaper printing an 
insidious antisemitic letter that not only called Jews “bloodsuckers,” but read that “the 
Americans say that they have forgiven us Germans everything except that we did not 
exterminate all the Jews.”52  On August 10, 1949, an estimated 750 Jewish DPs took to the 
streets to march on the newspaper headquarters on Fridensengel Platz, only to be blocked by 
the German police.  Trying to disperse the mob, police on horseback charged and opened fire 
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on the crowd, hitting four Jews.
53
  One Yiddish newspaper in the American occupation zone 
panicked and told the Jews to get out while they could: “Jews are attacked in the streets of 
Munich and Jewish cemeteries are desecrated as in the days of Hitler.  There is no hope for 
Jews in the new Germany.”54  For Canadian mainstream reporters, this fear was 
understandable, but hardly reflected Jewish conditions in Germany.  In Maclean’s, Blair 
Fraser explained that the persecution of Jews during the war has fostered in European Jews a 
“persecution mania,” in which Jews have become hypersensitive to antisemitism.55 
Nonetheless, Canadian Jews interpreted this fear as justified, remembering that 
warnings from German Jews in the 1930s had not been exaggerated.  Attacks from the 
Canadian Jewish press were launched at the Americans and Germans for their failure to 
denazify West Germany.  Abe Arnold, editor of the Western Jewish Bulletin, wrote that there 
were “serious short-comings of the denazificaton program as a whole,” and noted that the 
“anti-Semitic riot in Munich leads us to believe that the prospect of revived anti-Semitism in 
Germany is an immediate danger.”56  A. M. Klein called the denazification of Germany a 
“farce of the first order” and cautioned the Allies, saying that “the democracies would do 
well to postpone any thought of incorporating her [Germany] into the family of respectable 
nations.”57  The Canadian Jewish Review was more alarmist in its assessment of the failure 
of the occupying forces in eliminating Nazism from Germany:  
Secret Nazi organizations are extending their grip on the German people in a 
campaign of passive resistance against the occupying forces and deliberately 
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preventing the democratization of the Germans.  Germany is actually 
potentially stronger in respect to its neighbors than before the war because it 
encouraged the birth rate in Germany and held down the birth rate in 
neighboring states, mass-murdering non-German populations and starving 
occupied lands while feeding the Germans adequately….The continued 
existence of Jews in concentration camps makes them appear to be parasites in 
the German view and to confirm the Hitlerian thesis.  A whole generation of 
Germans has been corrupted, virtually all the liberal elements have been killed 
off, and there are no untainted sources from which adequate leadership and 
sufficient teachers could emerge.
58
 
 
Certainly not every report from Jewish observers about the resurgence of German 
antisemitism was so dire.  A close friend of the CJC’s Ben Kayfetz living in Germany, 
wanted to correct the impression that Kayfetz might have that “Germany is a crawling nest of 
suppressed Nazis,” but also warned that there are “lots of Arbeitslose [unemployed] who will 
gladly trade in their empty stomachs for a shiny new uniform or a job sorting gold teeth-
fillings should the occasion arise.”59 
Both Canadian Jewish Holocaust survivors and Jews who were Canadian bystanders 
to the Holocaust protested German rearmament and wrote to their MPs reminding them that 
Germany had been responsible for murdering millions of Jews less than a decade ago.  On 
February 13, 1951, Sydney Weisbord, an accountant from Montreal and a Canadian veteran 
of World War II, wrote his local MP, Allan A. MacNaughton, protesting the rearming of 
people who “were responsible for the deaths of over six million Jews and millions of 
others.”60  Ben Nemtin wrote to Leon Crestohl: “How are you able to remain silent when you 
have only to think back a few years when six million Jewish brothers and sisters were 
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murdered in cold blood....Your silence would be a betrayal to your beliefs.” Like many 
Canadian Jews, Nemtin was convinced that the Germans remained “indoctrinated with 
theories of ‘super-race’.”61   
 
Letter from Holocaust survivors to the Canadian Government, n.d., LAC
62
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Although Holocaust survivors were rarely active in political debates in the early 
1950s, the prospect of German rearmament pushed many to end their silence.  The Montreal 
Fur Workers’ Union, which represented hundreds of Holocaust survivors who had been 
brought to Canada through a scheme by the CJC to get around anti-Jewish immigration 
policies, unanimously supported a resolution that “strongly condemns the efforts of the 
Allied Governments to rearm Germany and vigorously protests the policy of releasing Nazi 
generals who were responsible for the murder of millions of our race.”  The Union wrote to 
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Pat Conroy of the Canadian Congress of Labour, 
suggesting that their membership’s voice be taken seriously because they had a unique 
perspective: “Many of them have suffered personally in Nazi concentration camps and have 
seen many of their loved ones murdered. We feel the policy of rearming Germany is suicidal 
and a complete betrayal of the things our men fought for, that is, the elimination of Fascism 
and the creation of a demilitarized and democratic German state that would no longer menace 
the peace of the world.”63   The Toronto branch of the International Fur & Leather Workers 
Union sent a similar letter to Pearson, writing: “all of us who remember the horrors of 
Hitlerism do not want to see the same Nazis being re-armed again.”64  The Executive Board 
of Canadian Garment Workers Union also wrote to local MP Chas Henry to protest German 
rearmament, noting that their membership was made up of many Canadians who had “fought 
in the last war” or who “had their families butchered by the Nazis” and were “saved from 
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certain death in Nazi concentration camps.”65 Michael Bosnich, a sergeant in the Canadian 
Army, furiously wrote Pearson, “have we forgotten the horror of the gas furnaces that burned 
millions of innocent people?”66  Al Borovoy, chairman of the Toronto Youth Public relations 
Committee for the CJC, made the case that “we cannot risk the rearmament of Germany,” 
primarily because “there is no genuine sign of repentance for the crimes of the Hitler 
regime.”67 
The Jewish press also pressured the Canadian government do something to prevent, 
or at least delay, German rearmament until Nazism had been eradicated.  Abe Arnold 
continued to present the situation in Germany as desperate: “The particular danger to the 
Jews in German rearmament is very grave.  It means that the former murderers and 
exterminators of Jewish people will once again have military power in their hands, and many 
of them have said that it is their avowed intention to resume the slaughter of Jews.”  The 
alarm needed to be raised and non-Jews told of the “seriousness of this matter.”  Jews “can 
hardly remain silent,” Arnold insisted, “on such a serious matter which can actually be 
described as a life-and-death issue.”68  Months later, Arnold’s message remained unchanged.  
He claimed that current rearmament plans continued to call for “mercy to Nazi hangmen” 
and “the restoring of arms to Jew-murderers.” Arnold pleaded that Jews “must consider self-
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interest first.”  The logic seemed obvious: if arming Germany “yesterday...meant death for 
six million Jews—Can it mean anything else if given free reign tomorrow?”69 
The Canadian Jewish Chronicle likewise did not let the threat of being perceived as 
communist silence its editorial voice when protesting German rearmament. Although Klein 
had seen the signs years earlier, his anger was quite evident within the pages of the Canadian 
Jewish Chronicle for much of the 1950s.
70
  The paper covered the controversial appointment 
of ex-Nazi Theodor Oberländer into the Adenauer Cabinet as Minister for Refugee and 
Expellee Affairs.  The appointment was troubling since Oberländer had been instrumental in 
the Nazi ethnic deportation program in Eastern Europe.
71
 
Although such protests had a major impact on Canadian Jews, most Canadian 
mainstream opinion outlets revealed that Canadians by and large saw German rearmament as 
necessary to oppose Soviet expansion.  With a few exemptions, the Canadian mainstream 
public was largely unsympathetic to Jewish concerns over German rearmament, certain that 
Soviet aggression constituted a far greater threat than German remilitarization.  In 1951, 
Arthur Lower, a noted history professor at Queen’s University, became an advocate for 
German rearmament, insisting that the Germany of the 1950s was different than that of the 
1930s.  While Germany had been an expansionist power during the interwar period, Lower 
contended that “most great modern nations have, at a given point in their development, 
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suffered from acute attacks of expansionism.”  For Lower, a rearmed Germany embedded in 
NATO was a necessary ally against the Soviet Union and a useful counterweight to 
American dominance in NATO councils.
 72
  The Canadian Association of Adult Education, 
in its regular publication Citizens’ Forum, agreed that the dangers of a remilitarized Germany 
“can be minimized” through integrating West Germany into NATO.73 
Most of the editorial opinion in the Canadian press also supported the Government’s 
position that fortifying West Germany was necessary.  Historian Donald Masters surveyed 
the Canadian press and concluded that the “Canadian press opinion did not differ from the 
views of the government in any major particular.”74  The Globe and Mail, for instance, noted 
that “there are arrogant Germans, still under the Nazi spell, who will demand total military 
independence for Germany as the price of their help in Western defense”; however, it noted 
that this group was minor and not “influential.”75  It presented France’s European Defence 
Community (EDC) proposal as an “ingenious solution” with “obvious merits”, namely using 
Germans to fill up the shortage of troops in Western Europe.
76
  The Toronto Star stated that 
the “talk about a revival of Naziism [sic] and German militarism has been full of 
exaggeration,” since “Germany is sick to death of militarism and war.” 77  
There were notable exceptions in the press.  United Church minister Charles Herbert 
Huestis worried that the West was repeating its error of the 1930s by pursuing the 
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appeasement of Germany to contain Soviet aggression: “Once more in our generation 
Germany is to be groomed for a service which may make her once more a menace to the 
peace of the world.
78
  The Montreal Star was also not willing to forget Germany’s past and 
supported French opposition to German rearmament, questioning the “comfortable belief that 
Hitlerism was really an un-German phenomenon, that Germans generally did not entertain 
master race ideas.” 79  The Vancouver Sun columnist Jack Scott’s article on German 
rearmament also cast doubt on whether Germany, “a nation that exterminated more than five 
million innocent men and women can be expected to die in less than 10 short years.” 80  For 
Scott, recent incidents of antisemitism in Germany brought “back the memory that can never 
die, of Dachau and Ravensbruck, Belsen and Auschwitz.”81  
The Canadian Jewish claim that denazification had not been pursued in West 
Germany was due to a difference of philosophy between the WJC—whose lectures and 
correspondence the CJC relied on to understand developments in West Germany—and the 
Adenauer Government regarding the most effective means to bring democracy to the 
Germans.  The WJC were convinced that Nazis needed to be punished and purged from 
authoritative positions in society.  Robert S. Marcus, Political Director of the WJC, explained 
that this had not happened, since “91 percent of all judges, prosecutors and court officials 
are…former party members.”  He continued by stating that “out of almost 13 million people 
who registered under the Denazification Law, 9½ million were not considered suspect, nearly 
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2½ million more were amnestied without trial, while 83.6 per cent of those brought to justice 
were also amnestied.”  For the WJC, this apparent leniency was evidence that Germans were 
willing to forgive the Nazis’ actions.82  However, the WJC was altogether wrong. According 
to historian Jeffrey Herf, although Adenauer, in conjunction with German public opinion, 
“urged amnesty rather than trials and punishment,”83 he was certainly not attempting to 
resurrect Nazism.  Rather Adenauer believed that the key to securing democracy in Germany 
was not in punishing the vast number of former Nazi members, but in building liberal 
institutions.  As Herf explains, “memory and justice might produce a right-wing revolt that 
would undermine a still fragile democracy.  So democracy had to be built on a shaky 
foundation of justice delayed—hence denied—and weakened memory.”84 
For the Canadian Government, the real threat to European peace was Soviet 
aggression and therefore Canada worked steadily to derail opposition to German rearmament.  
As early as October 12, 1950, just a couple weeks following the American announcement 
that NATO intended to rearm Western Germany, the Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee 
had already confirmed that “Canada should support the inclusion of the West German units 
in an integrated force for Europe in as rapid and effective a manner” as possible.85   Prime 
Minister St. Laurent and his cabinet colleagues agreed.
86
  Therefore External Affairs spent 
much effort attempting to reassure opponents of German rearmament that there would be 
sufficient protections against a Nazi resurgence.   
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The major opponent to German rearmament was France, which had a history of being 
invaded by Germany.  The French were worried that if the United States reverted to 
isolationism, Germany’s economic and military strength would disrupt the balance of power 
and lead to German hegemony in Western Europe.  Therefore, the French proposed the 
creation of a European Defence Community (EDC).  The EDC proposal went beyond the 
creation of a centralized command for the militaries of European democracies, and sought to 
entangle the political and economic structures of member states and weaken national 
autonomy through a series of trade agreements, theoretically making war undesirable 
between its members.
87
  However, as negotiations over EDC proposals dragged on for 
months, the Canadians came to believe that the French were attempting to forestall German 
rearmament.
88
  Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, H. H. Wrong, pointed the finger 
at French Defence Minister Jules Moch for utilizing this tactic, complaining that Moch was 
“personally almost fanatically opposed to German rearmament” because “of his Jewish 
origin.”  The fact that Moch had experienced “German persecution” and that his son had 
“died a cruel death at the hands of the Gestapo” only confirmed these suspicions.89  Pearson 
was also convinced that “Moch was satisfied with the deadlock...as it delayed the whole 
problem of German rearmament.”90  “Much disturbed” over the “intransigence” of Moch’s 
position which “threatened to arrest the forward movement of NATO plans for the defence of 
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Europe,” Pearson asked George Philias Vanier, Canada’s ambassador in France, to have a 
word with the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Robert Schuman, about Moch’s stance.  The 
“building up [of] the European political and economic framework,” according to Pearson, 
could not be allowed to delay military planning, because “this delay may present difficulties 
and dangers.”91  According to Vanier, Schuman was consterné or “dismayed” by Moch’s 
stance and agreed to push forward with the military plans for the defence of Western 
Europe.
92
  On November 7, 1950, Moch explained to the Canadian Cabinet that his position 
regarding German rearmament was based on political factors in France and not personal 
experiences, warning that if the French Government collapsed over the EDC, it might give 
“French Communists a golden opportunity to attempt the destruction of France from 
within.”93  Nevertheless, Pearson was firm that delay must be avoided at all costs since it 
“encourages both Soviet propaganda and American isolationism.”94 Following his meeting 
with Moch, Pearson admitted that Canada needed to help allay the French fears of a resurgent 
Germany.
95
   
The Canadian Jewish community hoped to change the Canadian Government’s 
position and to dissuade it from backing the American plan to rearm Germany. Saul Hayes 
briefed the CJC national executive on July 6, 1950, contesting that the CJC’s position needed 
to be realistic and not sensationalistic.  He understood that the “the foreign policy of Western 
countries depends upon a strong Germany as the central prop in the rebuilding of Western 
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Europe.”  The Communist invasion of Korea was “casting its shadow” and the Western 
democracies needed to be prepared for similar aggression in Europe.  The problem he wanted 
to raise was the Canadian Jewish concern that the West was doing “very little...to prevent 
anti-semitic leadership from re-establishing itself in Germany.”  Hayes summed up his 
worries: “Our fear is that a strong nationalist Germany will once again become the central 
power house for the worldwide worship of the anti-semitic cult.”96 
On October 19, Sam Bronfman addressed a letter to the prime minister on behalf of 
the CJC, arguing that German rearmament would be an affront to the memory of Canadian 
soldiers who died defeating Hitler and was inconsistent with the foreign policy pursued 
during the Second World War:  
The wounds inflicted only a short time ago in an inhuman war initiated by the 
Nazis and conducted by them in a most horrendous manner are not yet healed 
in the hearts of the citizens of our country who have made great sacrifices in 
order that the philosophy of the Nazis shall not prevail.  Nor is it possible 
readily to forget the massacre of more than eight million Christian civilians 
and of six million Jewish civilians during the German occupation of a large 
part of Europe.  To ignore these inhumanities in the formulation of Canada’s 
National policies is to ignore the sacrifices of our fighting men and of their kin 
and to raise a doubt about the consistency of Canada’s war aims during the 
conflict.   
 
Bronfman urged Canada to use its standing in NATO “to delay admission of Germany to the 
family of nations until it is clear that such an act will not imply the glossing over of the 
wicked record of the Nazis and until it is certain that such a reinstatement will not strengthen 
the forces of totalitarianism in the world.”97   
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With letters appearing to do little to shift the Government’s position, the CJC’s 
National Executive sent representatives to meet Pearson on April 13, 1951.  The delegation’s 
presentation did not vary from the position put forth in its submissions of previous years and 
reiterated the Jewish concern over the reemergence of a “militaristic Germany.”  The CJC 
demanded that NATO ensure that any treaty with Germany was conditional upon “a solemn 
repudiation by the whole of Germany of the Nazi misdeeds and ideology; the just punishment 
of all those guilty; effective restitution and compensation for the victims of German 
persecution and equitable reparations for the losses inflicted upon the Jewish people.”98  
Pearson responded sympathetically, but explained that the threat to liberty did not come from 
Germany, which had embraced democratic institutions: “the greatest threat to Canada’s 
existence is the spread of Communism and that the policy of containment which has been 
successful must be continued....  The necessity of containment of Communism in Europe 
makes Canada’s policy [of rearming Germany] the only possible one.”  That being said, he 
admitted that the Canadian Government is “fully aware” of the German record and therefore 
“safeguards are necessary to prevent the resurgence of a military clique.”  However, with 
France having “just as much reason to worry about the resurging militarism of Germany as 
have the Jews” and yet having “come around to the view that of two evils, you choose the 
lesser,” Pearson could see no reason why Canadian Jews should object.   Since “Germany’s 
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sovereignty is dependent on joining Europe’s defenses” and therefore, its military operation 
will not be “autonomous”, the security risks were negligible.99 
With the Jewish arguments making little inroads into the Canadian decision-making 
process, Saul Hayes was at a loss.  K .Z. Paltiel, active on the Joint Public Relations 
Committee (JPRC), sardonically asked Hayes: “will the war orphans, whom we of the 
Congress have brought to Canada with much expenditure of money and effort, will these 
pitiful survivors of the Nazi nightmare be asked to shoulder arms beside the executioners of 
their parents?”100  Hayes could only respond: “I don’t know what we can do further, other 
than the protest we have already lodged since we have to rely, now that we have recorded our 
views, on the opposition of the French and such other sections of European people.”  With no 
more than a “polite answer from Mr. St. Laurent,” and Brooke Claxton announcing after a 
NATO defence ministers meeting in Paris late in 1950 that he was “for the use of a German 
Division in a unified European Command,” the cause seemed totally lost.101 
3.3 German Rearmament and the rift in the Canadian Jewish Community 
 
The debate over German rearmament was a divisive issue for Canadian Jews primarily 
because the memory of the Holocaust was powerful throughout the community and was 
being used to fuel opposing positions and thereby exacerbating ideological differences 
between the CJC liberal leadership and the communist working class.  Throughout the late 
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1940s, the United Jewish People’s Order (UJPO) was the most significant Jewish communist 
organization and had mass appeal among the Jewish working class.  The organization went 
beyond reiterating Soviet propaganda and was a vital Canadian Jewish communal institution 
that boasted 3,000 members.  It promoted Yiddish culture in Canada through its affiliated 
cultural programs, such as the Jewish Folk Choir, the New Dance Theatre, the Morris 
Winchevsky Schools, and its Yiddish and English weekly newspaper Vochenblatt.
102
  The 
UJPO leadership, which included such prominent Canadian Jewish communists as J. B. 
Salsberg, Joseph Zuken, Joshua Gershman, Sam Lipstitz, and Morris Biderman, argued that 
the CJC was not adequately representing the opinions of their Jewish constituents, but only 
timidly speaking against German rearmament so as not to lose political favor in Ottawa. 
However, the UJPO was unapologetically a communist organization that supported 
policy emanating from the Soviet Union.  In 1949, Stalin had begun his “peace offensive,” 
which attempted to sew dissention within NATO over the United States’ defensive programs.  
In April 1949, the Cominform helped create the World Peace Congress, which argued that 
peace could only be furthered through disarmament, specifically in relation to the atomic 
bomb and Germany.  The program had widespread appeal among progressives throughout 
Europe, who worried about the United States provoking a nuclear arms race.
103
  The rhetoric 
of the appeal spoke to Canadian Jewish communists who worked closely with Canadian 
branches of the World Peace Congress.  The Canadian Peace Congress was founded in May 
1949 by James G. Endicott, a recently returned Canadian missionary in China, who drafted 
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the Stockholm Peace Appeal alongside Ilya Ehrenburg.
104
  The UJPO worked with the 
Canadian Peace Congress, through its Jewish Peace Committee, headed up by UJPO 
president Morris Biderman.  The two organizations attempted to use the Holocaust memory 
to garner signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal and challenge Canada’s support for 
West German rearmament.  An internal letter to UJPO members noted that the “most 
effective way possible” to secure peace was “by signing the Stockholm Peace Petition,” and 
that the UJPO’s goal was to secure 5000 signatures from the Canadian Jewish community in 
forty days in the late summer of 1950.  To achieve this goal, the Jewish Peace Committee 
planned to canvas “all Jewish homes,” distribute fliers, and hold mass meetings to raise 
awareness of the dangers of German rearmament.
105
   
In the early months of 1951, UJPO distributed thousands of copies of several different 
pamphlets condemning the West’s willingness to forgive the Nazis and rearm West 
Germany.  One flier written by Biderman had the title “NO ARMS IN THE HANDS OF 
THE MURDERERS OF OUR PEOPLE!”  The pamphlet asked readers: “can we forget our 
six million martyrs, slaughtered by the Nazi beasts?”106 The UJPO organized a number of 
protest meetings against German rearmament, all of which were well attended. On February 
25, 1951, the UJPO called upon Canadians to meet at Toronto’s Victory Theatre.  Pamphlets 
promoting the event exclaimed that “the blood of six million Jews, destroyed by the Nazis, 
has scarcely dried.  The tears of those of us who are alive are still wet.  Among us here in 
Toronto are many who bear on their bodies the stamp of the Nazi concentration and 
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extermination camps, the horror of the crematorium.”  Pointing to the renewal of “Nazi 
gangs” in West Germany, organizers declared that West German rearmament could very well 
bring war and “A third world war, without doubt, would surely mean again mass 
extermination of all Jews.”107  Eight hundred protesters attended the meeting and heard 
prominent, communist Winnipeg city-councillor Joseph Zuken and Holocaust survivor Pola 
Herman.
108
  Zuken spoke of the success that the Canadian Peace Congress was experiencing 
in Canada, having secured 300,000 names in support of the Stockholm Appeal.
109
  He told 
the crowd of his journey to the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, where he saw 
mountains of shoes and clothing stripped from Jewish victims, and “hair of children.”  This 
was a haunting reminder of “Nazi bestiality.”  Following Zuken, Pola Herman stood up and 
pulled up her sleeve, revealing 78544 tattooed onto her forearm.  She recalled how her 
parents had been torn from her arms and “herded off to the gas-chamber and crematorium” at 
Auschwitz.  She had subsequently witnessed the mass murder of countless Jews and had 
been tortured herself.  With her father’s last words ringing in her ears—“Do everything you 
can never to let this happen again”—she told the audience “I did not realize when I heard 
these words, that in a few short years, it would begin to happen again.”  The protest in 
Toronto concluded by circulating a motion to be sent to Prime Minister St. Laurent, which 
read that the rearmament of Germany was “a desecration of the memory of six million Jews 
and millions of peoples of many national origins who lost their lives as a result of the 
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barbarity of the German Wehrmacht.”110  The Jewish Peace Committee also organized a 
“National Assembly to Save Peace” on the weekend of April 7-9 in Toronto, ending with a 
“huge mass meeting” at Massey Hall.  Eight thousand leaflets were distributed in Toronto, 
insisting that Jews had to show up in force to show their solidarity against German 
rearmament: “we cannot forget our six million brothers and sisters who were murdered.”111 
The actions of the UJPO to gain sympathy for the communist peace offensive by 
using the Holocaust to challenge the West’s position on West German rearmament was 
problematic for liberal Jews, who felt that the UJPO was attempting to usurp the CJC’s role 
as the representative institution of Canadian Jewry.  Liberal Canadian Jews understood the 
power of the communist message as they too had memories of the extermination of Europe’s 
Jews, be they from the perspective of survivors, soldiers liberating Europe, or waging the war 
on the home front, and they hoped that the CJC would take control of the Holocaust 
discourse concerning the West’s defense plans.  Executive Director of the CJC’s Western 
Division, Heinz Frank stated that “there is hardly any Jewish meeting nowadays which would 
seriously consider to approve or even ignore German re-armament. The trouble is that this 
understandable attitude is being utilized, or rather abused by the Zukens and Salsbergs for 
their own political ends.”  Therefore, the Western Region of the CJC added a clause to their 
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anti-rearmament resolution mandating the CJC national office to protest the rearmament of 
East Germany by the Soviet Union to “inject a drop of bitterness for Zuken.”112 
Nonetheless, the communist position on West Germany was being received 
sympathetically by the Jewish community in Vancouver during the winter of 1951, 
threatening to undermine the CJC’s position.  This issue dominated the Pacific Region 
Congress meeting on March 1, 1951.  At the meeting, Dr. Fred Katz, spokesperson for the 
Jewish Peace Council, a communist front for World Peace Congress, addressed CJC 
representatives by reiterating the arguments found on numerous UJPO pamphlets.  The 
Committee for the Prevention of German Rearmament, sponsored by the Jewish Peace 
Council, had pamphleteered BC’s Jewish community in the previous weeks and criticized the 
CJC’s letter-writing campaign.  At the meeting, Katz reminded his audience of “the terrible 
Nazi atrocities and of the slaughter of six million Jews” which the West “suggest[ed] we 
forget.”113  Other Jewish organizations represented at the meeting, such as the Jewish branch 
of the Legion, the Jewish Community Council of Vancouver, and the Vancouver Section of 
the National Council of Jewish Women, agreed.
114
 The Jewish Community Council of 
Vancouver passed a resolution stating that since “six million Jews were slain at the hands of 
these same Nazis,” rearming Germany meant “plac[ing] arms back in the hands of convicted 
Nazi murderers.”115 The National Council of Jewish Women even called for a return to the 
Potsdam demilitarization decision.  At the Pacific Region Congress meeting, S. Sarkin 
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reportedly argued that communist organizations, such as the Jewish Peace Council, “arise 
when official Jewish bodies, such as Congress...take inadequate action on vital matters.”  
While most Jews at the meeting were not sympathetic to communism, they appreciated the 
energy that the Jewish Peace Council was devoting to the cause, and therefore asked that the 
Council officially represent itself at the CJC plenary session.
116
 
The failure of the CJC to shape public opinion and the UJPO’s challenge led to a 
heated meeting of the CJC National Executive on April 29, 1951, in which the issue of 
German rearmament was cast along ideological lines.  Saul Hayes noted that various 
Canadian Jews had accused the UJPO of publishing and distributing a pamphlet called 
Sholom Aleichem, which called on all Canadian Jews to sign the Stockholm Peace Petition, 
leading many liberal Jews to call for the expulsion of communist organizations from the CJC.  
On September 9, 1950, the CJC had specifically warned Canadian Jews not to sign the 
Stockholm Pace Appeal, which was seen as a Soviet ploy to disrupt Western defense. By 
pushing Canadian Jews to do the “very opposite” of CJC policy, Hayes argued that the UJPO 
was “undermin[ing] the position and good name of Canada’s Jews at a crucial time when 
intergroup strife must be avoided.”  Following Hayes’ speech, the minutes record that there 
was a “unanimous feeling of the members that no constructive purpose can be served by left-
wing elements in their further association with Congress.”  The resolution was adopted that 
individuals and groups associated with left-wing organizations were no longer eligible for 
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election at the next Plenary Session of the CJC, effectively expelling the UJPO from the 
CJC.
117
 
The expulsion of communists from the CJC was decidedly controversial.  At the next 
CJC Central Regional Council meeting in Toronto on June 6, 1951, attendance jumped well 
above the norm to one hundred, as communist and liberal leaders of the Jewish community 
gathered to debate and vote on accepting the National Executive’s resolution to expel the 
UJPO.  The debate focused on whether the CJC had taken adequate steps to protest German 
rearmament.  J. I. Oelbaum, Executive Director of the CJC Central Region pointed to the 
meeting between Pearson and Bronfman, noting that Pearson had “considerable sympathy” 
for the Jewish position, but that there was “very little” Canada could do.  J. B. Salsberg 
admonished the CJC’s diplomatic strategy, stating that the issue at stake was the “re-
establishment of Nazi power in Germany,” and that Canadian Jewry needed to draw the 
public’s attention “even if we had no chance of success we should not be silent.”  Moreover, 
Pearson’s reception to Jewish demands was hardly surprising, since Canada “had played a 
leading role in lining up resisting members of the Western powers in favour of the German 
rearmament policy,” most notably France.  What was needed was an “open and concerted 
program of protest,” according to Salsberg, not the “shtadlonus” [secret diplomacy] which 
had been in progress to date.”  Various CJC leaders took offense to Salsberg’s comments.  
Sam Lipshitz made a lengthy speech noting the cultural contributions that the UJPO made to 
Jewish life in Canada and the work it had done in challenging fascism during the war and 
domestic antisemitism now.  However, for the majority of delegates at the meeting, the 
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UJPO’s communist ideology had no place in Jewish life.  Edward Gelber said “I part 
company with those who hold that this ideology, foreign to Jewishness, has a rightful place 
in a Jewish Weltanschauung [worldview].”  The delegates overwhelming passed the 
resolution to expel left-wing elements from the CJC.
118
 
Severing the UJPO from the CJC angered many Canadian Jews, who found the action 
hypocritical and undemocratic.  The Toronto Jewish Youth Council wrote to J.I. Oelbaum of 
the CJC, expressing concern that removing left-wing elements from the CJC was introducing 
a “doctrine of rigid conformity” into Canadian Jewry that threatened to “undermine the entire 
democratic nature of the Congress.”119  For Oelbaum, the lessons of the Holocaust revealed 
that stifling a diversity of opinion was a small price to pay to protect democracy that was 
under threat by communism and necessary for Jewish survival.  He wrote back: “only within 
the framework of a democracy is the survival of our people assured. The past two decades 
have brought tragic proof that Judaism and dictatorship are irrevocably incompatible, 
whether such dictatorship is by Fascist, Communist or any other sponsorship.”  His letter also 
explained an additional reason for the break between the CJC and communist Jews: the 
UJPO’s refusal to acknowledge and protest the persecution of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.  
Canadian communist Jewish organizations “have steadfastly refused to join the rest of the 
community in the struggle against the breakup of religious, spiritual and cultural life of our 
remnants in Eastern Europe,” Oelbaum wrote.  They have denied their energies and of their 
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funds toward the rescue of our brethren seeking to escape from behind the Iron Curtain.”120  
The CJC’s growing concern over Soviet antisemitism would ultimately lead them to abandon 
their position to oppose West German rearmament. 
3.4 Canadian Jews, the Threat of Soviet Antisemitism, and the CJC’s Shift 
From Idealism to  Realism 
 
With France’s failure to ratify the EDC in August 1954, the British and the Americans 
pushed for West Germany to be granted full autonomy and be admitted into NATO.  To 
satisfy French security concerns, German rearmament would be limited numerically and 
prevented from developing certain weapons of mass destruction, while Britain agreed to 
station troops on the European continent.  The agreement, signed on October 23, 1954, came 
to be known as the London-Paris Accords and was quickly ratified by the NATO powers.
121
  
The thinking of liberal Canadian Jewry had evolved on the “German problem” during 1953 
and 1954 to understanding the need to build up West Germany in support of European 
democracy and Jewish life in Israel via West German restitution payments  This shift in 
thinking was due in part to the Canadian Jewish liberals stepping back from the idealism that 
had characterized their goal of building a just international order, as evidenced by their 
retributive stand against Germany in past years and their campaign for international legal 
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institutions, such as the UN and Genocide Convention.  While Canadian Jews whole-
heartedly supported these international devices, the fact that these institutions were powerless 
to protect Jews behind the Iron Curtain motivated Canadian Jewish leaders to take a more 
realistic approach, built on national interest and gaining a position of strength.  For Jewish 
communists in Canada, the shift in the CJC’s position was evidence of the corruption within 
liberal Judaism, where they abandoned the alleged threat to German Jewry in order to stay 
united with Canadian political leadership.  At the center of the rift in the Jewish community 
lay two opposing interpretations of the Holocaust.  Whereas communists insisted that 
German Jews were again being sacrificed on the altar of power politics to bolster Germany as 
a bulwark against the Soviet Union, as some had argued in the 1930s, liberals saw the 
totalitarian Soviet regime as the new threat to Jewish life, where Jewish rights were being 
stripped.  
It was clear to liberals that the Holocaust was being used by Soviets, not to protect 
Jewish minorities, but to garner Jewish support for a political agenda.  Revelations of Stalin’s 
anti-Jewish campaign throughout the Soviet Union caused many liberal Jews to question the 
sincerity of protests from communist Jews who protested German rearmament while turning 
a blind eye to the Soviet Union.  Stalin had become increasingly suspicious over the loyalty 
of Jews in the Soviet Union.  Perhaps fearing that Jews were aligning themselves with the 
United States, Stalin unleashed a vicious antisemitic campaign throughout the late 1940s and 
early 1950s that swept through Eastern Europe.  First, Stalin set his sights on destroying the 
Jewish organizations.  The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC) was targeted.  Solomon 
Mikhoels, Chairman of the JAFC, was assassinated on January 12, 1948.  Thirteen of the 
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JAFC’s leading figures, after being imprisoned for three years at Lubyanka prison and 
suffering torture, were tried and executed by firing squad on August 12, 1952 for “bourgeois 
nationalism” and treason.122  Second, Stalin eliminated Jewish intelligentsia throughout 
various Soviet states.  Leningrad’s Jewish intelligentsia were murdered in 1948.123  Stalin 
then progressed to purging Jews from the Czechoslovakian Soviet government in 1952.  
Rudolf Slansky, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, his 
Deputy Premier, and twelve other top officials in the Czechoslovakian Communist 
government were arrested, tortured, and made spectacles of in an eight day show trial in 
Prague. All but three of the condemned were Jews, including Slansky, and all were executed.  
It was clear to international observers, including the Canadian Government, that Stalin was 
purging Jews from the upper echelons of the Czechoslovakian Communist government.
124
  
To whip up frenzied antisemitic crusades among local populations, Stalin reinvigorated the 
medieval trope of the Jew as a poisoner of wells by accusing Jewish doctors of poisoning 
leading members of the Politburo.  Historian Elissa Bemporad argues that the Doctor’s Plot 
resonated with much of the public because it tapped into traditional Christian fears of an 
international Jewish conspiracy to control the world as well as the Blood Libel accusation: 
“in the popular response to the supposed plot at the local level, the image of the blood- and 
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power-thirsty Jewish enemy could merge and re-enact the killing of any member of the 
Russian (and Soviet) people, not just one of the elite.” 125  Hundreds of Jewish doctors were 
arrested between October 1952 and February 1953.
126
  Historians Jonathan Brent and 
Vladimir Naumov have argued that the “Doctors Plot” was not “the irrational product of the 
aging dictator’s mind,” but a strategic maneuver that consumed Stalin’s mind for nearly two 
years to ensure that his power remained unchallenged.   Had Stalin not died, Brent and 
Naumov are convinced that he would have unleashed his own Final Solution: “Soviet 
intellectuals and artists, particularly Jews, would have been mercilessly repressed; and the 
surviving remnant of Soviet and Eastern European Jewry would have been gravely (perhaps 
mortally) imperiled.”127 
Although many of the details regarding the Soviet campaign against Jews remained 
unclear until after Stalin’s death, Canadian Jews were keenly aware that the Soviet Union 
was persecuting Jews.  In January 1953, in the face of the doctor trials, Jewish MP David 
Croll asked Pearson to comment on the “growing anti-Semitism” in the Soviet Union.  
Pearson indicated that he took the doctor show trials to “be very serious indeed,” and noted 
that they bore a striking similarity to the origins of the Nazi persecution of Jews: “Terrible 
atrocities stemmed from unbridled anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany.  It would be a tragedy 
and a crime if the rulers of Communist Russia were now planning to revive this dark and evil 
                                                     
125
 Elissa Bemporad, “Empowerment, Defiance, and Demise: Jews and the Blood Libel Specter under 
Stalinism,” Jewish History 26 (2012): 343-361. 
126
 Mordechai Altshuler, “More about Public reaction to the Doctors’ Plot,” in Jews in Eastern Europe 30 
(1996): 54-55; Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime: The Doctors’ Plot, 1948-1953 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2003). 
127
 Brent and Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime, 1. 
  227 
force from the past and to make use of it for their own ends.”128  David Loven reported in the 
Canadian Jewish Chronicle that Jews were being expunged from the official Soviet historical 
narrative.  Loven noted that at an exhibition in Warsaw in 1955, centered on the rebuilding of 
the city following the devastating occupation of Nazi Germany, he found it “striking” that 
there was “neither sign nor mention of the Warsaw Ghetto.”  This was in accordance to 
“reports trickling through to Switzerland from behind the Iron Curtain that the Polish 
Government is doing its best to wipe out all traces of a formerly rich Jewish heritage.”  
Although Loven estimated that 70,000 Jews still lived in Poland, Soviet reconstruction of the 
Jewish quarter in Warsaw had ensured that the “new streets no longer b[ore] any resemblance 
to those of the former Jewish quarter.  In fact, there is nothing remaining to remind one of the 
rich Jewish cultural life which once bloomed there.”129  Similarly, Mendel Mozes’ report of 
Jews behind the Iron Curtain painted a picture of misery for Jews who constantly faced an 
antisemitic populous.  He described that Jews in Poland were so isolated that no 
representative of a Jewish organization had been permitted entry to visit the Jewish 
communities in Poland, nor had a single Jew been allowed to leave “for Israel or any other 
country of the Diaspora” during the year 5714 of the Jewish Calendar.  Soviet trials against 
Zionists had led to lengthy sentences, according to Mozes, and had “created panic.”  While 
Hungarian Jews were being deported, Mozes had little information on hand.  Romania’s 
Jewish population fared worse, having at least “several hundred Jews…arrested on ‘treason’ 
charges.”  In Czechoslovakia, especially during the Slansky trials, Jews were “shunned [in] 
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public places” in Prague, where signs had been put up that read “hang the Jews” and “The 
Jews are Czechoslovakia’s Misfortune.”130  Yet despite irrefutable evidence of deteriorating 
conditions for Jews in the Soviet Union, the UJPO’s mouth piece, Vochenblatt continued to 
present Jewish life positively behind the Iron Curtain. 
While evidence of Soviet antisemitism in the early 1950s was growing, West 
Germany’s decision to pay restitution for property stolen from Jews during the Hitler regime 
helped liberal Jews re-evaluate the German Government’s position on antisemitism.  
Initially, some Canadian Jews were cynical over the negotiations, perceiving the reparations 
as blood money.  On October 26, 1951, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against 
Germany opened with the purpose of negotiating restitution for Jewish property loss during 
the Nazi era.  Edward E. Gelber, newly-elected President of the Zionist Organization of 
Canada, attended the opening of the conference in 1951, and believed that the conference 
posed “no moral implications” since negotiations were concerned with property losses and 
not human deaths: “the question of absolving German guilt must be left for later generations; 
it can never be done in our own time.”  For Gelber, if the amount negotiated was only 
“several million dollars, the Jews might forego this sum on the grounds of honour, but when 
it reaches the proportions of a billion dollars and the possibility that this billion arouses for 
the continued existence of the Jewish state, then it becomes another matter.”131  Samuel 
Bronfman, who sat in on the Claims Conference in 1951 assured Canadians “that the 
negotiations were confined to material claims only, and that no general political or ethical 
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issues were involved.  It is not suggested that the crimes which had been committed have 
been expiated by those who are guilty or have been forgiven.”132  The CJC also issued a 
statement explaining that “German reparations can in no way be accepted as expiation for the 
massacres and horrors inflicted by the Nazis on the Jewish people.”133  The accepted figure 
of $822,000,000 to be used to offset the cost of settling survivors in Israel and rebuilding 
Jewish institutions destroyed in the Holocaust was seen as necessary for sustaining Israel’s 
economy. Journalist Sam Miller explained that with Israel’s trade deficit, German imports 
formed the “keystone” of Israeli economic development.134 
However, restitution payments did little to move Canadian Jewry to forgive the 
Germans.  In a press release following the signing of the Claims agreement, the CJC 
reassured members that “the satisfaction of such claims is not intended by any responsible 
party in any way to expiate the crimes of the destruction of human life and Jewish cultural 
values by the Nazis or to atone for the agony of the men, women and children they had 
tortured and put to death by every inhuman device.”135  Moreover, restitution payments did 
not lower animosity towards Jews among the German population.
136
  Eleonore Sterling in the 
Canadian Jewish Chronicle took notice of a publication out of the Institute for Social 
Research in Frankfurt by Friedrich Pollock that explored the psychological defense 
mechanisms that ordinary Germans were using to avoid feeling complicit in the Holocaust, 
such as claiming ignorance of varying degrees, even when evidence was abundant: “The 
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reports of Allied pilots who said that they had seen Jews laboring in Auschwitz, were not 
accepted as authentic proof. ‘How could they see,’ a group participant stated, ‘from their 
height that Jews were going through the chimneys in little clouds of smoke?’”  Pollock’s 
study also noted that Germans were using “transference,” and arguing that their crimes 
differed only in scale to the “lynching of Negroes in America,” and claiming helplessness 
since the ordinary German was “subjected to the terrorization methods of the Nazi elite who 
threatened him with punishment if he aided the Jews.”137  Although such evasion of guilt left 
Canadian Jews convinced that ordinary Germans were not repentant for their crimes, the fact 
that this research was being published in Germany and being supported by German 
politicians was encouraging.  The willingness of West Germany to establish the Claims 
Conference was evidence that the Bonn Government was willing, in a small way at least, to 
admit guilt.  West German President Theodor Heuss’s statement that Germany bore 
“collective shame” for the crimes of the Nazis, and that the Claims Conference was the first 
step in “moral as well as material restitution” was applauded in Terence Prittie’s column in 
the Canadian Jewish Chronicle.
138
 
But growing pessimism over the state of international justice and the ability of the 
international community to protect human rights motivated many Canadian Jews to accept 
that the bolstering up of West Germany was necessary.  This pessimism was shared by the 
WJC, who was beginning to shift away from advocating for universal human rights and 
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towards focusing on specific threats to Jewish rights.
139
  WJC President Nahum Goldmann 
made a passionate speech at the United Nations Conference of Non-Governmental 
Organizations on Prejudice and Discrimination about the disparaging state of human rights in 
the world that would require the West to remilitarize Germany.  Rather than human rights 
being a priority for the international sphere, “brutal power, political expedience, purely 
egocentric diplomatic manoeuvres, with the last resort on all occasions to reliance on armed 
might, and the horrifying menace of modern atomic warfare, these determine the climate of 
international relations in these days.”140 Arthur Lewis of the Canadian Jewish Chronicle was 
also disgruntled by the absence of consideration for human rights in the international sphere, 
as evidenced by the lack of support for the Genocide Convention.  Writing in June 1954, 
Lewis thought it “beyond belief” and “surely the greatest irony” that the Soviet Union and 
West Germany had ratified the Convention before Britain, the United States, and Israel.
141
  In 
the same year, the Canadian Jewish Chronicle emphasized the need to think strategically 
when considering the German problem, editorializing that keeping West Germany a 
“vacuum…was obviously dangerous to the peace of Europe.”  Regardless of how repugnant 
rearming Germany felt to the West, to do so was better than “to leave them to their own 
devices, or to permit them to fall within the Communist orbit.”142  
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When the London Paris Agreements came before the House of Commons to be 
ratified on January 20, 1955, public opinion firmly supported integrating Germany into 
NATO.  Pearson introduced the motion by stating that accepting German autonomy and 
rearmament within the confines of NATO was a “calculated risk,” which had safeguards, 
including Germany’s adherence to the Genocide Convention.143  Oppositional parties tended 
to agree.
144
  While Solon Low, leader of the Social Credit Party could understand that some 
Canadians found West German rearmament “morally wrong,” he reminded the House that 
they were delving into the field of “power politics” and that the West needed to take a 
position of strength and not appease totalitarian regimes.  “Just as it was true that Hitler and 
his objectives were made clear by his own publication, Mein Kampf,” Low said, “today the 
objectives and determination of the leaders of the Bolshevists are made quite clear by the 
things they do and the documents they publish.”  Since “the only thing the communists 
understand and respect is strength,” Low was convinced that “the most important deterrent to 
communist aggression is the knowledge of the unity of western Europe.”145  The socialist 
CCF was split on the issue due to its lingering idealism that progressive values needed to be 
infused into the international arena.  M. J. Coldwell, leader of the CCF, agreed that German 
rearmament was necessary due to the Soviet Union’s poor record on human rights.146   
Not all those opposing German rearmament had been convinced. The most adamant 
protest came not from the two Jewish MPs, but from the CCF in the voice of MP Stanley 
Knowles of Winnipeg.  Knowles, who did represent a large Jewish constituency, argued that 
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German rearmament would trigger an arms-race with the Soviet Union and weaken Canada’s 
“moral strength” by arming “ex-Nazis.”  While he understood the need “to negotiate from 
strength,” Knowles insisted that Canada should not align itself with Germany: “We will 
never forget the names Dachau, Buchenwald and Belsen. We will never forget those six 
million Jews who were slaughtered during the Hitler regime in Germany.”  Rather than risk 
provoking the Soviet Union, Canada ought to be trying to “remove the causes of war,”—
defined by Knowles as primarily social inequality that produced poverty and starvation—and 
follow the guidelines “outlined in the Charter of the United Nations.”147    
The two Jewish MPs, Leon Crestohl and David Croll, supported the motion to ratify 
the London-Paris Agreements, arguing that the communists posed the greater threat to Jews.   
Crestohl expressed that he was emotionally torn on the issue.  “I know of nothing more 
tormenting or more difficult,” he began, “than the clash between a man’s emotions and his 
urge for rationalization.  In the one case he is prone to deal with a problem in response to his 
feelings, his passions and his conscience and in the other he faces it with an almost precise 
mathematical calculation based on logic and pure reason.”  He admitted that his family’s 
experience in Nazi Germany made it difficult for him to contemplate granting Germany 
autonomy: 
I know, Mr. Speaker, that all my colleagues in the house will bear with me if 
they find that I have spoken with some emotion on this subject.  If I did so, it 
is perhaps due to the fact that, to a greater extent than anyone else in the house 
possibly, I have personally been a victim of Nazi cruelty.  My rather 
distressed feelings result not only from the fact that I belong to that ethnic 
group which suffered most, but also because my own uncles, aunts and 
cousins, consisting of a family of over 60 persons, were tormented and put to 
death by the Nazis.  
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Nonetheless, Crestohl told the House that flaws in the international system must not be 
ignored.  Without West Germany’s submission to international laws protecting minority 
rights, national sovereignty could once again give Germany a free hand to massacre its 
citizens and drag the world into war: 
We recall, during the Hitler regime, the cries from world Jewish leadership to 
the democracies that inhuman laws were being enacted and implemented in 
Germany.  The world remained silent.  This silence encouraged the horrible 
legislative process of exterminating millions of innocent people.  Under 
international law, very little could then have been done.  There could be no 
interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. 
 
Nonetheless, the leaders of the free world, “fully mindful of the inherent dangers in arming 
Germany, but in their wisdom, to avoid an even greater danger,” were prepared to grant West 
Germany sovereignty to protect against the threat of the Soviet Union.
148
  A couple days 
later, Croll reiterated Crestohl’s points and stated that he too was “torn,” but prepared to do 
“what needs to be done at this time, but without joy.”  He suggested that his decision was not 
taken lightly: “there is scarcely a home in one section of my riding that has not suffered from 
Nazi persecution of Jews.”  In spite of this, Croll supported the London-Paris Agreements, in 
the hope of “preventing a third blood bath.”149   
The appeals of Crestohl and Croll to ensure that the rearming of West Germany was 
combined with safeguards for the treatment of minorities, was met with widespread approval, 
both in Parliament and in the daily press.
150
  Responding on January 26, Pearson noted that 
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Crestohl’s speech in particular “moved us all” and that Canada would push the Federal 
Republic of Germany to “subscribe to some of the international conventions which have been 
worked out under the United Nations charter, and more particularly the genocide 
convention.”  In fact, West Germany had already signed the Genocide Convention by 1954, 
and Pearson claimed that West Germany was adhering to the United Nations Charter, 
particularly where it discussed “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or race.”  Mainly 
satisfied with the Canadian government’s stance, later that day the House voted 
overwhelmingly in favour (213 to 12) of ratifying the London-Paris Agreements and 
supporting German rearmament within the confines of NATO.
151
 
Canadian Jewish communists believed that Croll and Crestohl were currying political 
favor and had betrayed the interest of their Jewish constituents. The Vochenblatt launched an 
assault on the two Jewish MPs, comparing them to Nazi collaborators.  Sam Lipshitz equated 
Crestohl’s actions with those of the despised “Judenratler,” Nazi-appointed Jewish leaders 
whom many contemporary Jews believed had collaborated with the Nazis for their own 
personal good. “This man [Crestohl] had the temerity to get up and defile the memory of 60 
of his family, who perished in the gas chambers, in order to justify his betrayal of trust,” 
Lipshitz fumed, “we are quite satisfied to assign him to his ‘honorable’ position alongside 
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Rumkovski, Ganzvich, the Zeifman Brothers and their ilk.”152  The Vochenblatt wrote that 
“Canadian Jews will never forget this shameful betrayal” and that Croll and Crestohl had 
“forfeited their right to speak for us.”153  The Vochenblatt conducted an unscientific poll of 
Jewry, asking twenty-four Torontonians at random from the Toronto Directory: “Do you 
agree with the action of the two Jewish MPs who voted for the rearmament of Germany?”  
Fifteen replied “no”; five said “yes” and four had “no opinion.”  When those who answered 
“no,” were asked why, the Vochenblatt said the usual response was “aren’t six million dead 
Jews enough?”154 In front of 600 Torontonian Jews on January 30, J. B. Salsberg called the 
position taken by the Jewish MPs “infamous and disgraceful.”155   
The failure of Canadian Jewish leaders to oppose German rearmament ruptured the 
Jewish community, not only because left-leaning Jews believed that Germany’s Jews would 
face a dire situation as a result, but also because the West’s agreement to rearm Germany 
reawakened the painful memories of the Allies’ inadequate response to the persecution of 
Jews in the late 1930s, before the Nazi extermination began.  These memories and fears were 
quite evident at the emotionally-charged assembly during Toronto’s Annual Memorial 
Meeting for the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April 1955.  The memorial featured a number of 
speakers from the UJPO as well as Orthodox Rabbis.  The gathering was organized by the 
Canadian Federation of Polish Jews, was conducted in both Yiddish and English, and 
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attracted 700 Jewish Canadians.  The Jewish Folk Choir sang heroic ghetto anthems, such as 
Hirsh Glick’s 1943 Zog Nit Kainmol and Itzik Fefer’s 1948 Di Naye Hagoda, which 
celebrated human acts of resistance against the Nazis.
156
  Rabbi Aaron Price, widely regarded 
as the most influential Orthodox Rabbi in Toronto,
157
 stated that despite “the memory of the 
Ghetto becom[ing] more vivid and the pain more intense as the years go by,” the West’s 
rearming of Germany constituted “strengthening our executioners.  We declare before the 
whole world: ‘Don’t give them arms.’” Price demanded that Canadian Jews “protest in the 
streets of every city and particularly in Ottawa.”  “It is our duty to speak up,” Price declared, 
“A real outburst from the heart will be heard. We must never forget.”158  Mel Shipman, a 
recent addition to the Vochenblatt editorial board, then spoke and demanded that Canada’s 
Jews continue to raise the clarion call against West German rearmament.  Giving credence to 
absurd rumours that the Germans were “manufacturing equipment for atomic weapons,” 
Shipman warned: “The builders of Oswizciem, the organizers of brutal tortures and mass 
murder, the people who could make lampshades out of human skin, the exterminators of the 
Ghetto would have no scruples about plunging the world into an atomic bloodbath.”159   
The memory of the Holocaust fueled the panicked response from the left wing of the 
Jewish community and opposing interpretations regarding the significance of the Holocaust 
served to drive a wedge amongst Canadian Jews.  For members of the UJPO, the Holocaust 
provided a warning that Germany could not be trusted and that the West was more interested 
in securing its national interests than in protecting minorities.  In other words, Jewish 
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communists saw parallels between West German rearmament and the 1930’s appeasement of 
Hitler, both of which they interpreted as efforts to challenge the Soviet Union.  In both cases, 
Western diplomacy was interpreted by left-wing Jews as corrupt, but perhaps worse was that 
the established Jewish community’s response was in line with the “appeasers.”  The 
Vochenblatt believed that the CJC was not taking heed of Germany’s history and could not 
understand why the CJC would even want to commemorate Jewish resistance in the 
Holocaust.  Its editor wrote that while Canadian Jews would “welcome” the CJC’s 
commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, “in the light of the developments of the past 
few months, many must find in this decision a paradox.”  By “maintaining a studied silence 
in the face of the revival of the Wehrmacht,” the Vochenblatt thought it would be more 
logical if the CJC would “play down the heroism displayed by the ghetto fighters.”160  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The Holocaust played a pivotal role in the formulation of Canadian Jewish thinking on 
European postwar diplomacy.  From the formation of the United Nations Organization in 
1945 to the ratification of West Germany’s accession into NATO, the Holocaust shaped how 
Jews understood international relations and the postwar settlement.  Due to dubious reports 
that Nazism had infiltrated every aspect of German society, Canadian Jews were leery of 
granting German autonomy for fear that the Germans would launch another assault on their 
Jewish population.    First, Canadian Jews demanded that antisemitism be eradicated in 
Germany through a rigorous re-education program that would severely punish Nazis and give 
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justice to the Jews whom they had murdered.
161
  Second, Canadian Jews sought to create an 
international body that would be grounded on democratic and socially progressive ideas and 
would ensure that human rights were protected and that state sovereignty did not become a 
shield for genocide.   However, with both of these goals failing to materialize by the 1950s, 
Jews desperately sought to stop the West’s plans to rearm West Germany, fearing that the 
conditions in West Germany and in the international arena were not significantly different 
from those of the 1930s and 40s.  
Contrary to the opinion of historians, the fear of being viewed as a communist fifth-
column in Canada did not prevent Jews from protesting German rearmament through official 
channels or through more grassroots demonstrations. That being said, the CJC leadership was 
also motivated to protest German rearmament to dissuade Jews from joining communist 
organizations, such as the Peace Councils, and thereby sullying the Canadian Jewish 
community’s reputation.  Thus, the worry of an antisemitic backlash worked in the curious 
way of pushing the Holocaust into national discourse. Perhaps Canadian opposition to 
American McCarthyism also left Jews more free to discuss the Holocaust in relation to 
German rearmament. 
The Jewish failure to stop West German rearmament was not evidence that Canadians 
had forgotten Hitler’s crimes.  Although historians are right in that the dominant Canadian 
political discourse tended to minimize Germany’s history of atrocities, these assertions 
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require more nuance.  Certainly, many Canadians believed that Germany’s past should not 
interfere with solidifying the West’s defence since the new bipolar power system negated the 
threat of Germany challenging American or Soviet hegemony.  However, that is not to say 
that Canadians did not glean important lessons from their experience fighting Nazism.  For 
Canadian policy-makers, the foremost lesson of the Second World War was the necessity of 
negotiating from a position of strength with totalitarian states that were ideologically 
expansionistic.  It seemed clear that if the West had been united in the 1930s and risked war 
to contain Nazism early on, Hitler’s war, first waged against the Jews before evolving into a 
global conflict, would have been short-lived.
 241 
Chapter 4 
The Hitler of the Nile: Canadian Jewry and the Fight to Prevent a 
Second Holocaust 
The Holocaust’s impact on Canadian Jews was not only evident in their creation of  
international institutions to combat human rights injustices and their opposition to 
incorporating Germany into NATO, its presence can also be detected in the Canadian Jewish 
interpretation of Cold War diplomacy in the Middle East.  For fifteen years following the 
creation of Israel in 1948, the Canadian Jewish community engaged in an intense campaign 
to save Jews throughout the Middle East.  They believed that Arabs were determined to 
destroy Israel and exterminate Jews in Palestine, and also that Arab leaders had a wider aim 
of purging the Middle East of its long-established Jewish communities.  Shaped by their 
experience as bystanders during the Holocaust, Canadian Jews saw patterns that pointed to 
the coming of a second Holocaust and worked frantically to prevent it. 
By exploring Canadian Jewish efforts to save their Middle Eastern brethren in the 
1950s, this chapter hopes to make an important contribution to Canadian historiography.  
Surprisingly, Canadian historians rarely explore Jewish reactions to events in the Middle East 
during the 1950s, despite a number of controversial developments during this period that 
caused consternation within the Canadian Jewish community.  Of great concern was the rise 
of the dynamic Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who would back a revolution 
and eventually become dictator of Egypt in the early 1950s.  Behind Nasser’s rise and the 
budding of Arab nationalism, Canadian Jewry sensed antisemitism and believed that the 
Arabs dreamed of removing Israel from the map.  The escalation of border tensions, failure 
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to find a peace settlement, and the shift of power and world opinion away from Israel, caused 
Canadian Jews to train their eyes on the Middle East throughout the 1950s.  Focus turned to 
fixation in late 1956, when events in the Middle East seemed to spiral out of control.  Egypt 
gained a huge arsenal of weapons in September 1955 and bucked Western influence in the 
region by nationalizing the Suez Canal in July 1956.  In response, Britain and France 
colluded with Israel to invade Egypt, hoping to depose Nasser and regain control of the 
waterway.  With the outbreak of war, Nasser retaliated against his own Jewish population, 
stripping them of their property, citizenship, and liberty, and thereby instigating a massive 
refugee crisis.  The rapidly deteriorating conditions of Jews in the Middle East and the 
lackadaisical response from Canada and the United States stunned the Canadian Jewish 
community.  These events helped suture the political division between communist Jews and 
the liberal Jewish community.  Both wings of Canadian Jewry rallied around Israel and used 
the memory of the Holocaust to shift public opinion in the hope of averting another genocide. 
Most scholarly accounts of the Canadian-Jewish community, even those that 
emphasize the role of the Holocaust in constructing Jewish identity, tend to minimize the 
importance of the 1950s Middle Eastern struggles in their analyses.  Although numerous 
texts discuss the Canadian-Jewish response to the fight for Israeli independence in 1948
1
 or 
the panic that ensued in June 1967 when the West seemed to turn its back on Israel in the 
face of a united Arab threat to its survival, there is almost no commentary on Canadian 
Zionist thought in the 1950s.  This gap in the literature is caused by two assumptions.  First, 
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that the Holocaust had largely been suppressed by the Jewish community in Canada.
2
  The 
second assumption that pervades this literature is that Israel did not figure prominently within 
Canadian Jewish consciousness during the 1950s.
3
 
The only historian who has devoted much energy to discussing Canadian Jewish 
reactions to Canadian-Israeli diplomatic relations during the 1950s is Zachariah Kay.  In The 
Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958, Kay gives an account of Canada’s 
diplomatic relationship with Israel, noting that Canada’s approach was “cautious” and rarely 
deviated from American policy.  Since Canada had no specific political interests in the 
Middle East, its foreign policy was less concerned with aiding Israel than with reconciling 
British and American positions in order to maintain a united front against the Soviet Union.  
According to Kay, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson’s chief interest in 
the Middle East was to promote stability and peace in the region, which he believed could be 
best facilitated by the UN.
4
  However, Kay’s account is limited, relying almost exclusively 
on diplomatic correspondence and primarily discussing the formation of Canadian policy 
towards Israel in the Department of External Affairs.  Thus, short shrift is given to the 
Canadian Jewish community’s understanding of the threats facing Israel in the 1950s, or how 
the 1956 crisis molded Canadian Jewish identity. 
                                                     
2
 Franklin Bialystok, Delayed Impact: The Holocaust and the Canadian Jewish Community (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 69-70; Harold Troper, The Defining Decade: Identity, 
Politics, and the Canadian Jewish Community in the 1960s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
3
 No mention of the Suez Crisis or the Sinai War is found in Franklin Bialystok’s Delayed Impact and it is 
similarly minimized in Gerald Tulchinsky’s Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish 
Community (Toronto: Studdart, 1992) and his Canada’s Jews: a People’s Journey (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008). 
4
 Zachariah Kay, The Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1996), xiii-xiv, 100-110. 
  244 
 Most Canadian scholarship on the Middle East in the 1950s has almost exclusively 
focused on the perspectives of the Canadian Department of External Affairs in order to shed 
light on Canadian nationalism.  Traditionally, Canadian historians have presented Pearson’s 
crisis diplomacy as the apex of the golden age of Canadian foreign policy, in which Canada 
carved out a “middle power” role during the Suez Crisis.  Guided by national interests and 
the principles of collective defense exhibited by the institutions of the UN and NATO, 
historians have argued that Pearson moved Canada’s foreign policy beyond its supposed 
slavish allegiance to imperial Britain.  This body of literature is grounded within the “realist 
school” of diplomatic thought and focuses on Canadian triangular diplomacy, with Canada 
acting as the fulcrum between Britain and the United States.
5
   Such an angle has been useful 
in showing that the political atmosphere in Canada following the Suez Crisis marked a shift 
in Canadian nationalism away from identifying itself as a British colony and towards 
becoming more North American.  While Pearson was celebrated abroad with a Nobel Peace 
Prize for his efforts in defusing the Suez Crisis, Canadian public opinion turned against 
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Pearson and his party, with the Liberal Party being trounced in the 1957 elections, ending 
their twenty-year governorship of Canada.   
Historians have begun to add nuance to this interpretation by noting that a large 
portion of Canadian public opinion still favoured loyalty to Britain.  Most notably, José 
Igartua analyzes Canadian newspaper editorial opinion in 1956 and argues that the Suez 
Crisis was key to the ‘Cultural Revolution’ that transformed English Canada during the 
1950s.  According to Igartua’s theory, while English Canadians moved from identifying 
themselves as citizens living in a British colony to defining themselves as a nation based on 
democratic and liberal values, they remained rooted in the public belief that Canada needed 
to uphold “British” traditions of individual rights and liberties.6 
With historians focused primarily on Canada’s relationship with the British Empire 
and how Canadians understood Israel’s attack on Egypt, little attention has been given to 
how Canadian Jews responded to the Middle Eastern tensions.  This chapter attempts to fill 
this gap in the historiography by examining how Canadian Jewry responded to the rise of 
Arab nationalism in Egypt in the 1950s.  Through examinations of Zionist discourse and the 
lobbying efforts in Ottawa for Israel, it becomes clear that the Canadian Jewish community 
was far from disinterested in Israel’s plight, nor were they cautious in bringing the memory 
of the Holocaust into the public sphere.  Rather, they interpreted developments in the Middle 
East from the perspective of the Holocaust.  Nasser, whose willingness to use antisemitism to 
further his power, was seen by Canadian Jews as the reincarnation of Hitler.  The political 
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situation was also perceived by Canadian Jews to be dangerously analogous to the late 1930s 
when there was an antiwar atmosphere, fueled by the fear of mass bombings and mutual 
annihilation.  Similarly, in the mid-1950s there was concern that a regional war in the Middle 
East could easily drag in the superpowers and lead to a global nuclear catastrophe.  Canadian 
Jews feared that the West was repeating its appeasement mistake of the 1930s with Nasser, 
with equally dastardly consequences: the destruction of the Egyptian Jewish community and 
the last remnant of Europe’s Jews who had escaped to Israel.  Although new international 
structures, such as the UN and NATO, were in place and could be used to protect minorities 
and defend democracy, Canadian Jews were worried that other priorities would take 
precedence and that Jews would be sacrificed again to preserve the West’s political interests.  
While they hoped that the lessons of the Second World War would ensure that the world 
would protect the human rights of minorities, they feared that little had changed.  Nation 
states that supported these rights needed to exert their power to rescue the persecuted.  The 
fact that Canada did not stand beside Britain and Israel to fight a new threat to the Jewish 
people compelled Canadian Jews to embark on a massive public relations campaign to fight 
for the preservation of the Jewish sanctuary in the Middle East.  Communist and liberal Jews 
united to convince the West of the mortal danger that Nasser posed to civilization.  Although 
the Canadian Jewish lobby lacked clout in Ottawa and did little to influence Canadian foreign 
policy, its efforts were instrumental in understanding the mentality of Canadian Jews, the 
degree to which the Holocaust was fixed within their collective memory, and their beliefs 
regarding the role that Canada ought to play in international affairs.  
  247 
4.1 Isolated Israel in a Sea of Antisemitsm 
  
The Canadian-Jewish fear that Egyptian antisemitism would move the Arabs to purge the 
Jews from the Middle East emerged during the Israeli Independence War, before Canadian 
Jews had heard of Nasser.  Although historians have shown that the Arab nations were by no 
means united in their war efforts to squash the newly formed Israeli state, Zionist observers 
saw a tiny Israel besieged by a tenacious enemy.  This fear was not only rooted in the actions 
of the Arab military campaign in Palestine during the Independence War, but also in the 
policies instituted by Egyptian authorities on the home front, which were perceived by 
Canadian and American Zionist organizations as an Egyptian effort to wage war on all Jews.
7
 
While events in Egypt during the Israeli Independence War were worrying to many 
Jewish observers in Canada, not all were ready to conclude that racial discrimination against 
Egyptian Jews necessarily would lead to genocide.  Put simply, the situation facing Egypt’s 
Jews in the late 1940s and Germany’s Jews in the late 1930s were strikingly different.  Most 
notably, Egypt was not being driven by a fanatical dictator bent on exterminating Jews.  
Rather, since the First World War, Egypt was nominally a constitutional monarchy, 
following a similar parliamentary system to Great Britain.  Egypt’s King Farouk was seen by 
his populous as a British puppet, not a nationalist revolutionary.  Egypt’s parliament was 
dominated by the Wafd Party, which resented Farouk’s pro-British leanings, but ultimately 
held a liberal ideology and had been instrumental in bringing democracy to Egypt.  
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Therefore, to compare the Egyptian regime in the late 1940s to Nazi Germany in the 1930s 
stretched the imagination.   
The defeat and displacement of the Palestinians at the hands of the Israelis in 1949, 
known throughout the Arab world as al-Nakba or “the grievous catastrophe,” pushed the 
Arab world towards revolution, with nationalists determined to throw off the shackles of 
European imperialism.  Regimes that kowtowed to the West were overthrown.  In 1949 
alone, Syria experienced three coup d’états.  Prime Ministers in both Lebanon and Egypt 
were assassinated in the same year.  In Egypt, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser harnessed this 
malcontent by forming the Free Officers Corps after he returned from Rhodes in 1949, where 
he witnessed Egypt sign the ceasefire with Israel.
8
  Alongside General Muhammad Naguib, 
he led the Free Officers Corp in a coup d'état on July 23, 1952 in the so-called “bloodless 
revolution.”   
Since Nasser’s rhetoric and policies were aimed initially at removing British 
influence from Egypt, rather than demonizing Jews, the Egyptian Jewish community felt at 
ease.  Israeli-Egyptian relations soon broke down. Israel was worried that with the phased 
withdrawal, from 1954 to 1956, of the British occupation of Egypt, Nasser would be free to 
focus Egypt’s military power on the destruction of Israel.  Therefore Israel used propaganda 
and espionage in an effort to destabilize Anglo-Egyptian relations.
9
  Egypt, meanwhile 
contributed to tensions through the enforcement of a naval blockade and the perpetuation of 
border conflict.  Not only did Egypt’s interference in Israeli trade contravene international 
law, Israel viewed the blockade of the Israeli port at Eilat as a form of economic warfare.  
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While the Israelis saw the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement of February 1949 as the 
Egyptian capitulation to the existence of a Jewish sovereign state in Palestine, the Egyptians 
ascribed to the literal wording of the Agreement, interpreting it as nothing more than a truce 
in their continuing war over Palestine.
10
  Israel retaliated to the lingering state of war by 
activating a spy ring in Cairo, tasked with bombing American and British embassies and 
tourist spots to disrupt the rapprochement between Britain and Egypt. The plan, however, 
backfired when the plot was quickly uncovered by Egyptian authorities, and only worked to 
strain tensions further between Israel and Egypt.
11
 
 By late 1955, Israeli-Egyptian relations had suffered to such an extent that Nasser 
hoped to use Israel as a scapegoat to explain Arab economic stagnation and military 
weakness.
12
  His strategy had the two-fold purpose of solidifying his own position in the 
Revolutionary Command Council in Cairo and presenting Egypt as the chief defender of the 
Arab world against Western imperialism.  In pairing antisemitism with pan-Arab 
nationalism, Nasser sought to cease the rivalries and inter-state conflicts that had plagued the 
Arabs during the Israeli Independence War.  However, in order to challenge Israel, he needed 
to secure modern weaponry, specifically air power, and so turned to the Soviet Union.  Nikita 
Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, had re-oriented the Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards 
supporting anti-colonial nationalist movements in the Third World.  By providing weaponry 
and funds, Khrushchev hoped to steer recently independent states towards Communism, 
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thereby gaining valuable allies to improve the Soviet Union’s position vis-à-vis the West, 
both strategically and ideologically.
13
   
In the fall of 1955, Nasser announced that he had signed an arms deal with 
Czechoslovakia that made Israel’s situation appear critical to Canada’s Jews.  Although 
reports varied over the specifics of the arms transaction, it was clear that the sale ruptured the 
balance of power between Israel and Egypt.  The sale included one hundred fight jets, 
hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, and armoured personnel 
carriers.  In the autumn of 1955, Israel only possessed fifty jet fighters: the British Meteor 
and the slightly better French Dassault Ouragan, both outclassed by the MiG-15 fighters that 
the Egyptians had acquired.
14
  According to Mordechai Bar-On, Egypt’s new purchases 
would make its arsenal “three times larger than what Israel had or could expect to acquire in 
the near future” both in the air and on the ground.15   
Canadians support for Israel became evident in January 1956, when a fierce debate 
consumed parliament regarding Canada’s policy towards shipping armaments to the Middle 
East.  In the Liberal caucus, Pearson was joined by Jewish MP Leon Crestohl in attacking the 
motion from the Progressive Conservative Party to cease all arms shipments to the Middle 
East.  Crestohl scoffed at claims that Nasser was acquiring weapons to protect Egypt from an 
attack by the “tiny state of Israel and its handful of people.”  Rather Crestohl believed that 
Nasser’s ambitions were that of a “Moslem Bismarck,” whose purpose was territorial 
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expansion across the Arab world and into Africa.  The West could not abandon its morals as 
it had done in 1938 and betray Israel to Nasser’s militarism, but needed to “promptly 
challenge it [Egypt] not merely by talk nor by appeasement and certainly not by sacrificing 
important human values and principles which form the cornerstone of our civilization.”  
Arming Israel was the only safe course to maintain the peace and check Nasser’s ambitions: 
“to proceed further by appeasement at this critical time is again unrealistic and a deplorable 
show of western weakness.”  Moreover, Crestohl was convinced that the Jewish memory of 
“having only recently escaped from the great atrocities in history,” had left Israel “horrified 
by the thought of further assaults.”  While Israel exhibited a “willingness to negotiate a peace 
with the Arabs anytime and anywhere,” Nasser’s territorial ambitions continued to perpetuate 
a state of war along Israel’s borders.  Crestohl warned that “if appeasement now is to take the 
form of attempting to throw the tiny state of Israel…to the marauding Arabs,” the Israelis 
would fight “to the last man, woman and child,” and would not be “Muniched.”  Echoing the 
rhetoric of the aftermath of Kristallnacht, Crestohl argued that Israel was a bastion for 
Western civilization in the Middle East: “If Israel is an experiment that failed, then I say, Mr. 
Speaker, with horror and with shame, that the whole of our civilization is doomed to utter 
failure.”16  Crestohl’s speech immediately became a rallying cry for Jews throughout Canada 
and beyond, being reproduced and praised repeatedly.
17
  The American magazine The Jewish 
Spectator published the speech in its issue titled “The Sin of Forgetting,” a clear call to 
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remember the Holocaust or risk the destruction of Israel.
18
  Newspapers as far as Brazil 
printed copies of the speech.
19
  In the wake of this strong speech, the Liberals killed the 
motion to boycott all arms shipments to the Middle East. 
Following the House debate, Israeli ambassador to Canada, Michael Comay, met 
Pearson on February 3 to propose that Canada permit twenty-four F-86 Sabres to be sold to 
Israel.  These aircrafts were vital to defending Israel’s cities from Egypt’s recently acquired 
bombers, according to Comay. 
20
  At least on paper, air power seemed to lean dramatically in 
the Arabs’ favour.  Although Egypt’s air force outnumbered Israel’s, many experts in the 
west questioned Israel’s supposed inferiority.  A widely distributed New York Times report 
even suggested that Israel was “better equipped than almost all Arab countries combined.”21 
To Comay’s chagrin, Pearson was still reluctant to release the aircraft, because of pressure 
from experts within the Department of External Affairs, who argued that supplying Israel 
with arms would undermine Canada’s position as a neutral moderator.   
Throughout the summer of 1956, Israel and the United States worked together to 
convince Canada to release two squadrons of F-86s.
22
  The American position was that the 
United States could not send aircraft to Israel, but its allies could.
23
  Secretary of State, John 
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Foster Dulles told Pearson that the U.S. Government was not ready yet to send arms because 
it wanted to maintain its position as a possible mediator between the two parties; nor did the 
US desire to initiate an arms race with the Soviet Union.  Dulles admitted that he “found it 
difficult to maintain an impartial attitude because the Jews were using all their influence 
within the U.S. in favour of Israel.”  While members in the Canadian Cabinet sympathized 
with Israel’s position, noting that “the most probable objective of the Arab countries was to 
eliminate Israel,” and that the “most immediate danger was the isolation of Israel,” they 
believed that arming Israel was fraught with risk, for if war broke out, then Canada’s 
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decision to send arms to Israel “would be interpreted as a direct contribution to a possible 
explosion.” 24   
The Canadian Government’s intransigence towards sending the F-86s shocked the 
Canadian Jewish community.  When Pearson was invited to speak at Holy Blossom Temple 
in Toronto on February 20 for the Brotherhood Night Dinner, reactions to his speech were 
mixed.  To Pearson’s claim that Canada maintained friendly relations with Israel and that 
Canada was working “closely” with its NATO allies regarding the question of arms 
shipments, Myer Sharzer, Director of Public Relations at the UZC, was skeptical and 
complained that “the Canadian Government does not recognize at the moment the pitfalls of 
certain United States-British policies, or at least is not willing to use its influence against 
such policies.”25   
On May 22, 1956, Samuel Bronfman shot off a letter to Pearson expressing the CJC’s 
concerns over Israel’s strategic vulnerability.  Bronfman had visited Israel briefly in March 
as part of a Mediterranean cruise and met with David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir, and 
shared their worries.
26
  “It truly appears that the one way which may forestall war,” 
Bronfman wrote, “would be if the State of Israel could demonstrate, through its inventory of 
defensive weapons, that it can meet aggression quickly and effectively.”27  Bronfman’s letter 
received a short reply from Pearson thanking him for sharing his “views on the subject.”28  
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Unsatisfied with being brushed off, Bronfman and Michael Garber of the UZC, wrote to 
Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent on June 14, 1956.  This letter’s tone was grave, 
expressing the danger that faced Israel in the aftermath of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal and 
stressing the urgency of selling the jet interceptors to Israel immediately.  They wrote that 
“the threat to Israel’s safety and the desire of her Arab neighbours to exterminate Israel is as 
grave a threat today as it has been for the past many months.”  In fact, Israel’s peril was 
increasing “as the capacity of Egypt to use the newly acquired Soviet bloc arms increases to a 
point of effective military efficiency.”29  Again, the Canadian Government’s response was 
non-committal.  St. Laurent assured Bronfman that Cabinet was “giving earnest and hard-
searching thought to all aspects of this difficult question” and that the Jewish community 
“may remain confident that there need be no doubt about the sympathetic understanding of 
the Canadian government for the difficulties and problems which are being faced so 
resolutely by the people of Israel.”30 
Both the communist and liberal wings of the Canadian Jewish community saw the 
Czech-Egyptian arms deal in the light of Hitler’s 1930s remilitarization of Germany and 
were convinced that Nasser had similar genocidal aims against the Jews of Israel.  
Communist Jews were also furious at Canada’s unwillingness to support Israel with arms and 
used the memory of the Holocaust to challenge the Canadian government’s decision.  
Canada’s Jewish communist weekly, Vochenblatt, splashed “To Germany—Yes, For Israel—
No” across the front page on July 19, 1956 in response to Canada’s decision to grant 75 F-
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86s to West Germany, which had recently become a member of NATO.  The article 
proceeded to question the morality behind Canada’s foreign policy.  Germany, “a state 
responsible for the death of 60,000,000 people, including 6,000,000 Jews” gets F-86s, but 
Israel, “which emerged as a state on the ashes of Hitler’s determined effort to completely 
destroy the Jewish people, is snubbed and made a pawn in U.S. and British Middle East 
power politics.”31  Charles Law, writing for Vochenblatt, believed he saw Dulles’ 
“overbearing influence” behind Canada’s refusal and, despite the Liberals’ “verbal 
protestation,” believed that in the realm of Canadian foreign policy, Pearson had “decided on 
obeisance to the U.S. State Department.”32  
Jews on the left of the political spectrum began lobbying the West not to abandon 
Israel, but to lend its support through an alliance and the supplying of armaments.  The 
Canadian Peace Congress was quite vocal in their condemnation of the Czech-Egyptian arms 
deal, despite its close ties to the Labour Progressive Party and frequent antagonistic position 
towards the West. Canadian communist James Endicott wrote that “it would be a terrible 
crime if we forgot the lessons of the failure to get disarmament when things looked so bright 
in the 1920’s.  Complacency then led to World War II and the extermination of peoples.  We 
have a better chance now to take away the means of a worse holocaust from those who dream 
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of revenge.”33  Speaking at the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) Convention on October 
11, 1955, Rabbi Abraham Feinberg asserted that organized Canadian labour faced three 
challenges, which he termed the three “R’s”: 1. Re-Union; 2. Race-discrimination; 3. Red 
Arms to Egypt.
34
  Feinberg insisted that the Czech-Egyptian arms deal also be on the 
Canadian Labour’s agenda as it imperiled world peace.  Feinberg was convinced that the deal 
showed the hypocrisy behind the Soviet Union’s “peace movement” and that Khrushchev 
was using Arab antisemitism to force Israel to start an arms race “as the only way to 
survive.”  Feinberg was also concerned that Egypt had become a “meeting-ground for 
revived German militarism and Communist imperialism.”  He asserted that “the jobless Nazi 
officers and generals Cairo has hired during recent years will have Russian weapons.  An 
unholy alliance of Hitler and Stalin over prostrate Poland in 1938 led to World War Two.  
Shall this compact over an imperilled Israel be permitted to breed the Third and final war?”  
For Feinberg, the only solution for saving Israel was to supply it with defensive weapons: “as 
long as Israel is well-equipped to fight they [Arab states] will not dare to attack her.”35 
The CCL adopted Feinberg’s position as its own.  Before the end of the year, 
President A. R. Mosher and Secretary-Treasurer Donald MacDonald submitted a 
memorandum to the Canadian Government that shared their policy recommendations.  In 
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regards to the Middle East, the CCL noted that the tension between Israel and the Arab states 
was “fraught with danger to the peace of the whole world.”  Although they hoped that Soviet 
arms would not reach Egypt and that a peace settlement would be achieved over Israel, since 
“Israel [is] the one really democratic state in the area,” the CCL implored the Canadian 
government that Israel “not be left without sufficient means to defend itself.”36 
It was not just the left-wing elements within the Canadian Jewish community that 
were concerned that the West had not learned from the Holocaust to stand up to dictators.  
Worrying rumours filled the Canadian Jewish Chronicle that the pestilence of Nazi 
antisemitism was at the heart of Egyptian policies.  In his regular column “Heard in the 
Lobbies,” Milton Friedman continually argued that Arab antisemitism did not originate with 
the Israeli Independence War, but was deeply rooted in Islamic thought.  Many Arab 
statesmen had cozied up with Nazi Germany and they continued to share Hitler’s antisemitic 
vision of a Judenfrei world.  Friedman stated that the “loudest Nazi expressions today come 
from the Egyptian Government,” as Nasser denounced the United States as being under 
“Jewish control” and his Minister of State Anwar Sadat proclaimed “Hitler is my hero.”  
Friedman also pointed out that the state-controlled Egyptian radio broadcast Voice of the 
Arabs was trying to undermine the moral legitimacy of Israel by minimizing the Holocaust 
and suggesting that al-Naqba was a worse humanitarian crisis.  Across the Middle East on 
October 19, 1955, listeners tuned in to hear that “America must not find excuses for Israel 
and say the Israeli people were persecuted by Hitler.  All Arabs know that the American 
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support to Israel has a worse effect on Arab refugees and the people of occupied Palestine 
than Hitler’s persecution of the Jews.  Hitler did not send the Jews out of their country.  He 
did not deprive them of their father’s lands.  He did not confiscate their money.”37  The 
Arabs’ efforts to dismiss the Holocaust were worrying to Canadian Jews who believed that 
the Arabs were attempting to emphasize their own victimhood in order to justify future 
crimes against Israel. 
The course that the West was following by refusing to prevent Nasser’s armament 
deal and by arming Israel to mend the apparent imbalance of power in the region smacked of 
the interwar appeasement of the dictators for Canadian Jews.  They perceived that 
appeasement had given Hitler free reign to rearm, annex Germany’s neighbours, and 
pauperize Europe’s Jews, resulting not only in a far larger military conflict required to halt 
German expansion but also a greater catastrophe for European Jewry.  Just as the Jewish 
diaspora had warned the West about Hitler’s Nazi ideology and ambitions, Canadian Jewry 
believed that Israel was issuing a similar warning in 1955, which, if left unheeded, would 
have dire consequences for Western civilization and Middle Eastern Jewry.  Mass meetings 
were quickly organized across the country.  On December 7, the Vancouver Jewish 
community gathered at the Schara Tzedeck Auditorium for an “emergency meeting” to pass 
a number of resolutions protesting the Czech-Egyptian arms deal and to call on the Canadian 
Government to send defensive arms to Israel.
38
  Two months later, Jacques Torczyner, of the 
Zionist Organization of America, also spoke in Vancouver to a supportive audience.  He 
condemned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s Baghdad Pact as “appeasement of the 
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Arabs.”  Since Israel could not “afford a second round” with its Arab neighbours, Torczyner 
insisted that the West needed to supply Israel with defensive weapons in order to “show 
strength” and deter an Arab assault.39  Such arguments were echoed at the Zionist 
Organization of Canada’s 33rd National Convention in Ottawa.  Israeli Ambassador to 
Canada, Michael Comay, was keynote speaker and propounded the Israeli case that the West 
not only needed to formalize an alliance to guarantee Israel’s security, but also needed to arm 
Israel to ensure its protection: “Unless Israel is put in a strong defensive position, the talk 
about intervention may be academic, as it was with Czechoslovakia in 1938 and with Poland 
in 1939.”40 
Such sentiments were echoed by numerous prominent Canadian Jews.  In a speech at 
the Negev Dinner in Edmonton, Senator David Croll argued that Israeli fears of a coming 
war were justified as the “noose of isolation is tightening around Israel.”  While noting that 
various UN Security Council members had spoken against the Fedayeen raids and the illegal 
blockade of Israeli shipping, he lamented that no UN resolution condemning these acts had 
been passed because the West was “afraid to antagonize Arabs.”  In fact, Croll believed that 
with the focus on containing the Soviet Union by “entering into regional security 
agreements” and the “arming of the Arabs,” the West was “giving the Arabs exactly what 
they want—arms and the building of military power—while at the same time, they are 
ignoring Israel.”  With the destruction of “the delicate balance of strength,” there was no 
“determent to the Arab second round against Israel.”  The prospects for Israel seemed bleak 
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for Croll, as Israel stood “alone in the Middle East without a single defence agreement or 
defence alliance.”  Croll, too, saw Canada’s duty as a “middle power” in the traditional role 
of mediator to “spearhead a movement to bring Israel and the Arab nations to the conference 
table.”41  For Croll, the “American obsession with world communism” and the threat of the 
Soviet Union “engulfing that strategic, oil-rich area” had worked to “blind” the United States 
to realizing that a peace settlement concerning Israel was the best hope of maintaining 
Western influence in the region: “here is the bastion of democracy so sorely needed; here the 
virility, the courage and the competence to meet the challenge of communism. An Israel at 
peace with its Arab neighbors would help to weld the Middle East into a single thriving 
entity.”42 
Harry J. Stern, the eminent rabbi at Temple Emanu-El in the wealthy Westmount 
district of Montreal, insisted that if the West failed to take account of the warnings of the 
Jewish community as it did in the 1930s, the world would again be driven into a devastating 
war.  Speaking to the Montreal Lion’s Club on April 26, 1956, he noted that due to Israel’s 
democratic and liberal institutions, it provided the only hope for stability in a region that was 
“a sea of feudalistic states wherein some slavery is still in existence, where a low standard of 
living prevails and where absentee landlordism reigns supreme and where the masses lead a 
serf existence.”  However, Israel was “now threatened with destruction” because of the rise 
of “a new dictator that has come to Egypt” who was being supplied with “dreadful weapons.”  
Stern noted that Jews had not forgotten that “the conscience of the free world failed when the 
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Nazi dictator sent to the slaughter six million of the Jews of Europe.”  Although it was 
unclear whether the Western powers would abandon Israel, Stern assured Canadians that the 
Jews would defend themselves this time: “We ask now will the conscience of the free world 
fail again in the face of an Egyptian dictator and his allies planning the destruction of the 
State of Israel?  Alas, this, the world must know, that the Israelis will not yield like sheep to 
the slaughter.  If war comes and we pray that it be prevented, the embattled people of Israel 
will defend every inch of ground with their blood and with their lives.”43 
The Jewish community in the Maritimes was equally disturbed by the Arab-Soviet 
threat to Israel and by the apparent indifference of the West.  According to The Evening 
Time-Globe, New Brunswick’s Jewish community gathered in Saint John to protest the 
Czech-Egyptian arms deal on November 8, 1955.  Benjamin R. Guss, Q.C., gave such a 
dynamic keynote speech that it made front-page headlines in the local newspaper.  In 
accordance with the thoughts of Jews living in major Canadian urban centres, Guss 
interpreted the threat to Israel in the context of the situation facing Jews in Nazi Germany in 
the 1930s.  This was especially poignant for Guss since he realized that many of the Jews in 
Israel who were facing the Arab threat were the same individuals who had fled Hitler’s 
genocide: “let us then glance back: Six million Jews were wiped out during the Second 
World War.  The straggling remnants found a haven only in Israel….  Yes, those who 
survived the death chambers of the crematories of Europe, out of the crucible of their 
affliction found a haven at last and that haven was faced with an encircling attack on all its 
borders.”  Despite the reassurances of military intelligence that Israel still maintained 
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overwhelming military superiority, Guss presented a grim comparison of Israel to an isolated 
Britain that was dependent on American arms following the defeat of France in 1940.  As the 
only “bastion of democracy in the Middle East” and “confronted with overwhelming odds,” 
Israel “too has the right to expect the Western world to give it weapons with which to defend 
itself.”  Following the same vein of argumentation as Harry J. Stern, Guss cautioned the West 
that heeding the cries of Israel was not just in the interest of Jews, but in the interest of 
Western civilization: “Let us look back again when Hitler was attacking the Jews in 
Germany.  The Jews warned the world that that was only the beginning, that there was more 
at stake than just the Jews and now at this juncture in history the Jews may again warn the 
Western World.”44 
With comparisons being made between the Nazis and the Arabs, many Canadian 
Jews did not see the Egyptian threat of an invasion of Israel as merely a threat to democracy 
and the Jewish political structure in Palestine.  The memory of the Holocaust left the chilling 
prospect that Nasser posed a mortal threat against all Jewish lives in the Middle East.  Sam 
Jacobson, a frequent contributor to the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, painted an especially 
ominous description of the fate that awaited Jews if an Egyptian invasion of Israel took place.  
He described how the situation in Egypt was becoming similar to the situation in Nazi 
Germany that led to “the annihilation of six million Jews by Hitler.”  According to Jacobson, 
Nasser was following a similar course to Hitler in using antisemitism to gain hegemony in 
the Middle East and Africa.  Despite the creation of the United Nations, Jacobson was 
despondent about its ability to maintain peace.  Although he thought it was “right and 
                                                     
44
 The Evening Times-Globe, 9 November 1955, in CJCCCNA, CJC Collection, series CA, box 55, file 534, 
“Israel—News Clippings,” 1.  
  264 
proper” that the UN make genocide illegal, he questioned whether such international 
legislation was sufficient to end genocide since it did not address the cause of the problem: 
racism and national chauvinism.  As Jacobson put it: 
Does this really solve the problem?  The annihilation…of the Jews in Nazi 
Germany just did not happen overnight.  It took a long period of 
‘conditioning’, of indoctrination, of propaganda, before the people of the 
Nations were convinced that the annihilation of the Jews…was justified and 
the right thing to do.  The real crime therefore was in the propaganda, the lies 
that were not allowed to be refuted.  This propaganda planted the seed that 
made the murder of the Jews by Hitler a natural consequence. 
 
What was particularly worrying to Jacobson was that antisemitism was currently being 
propagated in Egypt to precipitate genocide.  Not only was there “the rise in the Middle East 
of a new little Hitler, a new dictator, hungry for power,” Jacobson was also convinced that 
“the seeds for future wars which will justify genocide, are being planted in the minds and 
hearts of millions, by the poisonous words that are being broadcast from Cairo daily.”  For 
Jacobson, “this is the real evil, it creates the motivation for future crime.  It is arousing hatred 
among hundreds of millions of the hungry backward Nations that will justify murder, 
destruction and wars in years to come.”  As if the spread of Nazi propaganda throughout the 
Arab world was not enough, Jacobson was horrified that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who 
had “helped Hitler in his campaign to annihilate the Jews,” was an advisor to Nasser.  
Jacobson could not see anything that the UN was doing to stop Nasser from “poisoning the 
minds of human beings” and thus it was up to Israel to “act on her own behalf.”  He believed 
that Israel needed to immediately acquire armaments to defend itself, but also in the long 
  265 
term to create propaganda that undermined and laid bare the antisemitic lies being peddled in 
the Arab world.
45
   
4.2 Arming Israel to Defend Civilization  
 
In the summer of 1956, Nasser’s actions moved beyond threatening Jews, to 
imperiling the British Empire, a move that dramatically altered Canadian public opinion of 
the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.  The United States initiated peace talks in January 1956 but 
despite the United States offering economic and military aid to Egypt, Nasser hestitated at 
the suggestion of beginning talks with Israel without prior commitments of Israeli territorial 
concessions and promises from the United States of rescinding support for the Baghdad 
Pact.
46
  On March 5, Nasser accused the Americans of caving to “Zionist influence” and 
“aligning themselves with Israel.”  Upon being asked whether he would meet with a 
representative of the Israeli Government or a prospective American citizen of the Jewish 
faith who Anderson believed might be “influential with the IG [Israeli Government],” Nasser 
refused, explaining “he would still be a Jew.”  The Americans concluded that Nasser was 
deliberately impeding a peace settlement in the Middle East and perpetuating the tensions in 
order to unite the Arabs under Nasser’s leadership.47  The British were frustrated with 
Nasser’s “double dealing” with the Soviet Union and agreed that the West needed to change 
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their policy towards Egypt and not worry about “alienat[ing] Egypt.”48  Therefore, both 
countries shifted to a new approach, codenamed Project Gama, which consisted of punitive 
actions including cutting aid monies to Egypt and denying their requests for arms sales.
49
  
Most significantly, by mid-July, the United States decided to deny funding for the Aswan 
High Dam project on the Nile River. 
50
  Nasser told journalist M. H. Heikal that America’s 
retraction of funds was “not a withdrawal, it is an attack on the regime and an invitation to 
the people of Egypt to bring it down.”51  One week later, at a rally in Alexandria celebrating 
the fourth year anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, Nasser made a dramatic speech in 
which he announced that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company to use its tolls to 
finance the Aswan Dam construction: “We shall build the High Dam on the skulls of 120,000 
Egyptian workmen who died in building the Suez Canal.”52  Nasser also lambasted 
America’s foreign aid policy as a form of imperialism, with Israel being labelled the “the 
vanguard of imperialism.”53  While Nasser spoke for two and a half hours to a 100,000 
person crowd, Egyptian military personnel seized the offices of the Suez Canal Company and 
froze its assets. 
Although Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal was strictly legal, since owners 
were properly compensated for their shares, the seizure was highly controversial.  The British 
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Government was the canal’s major shareholder, owning 44 percent of the common stock.  
The Canal was also an extremely profitable enterprise with an annual revenue of $25 to $35 
million.  Seventy percent of Western Europe’s oil went through the Suez. 54  However, the 
Suez was viewed as more than a business or a canal.  With the company headquartered in 
Paris and the canal built during the age of imperialism when Europe ruled most of the globe, 
it represented the apogee of Western civilization.  Thus, its loss was presented in apocalyptic 
terms.  British Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd declared that “if Nasser wins or even 
appears to win we might as well as a government (and indeed as a country) go out of 
business.”55  Eden agreed and warned that Nasser “has his thumb on our windpipe.”56 
The French Government immediately compared Nasser’s seizure of the Suez to 
Hitler’s1930s diplomacy.  The day after Nasser’s announcement, French Foreign Minister 
Christian Pineau informed the Americans that France saw Nasser’s action in a similar light 
“to [the] seizure of [the] Rhineland by Hitler.”  If the West did not respond “strongly,” the 
French Government worried that Nasser’s next move would be to grab “all of the Middle 
Eastern pipelines,” leaving Europe dependent on Arab goodwill for its oil supply.57  The 
French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, was hesitant to make such a “banal” comparison, but 
thought that the similarities between Nasser and Hitler were “extremely close” and therefore 
warranted attention.  Although making no reference to Hitler’s antisemitism, Mollet believed 
that Nasser’s “The Philosophy of Revolution” was “a perfect parallel to ‘Mein Kampf’” with 
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regards to the nationalist ideology of both dictators.  Although Egypt’s military power was 
deficient compared with that of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union exerted far more power in 
1956 than it did in 1939.  Thus the Soviet arms deal with Egypt would be considered similar 
to the “Hitler Stalin pact of 1939.”  Concerned about their colonial entanglements in Algeria 
and agitated by their recent memory of German conquest in the Second World War, the 
French were convinced that the “US was embarking on the same course of error by 
appeasement that had been followed toward Hitler in the 1930’s.”58   
The British Government also looked to the diplomacy of the 1930s to understand how 
to deal with Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal.  As a firm opponent of the appeasement of 
Nazi Germany during the 1930s, it was not surprising that British Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden was against allowing Egypt to keep the Canal.  On July 27, the British Cabinet decided 
that they would use force if necessary to undo Nasser’s seizure of the Canal.59  For Eden, 
Nasser’s seizure of the canal was “designed to impress opinion not only in Egypt but in the 
Arab world” with the goal of heading a Muslim Empire allied to the Soviet Union.  In a letter 
to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eden stated that Britain was willing to use military force 
to ensure Nasser’s “removal” and the “installation in Egypt of a regime less hostile to the 
West.”  Although Eden believed that the comparison of Nasser to Hitler was not accurate, 
since Nasser “has no warlike people behind him,” the relinquishing of the Canal to Nasser 
“would be catastrophic,” as the “whole position in the Middle East would thereby be lost 
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beyond recall.”60  It was hoped that international pressure would compel Nasser to relinquish 
the Canal, which in turn would undermine his popular support in Egypt, precipitating the 
downfall of his regime and making a military expedition into Egypt unnecessary.  
Canadians were apprehensive about how the Great Powers would respond to Nasser’s 
provocation, but were also mindful that the nationalization of the Suez had economic 
ramifications.  In particular, Canadians were concerned that Nasser’s nationalization of the 
Suez would affect the price of oil and could exacerbate an already high inflation rate.  Panic 
swept across North America that the disruption in oil production would send inflation 
soaring.  Despite the national focus on inflation, Canadian Jews immediately saw the 
nationalization as further evidence that Nasser was following Hitler’s aggressive road to 
national expansion.  Once again Leon Crestohl made an ardent plea on the floor of the House 
of Commons, insisting that in light of Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal, Canada needed to 
approve the sale of two dozen F-86s to Israel.  He criticized the previous diplomatic efforts 
by Britain and the United States to prop up Nasser and bring Egypt into a Middle Eastern 
defensive alliance, noting that they had created “a Frankenstein.”  Negotiating with Nasser 
was futile since dictators do not abide by the conventions of civilized nations. In fact, 
Crestohl was convinced that Nasser was following the same worrying “pattern of Hitler” and 
his next step would be the invasion of Israel.
61
  
Rabbi Solomon Frank made the same comparison, noting that in 1936, if France had 
responded to the “impending danger created by the presence of Nazi hordes on her 
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immediate border” and invaded Germany, Hitler “would have fallen,” and the tragedy of the 
Second World War would have been avoided.  Although Frank hoped that “the recourse to 
armed intervention will not prove necessary,” he believed that “by far too much is at stake to 
temporize or to appease.”  Only if the West was prepared to use “force as a last resort” would 
peace be secured.
62
 
The fear that Israel might take military recourse against Egypt before Nasser’s newly 
acquired arsenal became operational was being voiced in the U.S. State Department.  
American intelligence also realized that “if the Israelis were to lose hope of obtaining 
Western arms at a time when they still had substantial military superiority, the situation 
would enter a crucial phase.  Israel might then decide on ‘preventive action,’ in a desperate 
effort to destroy Arab military power while there was still time.”63  United States Secretary of 
State Dulles’ plan to prevent a pre-emptive Israeli strike while maintaining good relations 
with the Arab states was to earmark a stash of weapons, primarily F-86 interceptors, in 
Europe that could be flown to Crete and made  available to Israel in case of Arab aggression.  
Code-named Stockpile, the proposal was contingent on American allies, such as Canada, 
selling F-86s to Israel so that their pilots could be trained to fly the aircrafts.
64
   
Canada had decided to permit the sale of Sabre Jets prior to the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal, a decision that was based largely on propping Israel up to discourage it from 
launching a preventative war.  However, Nasser’s unpopular seizure of the Canal had 
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delayed the announcement that the fighter jets would be shipped to Israel.  With the Suez 
Crisis seemingly cooling down and the real possibility that negotiations would drag on for 
months, the Canadian government decided on September 20 to announce its intention to ship 
the F-86s to Israel.
65
  The United Zionist Council of Canada’s official comment was that 
Canada had made “an important contribution to stability and peace” because the jets would 
act as a deterrent and “help overcome the serious imbalance of armed strength which has 
greatly increased the danger of war in the Middle East in recent months.”66  Winnipeg native, 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America graduate, and Toronto Telegram correspondent 
Rabbi Reuben Slonim agreed, praising Canada’s decision to sell the Sabre jets to Israel.  
However, in a speech given in front of Windsor’s Jewish community on October 14, he 
cautioned that Israel’s situation remained dire and that Canadian Jews should buy Israeli 
bonds to support the financial burden caused by Israel’s need to buy defensive military 
equipment.  He also discussed his recent disconcerting interview with Nasser and, according 
to The Windsor Daily Star, recalled that his impression was that this “new Hitler [was] filled 
with hate for the Jewish race.”  If war did break out between Israel and Egypt, he stressed 
that “it would be a war of survival for the Jewish people.”67  
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4.3 Interpreting the Sinai War in light of the Holocaust 
 
Unbeknownst to St. Laurent or the Canadian Jewish community, Nasser’s seizure of the Suez 
Canal caused Britain and France to collaborate with Israel to take military action and retake 
the Suez Canal.  They looked to Israel to launch a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, a move 
that they had been planning since October 1955.  Ben-Gurion had ambitious war aims that 
included not only breaking Egypt’s naval blockade and crushing the Egyptian Army before it 
fully integrated the recently-purchased Soviet weaponry, but what he termed a 
“comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.”  Hoping to precipitate Nasser’s downfall, 
Ben-Gurion envisioned redrawing the Middle Eastern map by chopping off a part of Lebanon 
to establish a Christian state, annexing part of Jordan, and handing the rest to Iraq provided 
they settle the Palestinian refugees in their territory.  Israel would gain security and a peace 
settlement, and the European powers would gain useful allies in the region to secure their oil 
and colonial interests.
68
  From October 22 to 24, 1956, in Sévres, just outside Paris, Ben-
Gurion met with French Prime Minister Guy Mollet and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn 
Lloyd to solve the tricky problem of starting a war without being condemned as aggressors 
by world opinion.  The European powers furthermore did not want to be seen as acting in 
concert with Israel and thereby alienate Arab opinion.  France and Britain asked Israel to 
stage a large-scale raid against Egypt on October 29, drive through the Sinai desert, and 
secure the Suez Canal within twenty-four hours.  Under the pretext of an international police 
force, Britain and France would appeal to both belligerent states to agree to a ceasefire and 
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demand that all military forces withdraw at least ten miles from the Suez Canal.  Nasser 
would presumably refuse these terms, giving Britain and France casus belli against Egypt.  
Thus, the Egyptian threat would be neutralized under the façade of Western democratic 
values. 
On October 29, 1956, Israel launched Operation Kadesh, the pre-emptive strike on 
Egypt.  Israeli paratroopers were dropped 156 miles into the Sinai desert to clear the Mitla 
Pass.  Meanwhile Israeli armour and infantry threaded its way down the east coast of the 
Sinai Peninsula for Sharm el-Sheikh and the Straits of Teran to neutralize the Egyptian 
shipping blockade at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba.  However, the invasion force was soon 
bogged down.  On October 30, the British and French issued their ultimatum calling for the 
withdrawal of military forces along the Suez Canal within twelve hours.  After Nasser 
ignored the threat, French and British forces launched an amphibious assault on Port Said 
and an aerial campaign against Egypt’s airfields.   
World public opinion immediately turned against the warring democracies for 
apparently resorting to imperial gunboat strategies.  The façade that the British and French 
were intervening as part of an international police force quickly crumbled when they called 
for the belligerents to withdraw from the Suez while Israel was still miles away.  Moreover, 
when Britain and France vetoed the American demand for Israel’s immediate withdrawal of 
its forces on October 30 in the Security Council, it was clear that some conspiracy was in 
place.
69
  On November 1, the United States took its demand for a ceasefire to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and tabled Resolution 997, which called for an immediate 
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cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and charged that the Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld report back to the Security Council to recommend “further 
actions as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter.”  In other words, the 
UN could place sanctions on Israel if it did not abide by its ruling.  This resolution was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 2 despite Canada abstaining. 
Britain’s deception was a bitter pill to swallow for Canadians.  The Canadian 
Government shared America’s opinion that Western aggression in the Middle East had lost 
the West the moral high ground.
70
  Dulles phoned Pearson on October 30 and complained 
that Britain and France “undid everything” because “it would be argued, [British and French 
military intervention in Egypt] was comparable to the kind of action which the Russians had 
taken or were accustomed to take in situations which they claimed to be of an emergency 
kind.”71  The Canadian Government worried that the West had undermined its position in the 
Arab world.  L. V. J. Roy, Canada’s Chargés d’affaires in Beirut, reported that “the West has 
appeared to the Arabs as eminently resourceful in tricks, lies, and deceit,” causing the Arabs 
to lose “faith in the West.”72  Canada’s official response to Britian emphasized that there was 
a “danger of a war which might spread,” and also pointed out that the British-French military 
exploits undermined the UN, threatened the unity of the Commonwealth, and risked 
undermining the alliance between Britain and the United States, a relationship that “is the 
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very foundation of our hopes for progress toward a peaceful and secure world.”73  It was 
concern over the Western alliance, not Israel’s imperilled position, which motivated the 
Canadian Government to mediate the crisis.   
Canada’s abstention was a highly controversial diplomatic manoeuvre as many 
conservatives felt that Canada ought to stay in line with the Commonwealth and support 
Britain, which had been a bulwark against illiberal forces since before the Second World 
War.  In the early hours of November 2, Pearson explained that Canada’s decision to abstain 
was because the American resolution did nothing to ensure the preservation of peace 
following the withdrawal of Israel’s forces.  After consulting with American and British 
officials, Pearson introduced Resolution 998, which called for an international police force to 
preserve the peace between Israel and Egypt.  Pearson’s diplomacy permitted Britain and 
France to save face by passing off their supposed policing operation to the UN and to 
withdraw. 
Both the Canadian public and the government were polarized over the war against 
Egypt, but opinion was divided over Canada’s position vis-à-vis Britain, not Israel.  A Gallup 
Poll confined to Toronto found that forty-three percent of Canadians approved of the British 
and French Middle Eastern policy, while forty percent disapproved and only seventeen 
percent had no opinion.
74
 James Eayrs reported that “few events since the second world war 
have aroused so much concern in Canada.”  He recalled “foreign policy being discussed in 
the streets” and the numerous public libraries “reported a run on Colonel Nasser’s The 
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Philosophy of the Revolution.”75  However, Dale Thomson’s description of Canada’s mood 
towards Britain as comparable to one “finding a beloved uncle charged with rape”76 is an 
exaggeration.  Efforts by the Canadian Jewish community to shed light on the antisemitic 
nature of Nasser’s nationalism made Liberals sympathetic to the motives driving Britain’s 
invasion of Egypt.  The problem was not that Britain was defending a democracy in the 
Middle East, but that its duplicitous diplomacy threatened to tear apart NATO and prevented 
a united stand against the Soviet Union in the wake of the Hungarian Uprising.  Conservative 
newspapers across the country were outraged that Canada had abstained on the U.S. 
Resolution rather than vote against the motion and support Britain.
77
 In the government, 
many opposition members on both the left and right many applauded Britain’s willingness to 
confront a dictatorship.  
78
   
Like most non-Jewish Canadians, Canadian Jews were eager to support Israel due to 
its democratic values. Even the pages of Vochenblatt, which had previously criticized Israel, 
began to contain articles that argued that Israel’s preemptive strike was necessary to avert 
extermination.
 79
  While not wholly pardoning Israel’s occupation of the Sinai, Rabbi 
Feinberg was critical of the UN for not forcing the Arabs to agree to a permanent peace 
settlement, thus leaving Israel vulnerable to destruction: “Israel had grounds for believing 
that the only final alternative to a bold move was extinction at the hands of the Arab states 
dominated by a power dictator, appeased by the oil-hungry West and armed by the Soviet 
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Union.”80  Although Mel Shipman was initially torn about whether Israel’s attack was 
justified, he found Feinberg’s analysis convincing.  While he could not “condone aggression” 
and was worried that regional conflict might turn nuclear, Shipman believed that the super 
powers were ultimately responsible for the war.  Particularly “disappointing” was the fact 
that the Soviet Union had been as guilty as the West in not challenging “Arab nationalism’s 
fanatical refusal to accept Israel’s existence.”  For Shipman, it was “obviously Arab 
intransigence” that explained why “every effort at starting basic peace negotiations has 
failed.”  In fact, Shipman admitted that “we progressives have tended to minimize or ignore 
the real threat to Israel inherent in the policies of the Arab leaders.”81  Regular columnist 
Charles Law echoed David Croll’s position that “if your enemy holds a knife to your throat 
and you knock it out of his hands, you can’t be the aggressor.”  Law found that Canadian 
Jews were “incensed at the seemingly callous indifference of the world to Israel’s precarious 
existence in the midst of nations dedicated to her destruction,” and that “it is better Israel 
should stand with friends…than fall alone.”  In other words, since “Israel had every reason to 
fear for her life,” it was better that Israel collude with France and Britain than submit to 
destruction.  Law still hoped that Israel would be able to come to a peace settlement over 
Palestine with the Arab states through the UN.
82
   Although many Canadian Jewish 
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communists still remained loyal to Moscow, they were less eager to present a partisan 
position on the issue.   
The Jewish community in Canada was, on the whole, relieved that Britain and France 
had come to Israel’s aid and had averted a potential second Holocaust.  In the days following 
the pre-emptive strike, they invoked images of the destruction of Europe’s Jewry to justify 
Israel’s pre-emptive strike.  On Saturday morning, November 3, 1956, Rabbi Stuart E. 
Rosenberg got behind his pulpit at Canada’s largest Conservative synagogue, Toronto’s Beth 
Tzedec, and lambasted the Arab states for refusing to recognize the sovereignty of Israel and 
for destabilizing the region through their “ceaseless war” since May 1948.  Rosenberg stated 
that the Arabs had the “the express purpose of annihilating [Israel].”  Egypt’s intentions 
could not be denied, as Arab broadcasts for the past eight years had been “calling for the 
destruction of Israel” and warning Jews that “Egypt will grind you to dust.”  Moreover, such 
language was not just empty rhetoric, since Egyptian-trained “death commandoes” had been 
frequently crossing over Israel’s borders and murdering Jews and “terrorizing children.”  For 
Rosenberg, Egypt’s relationship with Israel was characterized not just by “belligerency” but 
by war: “war by attrition, war by propaganda, war by threat and by death.”  With “little 
Israel, isolated from all the world, given no assurance of mutual defense pacts by any nation, 
large or small, alienated constantly by the Western policies which permitted the arming of 
the Arabs,” it was faced with the terrifying question: “how will we survive in the midst of 
such a hostile sea?”  Rosenberg believed that the Holocaust experience demonstrated that 
Jews had to “battle for the survival of Israel.”  He concluded his sermon by reminding his 
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audience that this was not the first time that the Jews had been faced with a determined 
dictator “bent on Israel’s extermination”:  
while the world stood idly by, millions of Jews were killed or enslaved by the 
power of Hitler.  If people did care, they did little to show it.  While the world 
debated, and while the world said that Hitler had the legal right to do with his 
citizens as he wanted, millions of Jews went to their death.  Israel has now 
taken this tragic, but necessary, step because the world seems again indifferent 
to Israeli blook[d] [sic] and to Israeli lives….The victims of Hitler cannot 
fight back.  They are dead and cold in their graves. But the children, the 
brothers, and the sisters of the victims—they can fight back in self-defense, 
using the natural and moral right of human beings to preserve their own life.
83
 
 
For Rosenberg and many other Jews, the Holocaust was a constant reminder that threats to 
Jewish survival had to be taken seriously. 
As the representative organization for Zionists, the United Zionist Council of Canada 
(UZC) quickly issued a press statement on November 3, 1956 justifying Israel’s attack.  
While they hoped that peace would be restored soon, the statement emphasized that the 
Israeli attack was a necessary response to Nasser’s continued efforts to “destroy Israel.”   
Pointing to the Fedayeen strikes which “sought to terrorize the people of Israel,” the UZC 
claimed that “the avowed aim of Egypt has been to whittle away by these tactics the ability 
of Israel to maintain its own security, until the moment was ripe for united military action 
with Jordan and Syria to resume full-scale hostilities aimed at the destruction of the State of 
Israel.”  Although Israel launched a pre-emptive military strike against Egypt, the UZC 
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cautioned Canadians not to see Israel as the aggressor since it had constantly sought a peace 
settlement.
84
 
Relying on similar argumentation, on November 29 the Jewish community of Calgary 
gathered and adopted a resolution in which they pledged “all possible moral and material 
support to the people of Israel.”  To understand Israel’s military action, Canadians needed to 
understand that Israel’s “very existence” was threatened by Soviet arms flooding into the 
Middle East.  Fedayeen raiders regularly crossed into Israel to murder and sabotage in the 
hope of “undermining her [Israel’s] security and rendering her vulnerable to a concerted 
large-scale invasion.”  With Israel isolated and unable to secure a defensive alliance with any 
state or gain “vital arms necessary for her air and land defence,” Canadians needed to realize 
that Israel’s attack “represents nothing more or less than the exercise of the primary right of 
self-defence available to every people and every nation under international law and 
morality.”85 
Parliamentarian Leon Crestohl was not immune to the hysteria that eclipsed the 
Canadian Jewish community following Israel’s invasion of Egypt.  At a “Demonstration for 
Israel” assembly hosted by Montreal’s Chevra Kadisha-B-nai Jacob Synagogue on 
November 21, Crestohl criticized Canadians who failed to understand that Israel attacked in 
order to protect its citizens from a second Holocaust.  According to reports in Montreal’s 
Gazette, Crestohl propagated the incredible rumor that “huge quantities of potassium cyanide 
and some crematoria had been found by Israeli troops on the Sinai.”  “Well conceived plans” 
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had been formulated by the Egyptians, Crestohl told an astonished audience, “to pour the 
potassium cyanide into the drinking water of Israel” in preparation of a planned military 
assault on Israel on November 15.
86
 
Adding fuel to the hysteria was the threat that the UN would place sanctions on Israel 
if it did not immediately withdraw from Egyptian territory.  Israel had no intention of 
withdrawing if it faced the prospect of renewed Fedayeen attacks and the resumption of an 
Egyptian naval blockade.
87
  The estimated effect of sanctions would devastate Israel.
88
  The 
Israeli Foreign Ministry announced its plan to lay off five percent of civil service 
immediately should sanctions be imposed and implement a massive surtax on upper income 
families, with the high income bracket taxed ninety five percent.
89
  Israel launched a 
propaganda campaign to demonstrate the legitimacy of Israel’s invasion and the necessities 
of delaying withdrawal until its security was guaranteed.  Perhaps the most worrying 
pamphlet published by the Israelis was entitled “Nasser’s Pattern of Aggression,” which 
reproduced and translated a number of Egyptian documents captured by the Israeli armed 
forces. The documents revealed that the Egyptians were preparing a war of extermination in 
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the same vein as that which Hitler had conducted on the Eastern Front in the Second World 
War. As early as February 1956, the commanding officer Liwa Ahmed Salem of Egypt’s 3rd 
Infantry Division was sending directives that training was to prepare “to overpower and 
destroy Israel in the shortest possible time and with the greatest brutality and bestiality in 
battle.” Apparently training pamphlet no. 42, written under the auspices of the Training and 
Education Branch of the Egyptian Army in April 1955, used Nazi Germany’s judenfrei 
philosophy as a model for the anticipated Palestinian war: “Germany convinced herself that 
the Jews are traitors and could not be trusted, and so she expelled them from her land…but 
out of Palestine they could not find any refuge….   The Arab countries continue to proclaim 
their hatred of the Jews and are preparing to drive them out of the Holy Land.  Thus, history 
repeats itself.  The Arabs refuse to leave even a single Jew in Palestine so that the country 
will be all Arab.  Today it is we who are in the first line, preparing ourselves for the battle 
which will end in the annihilation of Israel.”  The Israelis claimed that regularly found among 
the belongings of captured Egyptian officers were Arabic translations of Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf.  The Israeli pamphlet contextualized these findings with the rhetoric being spewed on 
Cairo radio, such as on August 31, 1955, which called on Israel to “ready yourselves: shed 
tears, cry out and weep, O Israel, because the day of your liquidation is near.”  Based on 
these findings, the Government of Israel argued that “the oft-stated Egyptian plan of invading 
Israel and annihilating her was not mere bluff” and therefore justified Israel’s pre-emptive 
strike.
90
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This information confirmed what Canadians Jews had feared, and prompted Canadian 
Jews to lobby their Government to complain about the unfair treatment of the U.N.  The 
Board of Jewish Ministers of Greater Montreal
91
 voiced its “grave concern” over the pressure 
being brought to bear on Israel to withdraw.  They reminded Pearson of the “continued 
impassivity of the United Nations” when Israel was subjected to “the infiltration of groups 
for destructive purposes and the acts of murder,” which had “led to the desperate attempt on 
the part of Israel to protect itself.”  The “code of double moral standards” by the U.N. was 
abhorrent, and they charged Canada with “bespeaking the cause of international justice” to 
“formulate a positive program which will ensure for the State of Israel the security it 
seeks.”92  Similar appeals were sent to Pearson from the CJC and ZOC, taking the stand that 
“it would be immoral to employ the force of sanctions against Israel while leaving Egypt 
which has been in defiance of the United Nations for years free to reassert the irresponsible 
belligerency which is the root cause of the present crisis.”93 Ellsworth Flavelle, National 
Chairman of the Canada-Israel Association, was even more inflammatory in his rhetoric, 
calling the proposed sanctions “an ill-advised and cowardly act.”  “It would mark a 
beginning of the end of freedom of all people on this earth and ring the death knell of all 
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democratic ideals,” Flavelle warned.  “What would befall Israel as a result of such a vote 
would certainly be the fate of every freedom-loving democratic people in the world.”94   
The Canadian Jewish appeal to the public was quite successful, finding many 
sympathetic Canadians who wrote to Pearson and St. Laurent presenting Israel’s justification 
for not returning to the situation prior to their invasion.   Nearly one hundred telegrams were 
sent to Pearson from across Canada demanding that Pearson oppose sanctions against 
Israel.
95
  Ben Nobleman, Vice President of the Trinity Liberal Association in Toronto, was 
one of many Liberals, who found the Jewish case convincing, sending a telegram to Pearson: 
“Canadian public opinion and rank and file Liberals will not support Middle East Munich 
which will sacrifice Israel on alter of Arab appeasement.  Nasser is a communist dictator and 
stooge…Urge Canada to at least abstain on African-Asian resolution in interests of justice 
and democratic principles.”96  Pearson responded that he agreed “how unreasonable it would 
be to ask Israel to withdraw simply to the situation that existed before the recent outbreak of 
fighting,” but that Canada believed Israel’s security would be secured with the UNEF in 
place.
97
 
4.4 Canada’s Response to a Second Jewish Refugee Crisis 
Certainly one of the most significant reasons why the left-wing segment of the 
Canadian Jewish community shifted to support Zionism was the worrying evidence that the 
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Americans were digging up that Nasser was using Israel’s invasion to expunge Jewish life 
from Egypt.  This startling revelation reinforced the notion that the memory of the Holocaust 
was not irrelevant, but an important warning to the West that international antisemitism 
needed to be attacked by the civilized world before its hatred spawned death and destruction 
not just to Jews, but to all peoples who enjoyed freedom.  Rather than hoping that Egyptian 
Jews might continue to survive the persecution, both Canadian and American Jewish 
communities mobilized immediately, and efficiently and accurately uncovered the facts of 
the attack against Egyptian Jews. They sounded the clarion call that Egyptian Jewry was 
being targeted for extermination.  Both communities pressured their respective governments 
to open their doors to Jewish refugees to avoid another Holocaust.  By noting the similarities 
between Nasser’s and Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies, Jewish communities justified Israel’s 
recent military excursion as necessary to avoid a second genocide and argued that 
immediately withdrawing from occupied territory in Egypt would recreate the circumstances 
that led to the necessity of military intervention in the first place.  Jewish discourse, however, 
did not agree with Canadian and American political priorities, which were less concerned 
with the Middle East and more focused on the Hungarian revolt and the fight against 
communism in Europe.  
The American Jewish community first heard of the forced deportation of Egypt’s 
Jews on November 22, 1956 from an “influential leader of the French Jewish community” 
who had it on good authority from a non-Jewish Frenchman who had recently returned from 
Egypt and wished to remain anonymous.  According to this witness, numerous Jews had been 
ordered to leave by November 25 or risk imprisonment in a “desert concentration camp.”  
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When officials from the AJC Paris office question the “Frenchman,” he informed them that 
the Egyptian government had also “sequestered the properties and assets of a number of the 
most important Jews and Jewish firms in Egypt.”98   
The American Jewish Committee immediately launched a fact-finding mission to 
gauge the extent of the anti-Jewish campaign in Egypt.  John Slawson and William Frankel 
went to Naples in early January 1957 to interview Jewish refugees from Egypt.  The refugees 
“fully confirmed the now generally known facts of large-scale economic harassment, 
internment, forced and ‘voluntary’ expulsion of Jews in Egypt.”  Upon hearing the stories 
from refugees, the AJC speculated that Nasser’s strategy bore a striking similarity to the Nazi 
tactics used in prewar Germany and was “calculated to render the situation of Jews in that 
country unbearable and hopeless, and to create, indirectly, an almost hysterical mood of mass 
exodus.”99  Photostatic copies of the sequestration orders were also obtained, giving the AJC 
a clear picture of “the pattern of anti-Jewish measures now being applied by the Egyptian 
government” by the end of November.  The AJC had collaborating evidence that while the 
Egyptians had not issued “decrees of mass expulsion,” they hoped to accomplish as much 
“by imprisoning, expelling, and economically harassing individual Jews.” 100 
The Egyptians had implemented a number of wartime measures that were allegedly to 
prevent a Zionist fifth column from operating in Egypt.  These anti-Jewish measures in 
reality worked to rid Egypt of its Jewish population and in the process seize Jewish property 
inside Egypt.  The process was fourfold: (a) wide ranging discretionary police authority to 
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arrest potential traitors, (b) denaturalization of Egyptian Jews (c) sequestration of Jewish 
property, and finally (d) “voluntary” expulsion.  The purpose of these measures was to have 
Jews leave Egypt without issuing a general deportation order that would be scrutinized by the 
UN.  By manipulating the laws to make Jewish life in Egypt untenable and thus create the 
conditions in which Jews must flee Egypt, Nasser hoped not to lose favour with world public 
opinion.  The rewriting of Emergency Law No. 5333 of 1954, specifically article 3, 
paragraph 7, to authorize “the arrest and apprehension of suspects and those who prejudice 
public order and security,” was used to round up large numbers of Jews without bringing 
charges against them.  By November 7 1956, more than nine hundred Jews were imprisoned 
in the Cairo metropolis alone; less than a month later five hundred Jews were stateless, 
having their citizenship stripped from them.  The Egyptian Government also revised the 
Citizenship Law in order to strip Jews of their rights and liberties more easily.  On November 
22, Egypt amended Article 1 of its Citizenship Law, which defined who qualified as 
“Egyptian,” to exclude “Zionists”: “Neither Zionists nor those against whom a judgment has 
been handed down for crimes of disloyalty to the country or for treason, shall be covered by 
this provision.”  The law continued by stating that “no request for the delivery of a certificate 
of Egyptian nationality will be accepted from persons known as Zionists.”  In other words, 
suspected Zionists who applied for citizenship were denied and citizens who were suspected 
to be Zionists were to be treated in the same way as traitors by having their citizenship 
forfeited.  The assault on Jewish property was also made possible by Military Proclamation 
No. 4, in which article 1 stated that the government could “assume the management of the 
properties of the following persons and institutions: 1) all physical persons who were 
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interned or placed under surveillance in execution of the law relative to the state of siege; 2) 
every company, association, or foundation, whatever its purpose may be, functioning under 
the control of any single person citied above…; 3) all persons who reside outside the 
Republic of Egypt and function under the control of any of the aforementioned person…”   
Not only did this provision deprive Jewish property owners of their livelihood, the first order 
of business once a company was placed under government control was to fire all Jewish 
employees, thereby impoverishing a massive portion of Egyptian Jewry.
101
   
Through depriving Jews of their liberty and property, Egyptian authorities hoped that 
Jews would flee.  The World Jewish Congress estimated that 3,000 Jews had been placed in 
concentration camps by mid-November 1956.  Charges brought against interned Jews ranged 
from having had their lights on during a blackout or spreading false rumors.  The AJC rightly 
noted that as the new citizenship law “gives no definition of the term Zionism, it is obvious 
that the Egyptian authorities can apply it as they will, to the detriment of any Jew they 
choose.” 102  By June 30, 1957, over twenty thousand Jews had been deported, out of a total 
Jewish population of 60,000.  Many of these people were destitute, stateless, having fled with 
just the clothes on their back and 20 pounds of Egyptian currency, which was useless outside 
the Middle East.
103
  Alex Easterman, political secretary of the WJC’s British office, noted 
that Egypt’s anti-Jewish policies “might be thought to be emergency measures taken as a 
result of the conflict with Israel,” but were in fact “the climax of a long period of anti-Jewish 
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moves in Egypt” and were “very reminiscent of the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Nazi 
regime in Germany and the measure taken against the Jews there.”104 
For the Canadian and American Jewish communities, it was hardly a coincidence that 
Egypt’s anti-Jewish tactics bore a resemblance to Nazi Germany’s practices before the “Final 
Solution.”  Reports were circulating that some Nazis who had fled Germany following the 
Second World War had converted to Islam and found sanctuary in Egypt.  The World Jewish 
Congress estimated that 2000 German Nazis were in Egypt by 1957.  A widely distributed 
article in the August 25
th
 issue of Frankfurter Illustrierte contained alarming information that 
the Soviets were siphoning off Nazis in East Germany and shipping them to Egypt through a 
front organization named the “Allkhwan Al Akmaiyah el Arabiyah” [German-Arabic 
Brotherhood].  Leopold Gleim, the former SD-Chief and head of the Department of Jewish 
Affairs in the General Government of Poland during the Second World War, had resurfaced 
as head of Egyptian security forces.  The article also noted the existence of five concentration 
camps within Egypt.  Moreover, attached to the Samara Camp was a medical research facility 
headed by former Nazi doctor Heinrich Willermann, who some speculated was conducting 
medical research on Jewish prisoners.
105
 
The American Jewish community published several pamphlets that presented Nasser 
as a greater threat to Jewish life in Egypt than Hitler had been for Germany’s Jews.  One of 
the most widely distributed was the AJC’s The Black Record: Nasser’s Persecution of 
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Egyptian Jews.  Printed in the early months of 1957 and resembling similarly titled books 
about the Nazi Holocaust, it presented Nasser’s crimes against Jews as parallel to Hitler’s.106  
The AJC believed that the Egyptians’ attack was “patterned on Nazi techniques” and had 
“been conducted with ruthless efficiency and disregard of the minimal moral standards that 
civilized nations embrace.”  However, they also stated that Nasser “has learned from Hitler’s 
example that it cannot afford to ignore world opinion and that it is more expedient to conduct 
its anti-Jewish campaign in a manner that would avoid international notoriety.”  Hence, they 
argued that Nasser was disguising his motivations by insisting that only Zionists who posed a 
security threat were being deported.  For the AJC, the Holocaust provided a warning that 
antisemitism was only the first step taken by dictatorships in their quest for domination: “It 
should be recalled that the Nazi regime struck out first at the Jews and then proceeded against 
other groups.  Similarly, the assault by the Nasser regime on the Jews, its most defenseless 
minority, inaugurates a process which can extend to every group which bars the way to the 
grandiose Pan-Arabic design under Egyptian leadership.”  Just as Hitler sought to create an 
Aryan empire, the AJC believed that Nasser’s ambitions were to create an Arab empire.107 
Because Nasser attempted to disguise his racist persecution of Egyptian Jews as a 
reasonable precautionary wartime act, Jews throughout the diaspora were concerned that 
governments were unaware that Egypt was targeting Jews.  When a consortium of various 
Zionists institutions met under the banner of the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris on 
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January 7, 1957, Jewish advocates around the globe complained that the tragedy befalling 
Egypt’s Jews was not being publicized.  Claude Kelman, vice president of the Fonds Social 
Juif Unifié, the French Jewish welfare agency, “deplored the fact that the Egyptian crisis has 
not been given adequate coverage in the newspapers of France in order to arouse public 
opinion against the indignities which have been committed.”  Political director of the World 
Jewish Congress, Gerhard Riegner worried over what “appears to be a ‘conspiracy of silence’ 
on the entire Egyptian situation.”  With the “United States government…not using its best 
offices in pressuring Nasser to modify his actions against Jews,” Riegner saw the Jewish 
situation in Egypt as “all black”; presumably his pessimistic impression was due to his own 
futile efforts to raise awareness of the impending destruction of Europe’s Jews during the 
Second World War.
108
  Now, nearly fifteen years later, Nasser was “committed to expel Jews 
from Egypt” and was creating the “legal mechanisms” necessary to “achieve this objective.” 
The Paris meeting quickly devolved into a cacophony of “unfriendly remarks made about 
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American Jewish organizations and their somewhat lackadaisical efforts in this matter,” 
according to Fred Baker, the AJC representative in Paris.
109
  Although Baker was able to cool 
down the delegates by highlighting some of the work the AJC had done in recent weeks, all 
were frustrated by the seeming indifference of world opinion to yet another Jewish refugee 
crisis.
110
  Similarly, the WJC was determined to “continue our efforts in all parts of the world 
to break through the shameful cloak of silence behind which an ancient community is being 
liquidated,” and the helped establish the Central Registry of Jewish Losses in Egypt.111   
In fact, Jewish organizations in both America and Canada were furiously attempting 
to prevent a second Jewish catastrophe from occurring in Egypt by advocating that Western 
governments permit entrance to Jews who had already fled from Egypt and demand that 
Nasser cease persecuting Jews.  On November 27, 1956, nearly every major Jewish 
organization in the United States signed a joint appeal to President Eisenhower insisting that 
America needed to act before Jewish corpses began to pile up in Egyptian concentration 
camps.  The letter began by appealing to Eisenhower’s memory of touring concentration 
camp Ohrdruf on April 12, 1945:  
Less than eleven years ago, you were a shocked witness to the consequences 
of racist persecution by the Nazi regime and of man’s inhumanity to man.  
Your words and conduct at that time bespoke the outraged conscience of the 
American people and its determination to prevent the repetition of such 
unspeakable crimes.  In recent days…we have become aware of the Egyptian 
Government’s conduct, which, if unchecked, may lead to a repetition of the 
Hitler era.  Thousands of men, women and children, whose only alleged 
crimes is that they are of the Jewish faith, have been served notice of 
deportation or hurled into internment camps and divested of their possessions. 
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The letter concluded by urging the President to express the American “shock” through its 
Ambassador in Egypt and to send an “immediate warning to the Egyptian rulers that our 
country, our people, and the civilized world generally will not countenance this inhumanity.”  
The appeal was signed by Philip S. Bernstein of the American Zionist Committee for Public 
Affairs, Moise S. Cahn of the National Council of Jewish Women, Maurice N. Eisendrath of 
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Miriam Freund of Hadassah, Israel Goldstein 
of the American Jewish Congress, Naham Goldmann of the Jewish Agency, Philip M. 
Klutznick of B’nai B’rith, and nearly a dozen other organizations.112 
In Canada, panic swept through the Jewish community.  Maurice D. Schouela, a 
volunteer at the Joint Campaign of the Combined Jewish Appeal and the United Israel 
Appeal had family roots in Egypt and consequently received dozens of urgent requests from 
concerned Canadian families who had relatives in Egypt.  On November 29, 1956, Schouela 
contacted Hayes to exclaim that forty people had already reached out to him for help, each 
knowing multiple families destitute and needing rescue, “and the list is growing rapidly.”  
Feeling helpless and seeing the situation spiral out of control, Schouela demanded to see 
Hayes in the next couple days to find out what coordinated plan the CJC was pursuing: “I 
certainly don’t have to tell you how concerned we all are here for the dear relatives left 
behind; and unable to help except to count plainly on your kind co-operation and the good 
graces of the Canadian Government.”113  Over the next several weeks, Schouela contacted 
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Hayes repeatedly, relaying evidence of the Egyptian Government’s assault on Jewish 
liberties for him to pass on to the Canadian Government.  By December 7, Schoula’s 
correspondence had become desperate and he lamented that “The other alternative would be 
[for Egyptian Jews] to live in Egypt, without freedom or livelihood, in the constant fear of 
what the next move of the Egyptian Government will be.  What can we do for these 
Unfortunates?  We must act quickly and give them recomfort and some hope.  Please help 
us----.”114 
 Early requests for the Canadian Government to act and forestall a humanitarian crisis 
precipitated little response.  On November 28, during question period in the House, MP Leon 
Crestohl called on Pearson to “take effective steps to safeguard these people against illegal 
and inhuman treatment before it degenerates to Nazi proportions.”  Pearson agreed that 
reports coming out of the Middle East suggested that Egypt’s 50,000 Jews faced the “gravest 
disaster” and thus could not be ignored.  Pearson therefore instructed the Canadian embassy 
in Cairo to investigate the situation to determine if these reports were valid.
115
 
Saul Hayes hoped Canada might open its doors to Jews fleeing Egypt and sent a 
telegram on December 3 to Deputy Minister Colonel Laval Fortier of the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration asking that they give “sympathetic action” to Egyptian Jewish 
refugees.  Acting Minister and Leader of the Government in the House Walter Harris’ 
response was anything but reassuring.  He remained unconvinced that there was an attack 
against Jews in Egypt. Despite Harris’ claim that “the Government is doing its utmost to 
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ascertain precisely what the situation is in Egypt,” he expressed the belief that the CJC was 
perceiving a pattern of antisemitism where there was none: “the occurrences which cause you 
concern are the outcome of a general anti-foreign feeling following the attack on Egypt and 
are not part of a specific program aimed against Jewish people.”  Clearly unaware of the 
fragile position of the Egyptian Jewish community since Israel’s War of Independence, 
Harris attempted to reassure the CJC by saying: “as you probably know, Egypt has had a 
good record in the matter of treatment of minority groups and anti-Semitism has not been a 
feature of public life in that country.”  Nonetheless, the Immigration Branch stated that it was 
willing to compromise and allow Egyptian Jews who had first-degree relatives in Canada 
“consideration” for immigration, but that it was not “practicable” for Canada to offer 
sanctuary to a significant proportion of the Egyptian Jews in a similar fashion as it was doing 
for Hungary’s rebels.  According to Harris, the situation for refugees in Egypt was 
“somewhat different from that of the Hungarians who fled from their home under desperate 
conditions and have no country to which they might legitimately claim refuge.”  For Harris, 
Jewish refugees should go to Israel.
116
 
 Disturbed that Harris was oblivious to Egypt’s poor track record with regards to 
human rights, especially with regards to Egyptian Jews, Saul Hayes switched to a different 
front and contacted the Department of External Affairs, hoping that the Canadian 
Government would put pressure on the Egyptian Government in the UN to end its 
persecution of Jews.  However, when Hayes phoned External Affairs’ Middle East desk on 
December 11, he learned that the Canadian diplomatic corp was of the same mind as Harris, 
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noting that since “the situation also involves non-Jewish residents of Egypt” there was no 
pattern of antisemitism.  Since Israel’s military invasion of Egypt was to blame for the 
persecution of Egyptian Jews, the “speedy withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt will 
prevent outbursts and anti-Jewish discrimination.”  Canada would not protest in the UN 
against Egypt’s anti-Jewish measures, Hayes was informed, because a protest “might 
aggravate the situation.”117  
The Canadian Government’s dismissal of Egyptian antisemitism contrasted the 
information they were receiving from the Canadian Ambassador in Egypt, E. Herbert 
Norman.  On November 30, he telegraphed Pearson about the “plight of stateless Jews in 
Egypt” with the subject line: “immediate assistance for Jews from Egypt.”  Fearing that 
another refugee crisis was about to emerge, Norman wrote “The purpose of this message is 
simply to stress the urgency of the case for early implementation of any special provision that 
might be made for the admission to Canada of some of these people.” While South Africa 
and Brazil may take some of the refugees, Norman said “we are being literally swamped by 
applicants here and we are also being hard pressed by friendly missions concerning any step 
that the Canadian govt may have decided to take with a view to admitting a number of these 
stateless Jews.”118  Norman’s emphasis on the crisis facing Jews suggests that the Canadian 
government was cognizant of the fact that Nasser’s domestic policies after the outbreak of 
war were directed at the expulsion of Egypt’s Jews and not simply an outpouring of anti-
foreign sentiment.   
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Throughout the winter of 1956 and 1957, Canadian Jews devoted considerable energy 
to learning about the conditions facing Egypt’s Jews, in part to present to the Canadian 
Government.  Saul Hayes got in touch with Canadian freelance journalist Donald R. Gordon, 
who was in Egypt to cover the Suez Crisis, but was also writing for the Jerusalem Post about 
the persecution of Jews.  Gordon revealed the emergence of a “new Gestapo rule,” bent on 
stealing Jewish property and then removing Jews from Egypt.  He was not optimistic that the 
situation would improve and even found it “surprising that open violence has not broken 
out,” though he warned that “it still could.”119  Another valuable source of information was 
Toronto Telegram correspondent Reuben Slonim.  He flew to Cairo in late November 1956 
to investigate reports of Jewish persecution.  Despite being put under surveillance by 
Egyptian authorities and having his phone monitored, he managed to give his trackers the 
slip and visited a synagogue to interview Jewish residents. “With all their precautions, 
officials could not keep from me the answer to a burning question,” Slonim reported in his 
column in the Toronto Telegram, “How are the Jews faring as Egypt’s chief scapegoat? The 
answer was not hard to find. Terror cannot be hidden—one smells it in the air.”120  However 
Slonim was forced to flee Egypt because he felt “his life was in danger.” His observations of 
the Jewish crisis in Egypt and the international situation in the Middle East were in demand 
by many Canadians.  In an address to the Canadian Club in Toronto’s Royal York Hotel, on 
January 7, 1957, Slonim theorized that Nasser was threatening the lives of Egypt’s Jews to 
extract concession from Israel: “Perhaps Nasser means to hold the Jews as hostages in his 
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bargaining with Israel.  If this be so he would be guilty of the dastardly acts of Hitlerism at its 
worst.  Such a cold, cruel act would render him a stench in the nostrils of every decent human 
being.”121  A few months later, Slonim was convinced that Nasser still “intends to eliminate 
Israel,” and reported that Soviet armament shipments to Egypt had resumed.122 
Alongside raising public awareness of the Egyptian Jewish crisis, Canadian Jews also 
instigated intense fundraising campaigns to help bring refugees to Canada and support 
destitute Jews stranded in foreign countries.  The central focus of the United Jewish Relief 
Agencies fundraising campaign was the failure of the West to save Europe’s Jews from 
Hitler’s gas chambers.  Pamphlets called on Canadians to financially support rescue efforts 
before it was too late.   
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Calgary Jewish Welfare Fund, 1957, Campaign pamphlet, Glenbow Museum and Archive 
123
 
  
While the United Israel Appeal’s fundraising goal received a bump in 1956, it increased even 
more for the 1957 campaign in light of the humanitarian crises in Egypt and Hungary.  In 
Toronto, the goal was raised from 2 million to 2.5 million dollars.  Winnipeg’s goal was 
raised by fifty percent.
124
  The Canadian campaign was part of the American United Jewish 
Appeal plan to raise an additional one hundred million dollars to accommodate the needs of 
both Hungarian and Egyptian Jewry.  According to delegates who opened the American UJA 
campaign in November 1956, “this is an hour of consummate peril for hundreds of thousands 
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of Jews overseas, and for the free and democratic people of Israel, who are threatened by 
naked and rampant totalitarians to a degree unmatched since the days of Hitler.”125  
The Egyptian Jewish crisis, in tandem with fear that hatred of Jews was seizing the 
Arab world, helped to draw progressive Jews away from Communism and back into the 
Canadian Jewish Congress’ fold.  To understand Canadian Jewry’s break with communism, 
historians have focused on J. B. Salsberg’s quest to uncover Stalin’s crimes against Jews in 
his later years, which culminated in a personal interview with Khrushchev in August 1956 
and was followed by a series of nine articles in Vochenblatt which outlined the continued 
systematic program to eliminate Jewish culture from the Soviet Union.  These revelations 
have been used to explain the break between Jewish progressives and the Labor-Progressive 
Party.
126
  However, this rift should also be seen in the context of the threat to Jews in the 
Middle East. Following UJPO leadership meetings in Toronto and Montreal, a statement was 
released that outlined the organization’s past failings.  While the UJPO apologized for 
turning a blind eye to the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union, it also noted its 
problematic Zionist perspective: “We recognize that while we have said that we have a 
positive attitude to the State of Israel, we did not demonstrate this in any constructive way in 
the last number of years.  Concern for the State of Israel, and its people, its existence, its 
development, must not in any way be confused with the policies of its government, with 
which one may or may not agree.”127  Morris Biderman, president of the UJPO, sent a letter 
to St. Laurent and Pearson calling for Canada to “demand in no uncertain terms” that Nasser 
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end his policy of Jewish persecution, which “should have no place in a civilized nation.”128  
Even Joshua Gershman, editor of Vochenblatt and one of the few Canadian Jewish 
progressives who remained loyal to the LPP throughout the 1960s and early 1970s in order to 
fight against Soviet antisemitism from within the party, insisted that the persecution of 
Egyptian Jews only served to undermine the Arab nationalist cause: 
We have been generally sympathetic to national movements sweeping the 
Arab world….  But a righteous cause is not license to persecute whole 
communities for the alleged crimes of individuals….  Nasser gives credibility 
to charges his methods border on those of fascism.  We join those 
governments and organizations demanding of the Egyptian government 
respect for human rights and dignity.  A sound basis for peace in the Middle 
East will be so much harder if such inhumanities continue….  No matter how 
Israel came into being, the young Jewish state is here to stay, and must stay 
unless the world would be willing to accede to the expulsion and eventual 
extinction of Israeli Jewry.  The Arab refugee problem can be solved because 
the Arab world is big enough to absorb them.
129
 
   
The creation of a Jewish disaster in Egypt led Gershman to conclude that there was validity 
to Israel’s position that the Palestinian refugee crisis was being perpetuated by the Arab 
states to mobilize the Arab world against the Israeli state.
130
   
In any case, faced with an intransigent Canadian government, Hayes turned to 
Canadian Jewish Congress’s president Samuel Bronfman and requested that he send a letter 
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to Pearson presenting the CJC’s position on Egyptian Jewry.  Bronfman asked Pearson to go 
beyond the official denials of antisemitism from the Egyptian Government “which are known 
by all objective sources to be dust thrown into the eyes of all wishing to enquire into the 
malefactions of its present regime.”  Bronfman explained that Egypt was going to 
extraordinary length of keeping a member of each refugee family hostage to intimidate those 
who had escaped from speaking.  “It is not coincidental that this sounds like a page out of a 
Nazi notebook of terror,” Bronfman explained, since numerous Nazis had found employment 
in Nasser’s regime, including Johann Von Leers.  Bronfman warned that “it is an ineluctable 
conclusion that if the present situation goes unchallenged and unchecked it could well be the 
prelude to a catastrophe, the result of which would be the imperiling of the lives of the entire 
non-Egyptian population of Egypt and which encompass, also, all Jews in Egypt whether 
people born Egyptian, denationalized or stateless.”131  To support Canadian Jewish concerns, 
Bronfman attached a lengthy dossier, containing detailed evidence of the methods Egyptians 
were using to persecute Jews, including an Egyptian sequestration law.
132
 
Regardless of how convincing Bronfman’s rhetoric was, the Canadian government’s 
thinking on the Egyptian-Jewish situation had already changed before they received the 
letter.  While maintaining that Israel could welcome all Egypt’s Jewish refugees, Under 
Secretary for External Affairs, Jules Lesage, asked Pearson on December 20, 1956, the 
question of “whether or not it is to our interest to insist that Jewish refugees should look to 
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Israel for help whether they wish to do so or not.”  One of the stumbling blocks to a peace 
settlement in Palestine was the movement to expand Israel’s border into the West Bank 
towards the Jordan River.  These “active elements in Israel,” according to Lesage, “want as 
rapid an increase of the population as possible in order to justify this expansion of territory.”  
Therefore, Lesage counseled that Canada ought to accept the CJC’s request to sponsor a 
number of Egyptian Jews to enter Canada: “there seems to be something illogical about our 
putting a great deal of effort into the task of bringing peace to the Middle East through the 
United Nations if our immigration policy is based on the assumption that all Jewish refugees 
should go to Israel, whether they wish to do so or not, when we know that the increased 
pressure of immigration to Israel will make the achievement of a peace settlement a longer 
and more costly operation for the United Nations.”  This was especially important if Canada 
was to “lend [its] forces to the United Nations to keep peace in the Middle East.”  Although 
the CJC promise that the settlement would be paid for by CJC helped convince the 
Department of Immigration, this shift in position was also helped by the racial stereotype that 
most of these Jewish refugees will have “above average intelligence.”133  
The following day, a large delegation from the Canadian Jewish Congress and the 
Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS) visited J. W. Pickersgill at the Ministry of Citizenship 
and Immigration.
134
   The delegation was encouraged when the Minister agreed to extend 
refugee status to Jews fleeing Egypt who had relatives in Canada, allowing them immediate 
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admission to Canada provided each refugee passed the security and health inspection.
135
  By 
January 29, Hayes had presented four hundred names to the Immigration Department who 
fell into the prescribed regulations; however, the security regulations meant that refugees had 
to wait “up to two years in a European country” while the checks were completed.136  Despite 
being warned by the RCMP that this requirement was necessary to prevent entry to 
communists, criminals, and “opportunists who just move from one country to the other,”137 
Pickersgill decided to waive these security requirements for immigrants whose relatives had 
lived in Canada for at least two years to expedite the process and take the heat off the 
Department.
138
  However, he remained unwilling to consider any policy that would go 
beyond rescuing Canadian relatives.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Both the Holocaust and Israel dominated Canadian Jewish thought during the 1950s.  Rather 
than seeing the Holocaust as a tragic enigma in German history, Canadian Jewry approached 
Israel and diplomacy in the Middle East from a post-Holocaust mindset.  Canadian Jews 
made crude comparisons between Arab nationalism and Nazi ideology, deriving lessons from 
the Hitler era.  Reinforced by Israeli propaganda, Canadian Jewry became convinced 
throughout the 1950s that Nasser was tacking the same murderous line that Hitler had taken 
fifteen years earlier.  The narrative of Hitler harnessing latent antisemitism within his culture 
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to solidify his own power by using the Jew as a scapegoat for Germany’s woes was presented 
as analogous to Nasser rallying support for Arab nationalism around al Nakba and the 
displacement of Palestinian Arabs.   
The events in the Middle East in the 1950s helped to heal the rift in the Canadian 
Jewish community between former communists who were critical of Israel’s leadership and 
the Canadian Jewish Congress.  With most Canadian Jewish communists breaking their ties 
to Moscow in light of the continued antisemitism within Khrushchev’s administration, the 
anti-Zionist Communist propaganda that Israel was an imperial outpost of American 
capitalism lost some of its luster.   The worrying rumors that Israel would have faced 
extermination had it not colluded with Britain and France to launch a preemptive strike to 
destroy Egypt’s military capabilities won many Canadian Jews over to Israel’s cause.   
Disturbing for Canadian Jewish observers was the West’s response to Nasser’s 
antisemitism and the threat it posed to Israel’s existence.  The notion that the international 
environment and the attitudes of bystanders had changed little since the 1930s, content to 
sacrifice Jews in order to appease dictators to preserve peace, was a constant feature in 
Canadian Jewish circles throughout the 1950s.  It was distressing for Canadian Jews to be 
reminded once again that the democracies would only avert a humanitarian crisis in Israel or 
save Egypt’s Jews if it served their own national interests. Although Canadian Jewry did not 
realize that the Canadian government had decided to sell the F-86s to Israel prior to Egypt’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, the announcement of the sale following the Suez Crisis 
reinforced the view that the Canadian Government would only act to protect democracies 
abroad when British interests were at stake.  While Canadian Jews were at the forefront of 
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promoting international governance that could spread democratic ideas and safeguard 
minority rights, they lacked confidence in the ability of the democracies and the institutions 
of the UN in safeguarding Israel and Jewish minorities in the Middle East.  The dangerous 
position of Jews in Egypt by Nasser’s domestic anti-Jewish measures following the Sinai 
War and the stunted Canadian response to the refugee crisis was a troubling indication that 
racism still persisted in Canadian immigration procedures.  The repeated inability of 
international bodies to breach the sanctum of national sovereignty to stop Egyptian 
rearmament and persecution of minorities pushed Canadian Jewry towards taking a more 
realist diplomatic position, going so far as to advocate for arms shipments to Israel and the 
invasion of Egypt.
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that, contrary to established scholarly opinion, the Holocaust 
was an important feature of postwar Canadian Jewish thought and was crucial to the 
construction of Jewish identity in Canada.  The Canadian Jewish understanding of the 
Holocaust was shaped both by national discourse concerning Nazi atrocities and also by the 
subsequent crises facing Jews in Europe and the Middle East.  Throughout the Second World 
War, Canadian Jews concurred with mainstream opinion that the origins of the Jewish 
Holocaust lay in the Nazis’ anti-liberal philosophy.  The dominant position in Canada was 
that the experience of Nazi Germany warned countries to uphold liberal principles, such as 
the rule of law and individual right.  Canadians also disparaged the European democracies’ 
appeasement policy and the American isolationist stance of the 1930s, which permitted Nazi 
Germany to pursue antagonistic policies against its own citizens and disregard international 
conventions and treaties.  However, with the United States firmly pursuing a policy of 
containment against the illiberal Soviet Union in the postwar years, the danger of revisionist 
states pursuing expansionist foreign policies was seen by Canadians to be somewhat 
mitigated.   
 For Canadian Jews, the Holocaust demonstrated that aspects within liberal society, 
such as racism and antisemitism, were flawed and needed to be expunged to safeguard 
Jewish life abroad.  The Canadian Jewish community sought to present antisemitism not 
merely as a danger to Jews, but to international peace.  They bemoaned the state-centric 
perspective that democracies applied to international relations, which operated to diminish 
  308 
humanitarian considerations in favor of great power politics and national self-interest.  
However, in the early 1950s, as evidence mounted that liberal internationalism was failing to 
gain ground both in the democracies and in the communist states, the Jewish liberal 
establishment pressed for more a realist position. They were determined that Jews never 
again be placed in the vulnerable situation where they had to rely on the moral integrity of 
the West to safeguard them from annihilation.  For communist Canadian Jews, this shift in 
focus constituted an abandonment of the lessons of the Holocaust.  Entrenched alliance 
systems and remilitarization was moving the world in the opposite direction of safeguarding 
Jewish life.  Instead, they called on the West to redouble its efforts to eliminate antisemitism 
and ease international tensions.   
Therefore, Holocaust memory proved contentious in Canada in the decade following 
the Second World War since its lessons were not self-evident, but varied to reflect 
ideological worldviews.  For liberal Jews, the memory of reading about the persecution and 
extermination of Europe’s Jews from the relative safety of North America demonstrated the 
superiority of liberal democracy.  With evidence emerging that antisemitism in the Soviet 
Union and in the Arab states was rife and largely unchecked, many Canadian Jews remained 
convinced that liberalism, despite the failings of democracies, was essential to Jewish 
survival.  Therefore they supported the West’s containment policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  
Dictatorships that exhibited antisemitism needed to be sanctioned immediately to ensure that 
the pattern that led to the extermination of Europe’s Jews was not repeated.  In the absence of 
meaningful reform to international law to protect the rights of minorities groups by breaching 
the sanctity of state sovereignty, Canadian Jewish liberals came to support a more realist 
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agenda regarding West German rearmament.  The Canadian Jewish liberal establishment 
therefore conjoined its campaign for human rights with efforts to strengthen specifically 
Jewish interests, notably through economically and politically supporting Israel.  This 
transition was due to the belief that a pattern was evident in the Holocaust narrative: 
specifically, that dictators exploit antisemitism within society to solidify their power both 
internally and externally, and that Western democracies are more keen to preserve peace than 
risk war to safeguard Jewish communities.   
While communist Canadian Jews agreed with this pattern, they were even less 
inclined to believe that liberal-democracies were interested in protecting Jewish rights 
abroad, as was evidenced by the West’s diplomacy towards Nazi Germany and its abysmal 
record on rescuing Jewish refugees before the outbreak of the Second World War.  
Communist Canadian Jews remained convinced that economic and political expedience 
would always trump humanitarian action and that any humanitarian intervention would cloak 
imperialist aims.  They were not only angered by evidence of leniency within the 
denazification programs of West Germany and the remilitarization of West Germany and its 
integration into NATO in 1954, but they were appalled that Canadian Jewish liberals had 
politicized the Holocaust to support of American foreign policy.  However, by the mid-
1950s, with overwhelming evidence revealing that the Arab states, backed by the Soviet 
Union, were not only hostile to Jews, but threatening to unleash a second genocide 
throughout the Middle East, many Canadian Jewish communists abandoned their political 
allegiance to communism, largely uniting Canadian Jewry in its support for Israel and its 
emphasis on the importance of the Holocaust towards Western civilization. 
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The prevalence of Holocaust memorials today has obscured earlier, more modest, 
efforts to politicize the Holocaust in the late 1940s and 1950s, and have left the impression 
among later observers that the Holocaust was simply unimportant to Canadian Jews in the 
immediate postwar era. Yet it is important not to discount the impact that the Holocaust had 
on the generation of Canadian Jews who were bystanders to it.  Canadian Jewish memorials 
to the sacrifices made by fighters in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising offered templates for 
contemporary Holocaust memorials and were organized to help Canadian Jews grieve.  
Canadian Jews attempted to draw attention to the mass murder of their brethren not only 
because they thought it was important, but also because they believed that the diplomacy and 
policies that led to the extermination of European Jewry contained important lessons that the 
world needed to understand if Jews were to survive.  Realizing that they were fortunate 
enough to emerge from the crisis of the rise of fascism largely unscathed, the Canadian 
Jewish community felt a moral responsibility to safeguard other Jewish communities who did 
not live within liberal democracies.  Rather than feeling guilty for enjoying the safety of 
North America while reading about millions of Jews being murdered in Europe, Canadian 
Jews came to understand that Jewish survival depended on promoting democratic rights 
abroad and at home. 
 In fact, the mass murder of their European brethren served as a lens through which 
Canadian Jewry interpreted their identity, despite the ideological divisions that split the 
community.  During the 1930s and 1940s, Canadian Jews interpreted Hitler’s war against 
European Jewry from a Canadian perspective, as an assault on the liberal order.  Believing 
that Hitler was persecuting and killing Jews to exploit common antisemitic attitudes in 
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Germany, Canadian Jews attempted to change Canada’s restrictive immigration policy in the 
hope of saving Germany’s Jews.  The outbreak of war was interpreted as an expansion of 
Hitler’s domestic antisemitism and racism to the international sphere.  While the Canadian 
government did its utmost to disassociate Canada’s war effort from Hitler’s destruction of 
European Jewry and the mainstream press suggested that the mass murder of European Jews 
was just one of many Nazi crimes against humanity, for Canadian Jews, the struggle to defeat 
Nazi Germany and bring democracy and liberalism to the European continent was 
inseparable in their minds from the effort to rescue Jews from the Holocaust.  Jews trapped in 
Europe were perceived by Canadian Jews as both victims of Hitler’s antisemitism and as 
casualties in the struggle for freedom.  It was within this framework that Canadian Jews 
memorialized the millions of Jews murdered. Not only did this interpretation of the 
Holocaust justify the need for a Jewish state as a bulwark for liberalism in the Middle East, 
but it also helped slow the growing realization that millions of Jews had been senselessly 
murdered.  Due to the perception that they were fully participating in a war to save their 
brethren, Canadian Jews were certainly angry that Canada had not opened its gates to Jewish 
refugees, but there was little guilt to assuage within the Canadian Jewish community.  
Canadian Jews remained proud of their contributions to the war effort.  There was no reason 
to repress memory of the Holocaust. 
 Although Canadian Jewry remained united throughout the Second World War to 
contribute effectively to the defeat of Hitler, ideological divisions within the community 
began to emerge.  While Canadian Jews tended to find meaning in Jewish resistance during 
the Holocaust in the early years of the Cold War and sought to strengthen liberal 
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international institutions to safeguard Jews and other minorities from genocide, by the late 
1940s, this interpretation was coming under attack by left-wing Jews who had lost 
confidence in the West’s ability to safeguard Jews from persecution and even a second 
genocide, as many initiatives to protect human rights—such as the Genocide Convention—
gained little traction.  One of the most substantive effects of the Holocaust was the 
unrelenting anxiety among Canadian Jews that Jews would suffer from another Holocaust.  
This fear became a divisive force amongst Canadian Jews throughout the early postwar era, 
but especially during the German rearmament debate in the late 1940s and early 1950s and 
throughout the Suez Crisis of 1956.  Although the Holocaust was politicized to shift 
Canadian opinion regarding Israel’s defensive needs, the memory of the Holocaust also 
heightened Canadian Jewish emotions and fostered a frenzied atmosphere within Canadian 
Jewish circles. In other words, the Holocaust became a fixture in the thinking of Canadian 
Jews not only because of its importance in transforming Jewish life, but also because 
Canadian Jews believed that it held important lessons for statesmen.  Most significantly, the 
failure of the West to prevent the annihilation of Europe’s Jews became a warning for those 
witnessing renewed threats to Jewish safety in Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the 
1950s that waiting for the United States to sanction action to protect Jews could be too late. 
There are a number of reasons why Holocaust memory in the immediate postwar era 
has been discounted by historians, not least of which is because earlier responses were 
eclipsed by the enormity of Holocaust commemoration within the last thirty years.  First, 
Holocaust discourse was primarily limited to the Jewish community in the decade following 
the Second World War, although Canadian Jews politicized the Holocaust and brought it into 
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the public forum.  It was only in the late 1970s and early1980s that the Holocaust became a 
central feature of North American life.  Major film productions, such as the NBC miniseries 
Holocaust (1978), Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985), Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List 
(1993), Roberto Benigni’s La Vita è Bella (1997), and Roman Polanski’s The Pianist (2002), 
brought visual representations of the Holocaust into Canadian popular culture.
1
  Also, with 
the publication in 1983 of Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s None Is Too Many: Canada 
and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948, the Holocaust gained a Canadian angle that uncovered 
Canada’s complicity in trapping Jews in Europe and challenged the widely-held opinion that 
Canada was a tolerant society.  Moreover, the attention garnered through the highly-
publicized Canadian trials of Holocaust deniers and the corresponding sensationalist media 
coverage led many Canadian Jews to question whether Canadian educational institutions had 
done enough to teach the history of the Holocaust to the next generation of Canadians.
2
  
Revelations of Canadian public apathy towards Jewish refugees in the 1930s and 1940s and 
the belief that Canadians were unaware of the dangers of antisemitism, even the widespread 
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misperception that many Canadians doubted the Holocaust had even happened, compelled 
many Holocaust survivors to share their testimonies for the first time.
3
   
Second, historians have been remiss in discounting early Holocaust memory in 
Canada because the widely held assumption that the Holocaust was first politicized by 
survivors has caused historians to neglect examining the archival records of the existing 
Jewish community.  Certainly from the 1960s onwards, survivors have taken the reigns in 
organizing memorials and by the 1970s they were instrumental in the promotion of 
Holocaust education.  Today the few survivors alive are revered as authoritative voices on 
the dangers of antisemitism and are sought out by the media.  However, during the late 
1940s, most of these survivors were still in Europe, and by the 1950s the thousands who had 
arrived in Canada were often consumed with mundane issues such as finding housing, 
gaining employment, and learning languages.  Tensions over religious practices and the 
financial burdens associated with incorporating proportionately large numbers of destitute 
Eastern European Jews led to some ill-will between the established Jewish community in 
Canada and the newcomers.
4
  Although many survivors participated in Holocaust 
commemorations, they rarely organized these events.  Since survivors were not in a position 
to shape the community’s agenda, it is necessary to examine the actions of the existing 
Jewish community.  These Canadian Jews, who were the first to politicize the Holocaust in 
an effort to protest the apparent rise of antisemitism in West Germany and Arab threats 
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against Israel in the late 1940s and 1950s, were born around the turn of the Century to 
parents who emigrated from Eastern Europe and were steeped in Yiddish culture.
5
 
The third reason why early Holocaust memory is discounted by historians in Canada 
and the United States is because many advocates for human rights deride the culture of 
victimization that appears to consume North American Jewry.  Franklin Bialystok comments 
that “for an ethnic community to wrap its identity around its own victimization is 
counterproductive to its vitality.”6  Centering Jewish identity on the Holocaust fails to 
encapsulate the numerous aspects of Jewish culture and tradition. Other historians have 
questioned the usefulness of the Holocaust in combatting human rights violations, especially 
considering that subsequent genocides have occurred in every decade following the Second 
World War.  Most notably, Peter Novick has questioned whether the Holocaust “sensitizes” 
the public to “lesser atrocities” or whether it makes democracies more inclined “to take a 
more welcoming attitude towards those fleeing oppression.”  He notes that American policy 
regarding genocides and refugee crises remain determined by national self-interest and 
politics.
7
  By presenting Holocaust memory as a modern construct, these historians infer that 
Jews do not feel the need to bind their communal existence to the Holocaust, especially if 
Holocaust memory does little to advance human rights.   
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It is perhaps not surprising that Jewish thought in the postwar era was so consumed 
by the Holocaust when considering that its ties to Eastern European Jewry were closer than 
that of the United States.  Eastern Europe was neither remote in the imaginations of Canadian 
Jews nor of little importance.  Louis Rosenberg’s detailed demographic study of Canadian 
Jewry during the interwar period shows that a high proportion of Canadian Jews traced their 
ancestry to Eastern Europe.  The highest level of Jewish immigration into Canada occurred 
prior to the First World War, between 1880 and 1920, when Jews fled primarily from shtetls 
in “The Pale of Settlement,” in response to political upheaval and pogroms.  Therefore most 
Canadian Jews during the Second World War were either first-generation Jewish Canadians 
who had first-hand memories of the Old World or second-generation Canadians who still had 
relatives in Eastern Europe.  In 1931, 50.7% of the 156,726 Canadian Jews had been born 
outside of the British Empire and the United States.
8
  Although this percentage had shrunk 
between the turn of the century and the 1930s, as more Canadian Jews were born in Canada 
and Jewish immigration dried up thanks to the Great Depression and antisemitic immigration 
restrictions of the 1930s, Jewish immigrants in Canada from Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, and 
Romanian Jewish immigrants tended to have a “much higher” birth rate than Canadian-born 
Jews, rapidly orientating the Jewish community away from German and Dutch towards 
Eastern Europe roots.  Of Canadian Jews born outside of the country in the 1930s, over a 
quarter were born in Russia and another fifteen percent were born in Poland. Over half of all 
Polish Jews in Canada during the 1930s lived in Toronto.
9
 These trends in the ancestral ties 
of Canadian Jewry were fairly consistent until the 1950s since Jewish immigration to Canada 
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during the late 1930s and throughout the Second World War were minimal.  With Canadian 
Jewish families so closely connected to Eastern Europe, it makes sense that they kept a keen 
eye on developments under Nazi rule and did not forget the familial losses they experienced 
when the war concluded. 
While it is true that the word “Holocaust” was not a term regularly used in Canada 
during the 1940s and even 1950s to describe the Nazi judeocide, the ideas that would 
epitomize the Holocaust had their origin in the discourses of the immediate postwar era, 
specifically in the notion of sacrifice.  Geoff Eley has probed the etymology of the word 
‘holocaust’ and found that its roots are religious, deriving from the Hebrew word olah, which 
was translated into the Greek holokaustos in the third century BC to mean a “totally burnt” 
sacrifice to God.
10
  Since the Nazis were clearly not “sacrificing” European Jews in a 
religious offering to God but murdering them, some Holocaust thinkers have suggested that 
the employing of a religiously-loaded term like ‘Holocaust’ is an effort to separate the Jewish 
annihilation from other genocides, making it unique and incomprehensible. As Elie Wiesel 
has written, “the universe of concentration camps, by its design, lies outside if not beyond 
history.  Its vocabulary belongs to it alone.”11  Other historians have rejected such efforts, 
noting that the placing of the Holocaust outside of history strips it of practical lessons to be 
applied in the prevention of genocide and racism.  This has led historians to argue that the 
emphasis on religious sacrificial connotations within the term ‘Holocaust’ are misplaced, 
noting that the word was used popularly prior to the Second World to denote massive 
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destruction due to war.
12
  However, this thesis illustrates that Canadian Jewry came to see the 
destruction of European Jewry during the Second World War as an unwitting sacrifice made 
first by the Western democracies in their vain attempt to preserve the peace by appeasing 
Hitler in the 1930s, and then as the supreme sacrifice by world Jewry for the cause of 
defeating Nazism and bringing liberalism to Europe.  Subsequent crises surrounding the 
fragility of the Jewish diaspora and insecurity of Israel were hardened by the sentiment that 
Jews should never again be placed in a position to sacrifice themselves to the interests of 
national great power politics. 
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